Abstract
In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to keep apart the very different roles that systems of spheres can play. Nozick’s sensitivity account turns out to be closer to the stability analysis of knowledge (versions of which I identify in Plato, Descartes, Klein and Lehrer) than one might have suspected.
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Rott, H. Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief into Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61, 469–493 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9287-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9287-1