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Index of Implicit Power as a Measure of Reciprocal Ownership

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Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((TCCI,volume 9760))

Abstract

The multitude of existing forms of business organization (e.g. limited liability company, private partnership, joint stock company, etc.) and the possibilities of relationships and interactions between them call for the need to recognise individual components of these forms as elements influencing the group decision-making process. Among the many possible ways to assess this impact are so-called power indices, including the implicit index proposed here as a means of measuring of power in reciprocal ownership structures.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This non-linearity often allows control company operations without holding a qualified majority of shares.

  2. 2.

    According to commercial codes some of these relationships are considered illegal in many countries, depending on their form and/or extent.

  3. 3.

    This comes directly from the definition of a weighted game.

  4. 4.

    The analysis of the application of classical power index for similar situations is found in Gambarelli, Owen (1994) and Leech (2002). The latter in particular also presents empirical analysis of the situation of minority shareholders in UK companies.

  5. 5.

    This is a classic Johnston power index.

  6. 6.

    In such instances Gambarelli and Owen (1994) take into account only individual shareholders. In our opinion the fact that majority shareholders tend to implement their policy by appointing board members and/or certain other CEOs bestows a certain independence on companies and thus should be included in the calculation of power.

  7. 7.

    We do not observe such situations in reality, either.

  8. 8.

    This assumption also means that the majority (the winning coalition) must hold at least 11 shares.

  9. 9.

    Kim (2008) presents an interesting discussion on this issue.

  10. 10.

    The values of shares shown in Fig. 2 have been approximate for convenience.

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Mercik, J., Łobos, K. (2016). Index of Implicit Power as a Measure of Reciprocal Ownership. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_8

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