Abstract
We consider situations in which shares ofn firms are held by the samen firms as well as by individual investors. The probelm is to determine the actual control of the firms by the individual investors.
In part 1, we develop the mathematical model, and explain the basic notions of clutter and of effective reduction. In part 2 we introduce the idea of a consistent reduction, prove existence of such, and show the relation between consistent and effective reductions. In part 3 we introduce multilinear extensions and show how these can be used to calculate the effective and consistent reductions. Several examples are worked out in detail.
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References
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Gambarelli's research was supported by the MURST of Italy (Grants 40 and 60). Owen's research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 9116416. This collaboration was made possible by GNAFA of the National Research Council (Italy) which financed Owen's visits to Bergamo.
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Gambarelli, G., Owen, G. Indirect control of corporations. Int J Game Theory 23, 287–302 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242945
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242945