Abstract
This paper studies conscription and possible resistance to it as an extensive form game. The draft resistance game is played in three stages. The volunteer stage consists of a call for volunteers and its possible fulfillment. In case of a shortfall of volunteers, the remaining players enter the resistance formation stage, during which a resistance movement may take shape. In the conscription stage, conscripts are called up and the resistance carries out an agreed upon threat. The paper characterizes the class of perfect equilibria for this game. Also studied are institutional variations, such as the payment of commutation fees. The theory is illustrated with data drawn from the Civil and Vietnam War.
The author wishes to thank M. Ali Khan, C.M. Kahn, E. van Damme, R. KcKelvey, E. Ostrom, R. Selten, R. Spector and S. Stowe for helpful comments. This research was supported in part by a stipend from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gardner, R. (1991). Resisting the Draft a Perfect Equilibrium Approach. In: Selten, R. (eds) Game Equilibrium Models IV. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8_6
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