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Game Equilibrium Models IV

Social and Political Interaction

  • Book
  • © 1991

Overview

Editors:
  1. Reinhard Selten

    1. Institut für Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

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Table of contents (14 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XI
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  2. Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

    • Reinhard Selten
    Pages 1-2

  3. Introduction to Volume IV: “Social and Political Interaction”

    • Rudolf Avenhaus, Werner Güth
    Pages 3-6

  4. Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection

    • Werner Güth, Reinhard Selten
    Pages 7-40

  5. Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?

    • Jan Potters, Frans van Winden, Michael Mitzkewitz
    Pages 41-63

  6. The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium

    • Reinhard Selten, Jonathan Pool
    Pages 64-87

  7. Resisting the Draft a Perfect Equilibrium Approach

    • Roy Gardner
    Pages 88-102

  8. Altruism in Social Dilemmas — Failure to Catch It in a Parameter

    • Dirk Wendt
    Pages 103-123

  9. The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature

    • Barry O’Neill
    Pages 124-149

  10. Balance of Power in a Parlor Game

    • R. Selten
    Pages 150-209

  11. Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach

    • Roy Gardner, Werner Güth
    Pages 210-228

  12. The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance

    • Werner Güth
    Pages 229-255

  13. Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions

    • Rudolf Avenhaus, Werner Güth, Reiner K. Huber
    Pages 256-288

  14. Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces

    • Rudolf Avenhaus, Werner Güth, Reiner K. Huber
    Pages 289-318

  15. Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information

    • Rudolf Avenhaus, Akira Okada, Shmuel Zamir
    Pages 319-361

  16. Back Matter

    Pages 362-363
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Keywords

About this book

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

    Reinhard Selten

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