Abstract
Collective decision making by people who, as humans, are merely quasirational is subject to influences of substantively irrelevant features of the decision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences change through competition and learning.*
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References
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Albers, W., Laing, J.D. (1991). Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatial Games. In: Selten, R. (eds) Game Equilibrium Models III. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08110-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-07367-4
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