Game Equilibrium Models III

Strategic Bargaining

  • Reinhard Selten

Table of contents

About this book

Introduction

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.

Keywords

Evolution Spieltheorie Wirtschaftstheorie economics equilibrium evolutionary processes evolutionäre Prozesse game theory incomplete information modeling nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie non-cooperative game theory

Editors and affiliations

  • Reinhard Selten
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für Gesellschaft- und WirtschaftswissenschaftenUniversität Bonn, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung IBonn 1Germany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-08110-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-662-07367-4
  • About this book