Zusammenfassung
Die unerwartete und unaufgeforderte russische Aggression in der Ukraine im Februar 2022 hat deutlich gemacht, wie dringend notwendig es ist, die allgemeinen Annahmen über postkommunistische Länder zu aktualisieren. Der Krieg hat die Unzulänglichkeit der für westliche Demokratien verwendeten Begriffe und Konzepte zur Beschreibung, zum Verständnis und zur Vorhersage der Entwicklungen in den „hybriden“ Regimen Osteuropas und der ehemaligen UdSSR offenbart. Magyar und Madlovics plädieren nachdrücklich für ein Vokabular und eine Grammatik, die auf die Besonderheiten des postkommunistischen Blocks zugeschnitten sind. In diesem kompakten Begleitbuch zu dem 800 Seiten starken Werk The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes (CEU Press, 2020) entwickeln sie in 120 Thesen einen konzeptionellen Rahmen mit (1) einer Typologie postkommunistischer Regime und (2) einer detaillierten Darstellung idealtypischer Akteure und der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Phänomene in diesen Regimen.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Schmitter und Karl, „The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists“.
- 2.
Kopecký und Mudde, „What Has Eastern Europe Taught Us about the Democratization Literature (and Vice Versa)?“
- 3.
Carothers, „The End of the Transition Paradigm“.
- 4.
Cassani, „Hybrid What?“
- 5.
Offe, „Political Corruption“.
- 6.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
- 7.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations.
- 8.
Katzenstein, Civilizations in World Politics.
- 9.
Szűcs, „The Three Historical Regions of Europe“.
- 10.
Hale, Patronal Politics.
- 11.
Ryabov, „The Institution of Power&Ownership in the Former U.S.S.R.“
- 12.
Kornai, The Socialist System.
- 13.
Bokros, Accidental Occidental.
- 14.
Magyar, Stubborn Structures.
- 15.
Levitsky und Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
- 16.
Kornai, „The system paradigm revisited“.
- 17.
Eisenstadt und Roniger, „Patron – Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange“.
- 18.
Klíma, Informal Politics in Post-Communist Europe.
- 19.
Fisun, „Neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet Eurasia“.
- 20.
Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?
- 21.
Holcombe, Political Capitalism.
- 22.
Szelényi und Szelényi, „Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe“.
- 23.
Markus, „The Atlas That has Not Shrugged“.
- 24.
Weber, Economy and Society.
- 25.
Nureev, „Power-Property as a Path-Dependence Problem“.
- 26.
Minakov, „Republic of Clans“.
- 27.
Kryshtanovskaya und White, „Inside the Putin court“.
- 28.
Weber, Economy and Society.
- 29.
Szabó, A jó kommunista szilárdan együtt ingadozik a párttal.
- 30.
Baez-Camargo und Ledeneva, „Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin?“, 63.
- 31.
Jancsics, „From Local Cliques to Mafia State“.
- 32.
Åslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism.
- 33.
Fishman, „Rethinking State and Regime“.
- 34.
„The Rise of Kleptocracy [Special section]“.
- 35.
Bach und Gazibo, Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond.
- 36.
Wedel, „Clans, cliques and captured states“.
- 37.
Chehabi und Linz, Sultanistic Regimes.
- 38.
Vahabi, „A Positive Theory of the Predatory State“.
- 39.
Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals.
- 40.
Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, 55.
- 41.
Wade, „The Developmental State“.
- 42.
Choi, „Industrial Policy as the Engine of Economic Growth in South Korea: Myth and Reality“.
- 43.
Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs.
- 44.
Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection.
- 45.
Shlapentokh und Woods, Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society.
- 46.
Vörös, „Hungary’s Constitutional Evolution During the Last 25 Years“.
- 47.
Wright, „Understanding Class“.
- 48.
Pakulski und Waters, „The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society“.
- 49.
Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia.
- 50.
Collins.
- 51.
Minakov, „Republic of Clans“.
- 52.
Petrov, „Putin’s Neo-Nomenklatura System and its Evolution“.
- 53.
Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State.
- 54.
Földi, „A római család jogi rendje [The legal order of the Roman family]“.
- 55.
Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works.
- 56.
Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
- 57.
Graber, Levinson, und Tushnet, Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?
- 58.
Okara, „Sovereign Democracy“.
- 59.
Shilling, „‘People’s democracy’ in soviet theory‐I“.
- 60.
Murphy, „Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy“.
- 61.
Schmitter und Karl, „What Democracy Is.. and Is Not“.
- 62.
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
- 63.
Ryabov, „The Reasons for the Rise of Populism in Developed Countries and Its Absence in the Post-Soviet Space“.
- 64.
Müller, What is populism?
- 65.
Weber, Economy and Society.
- 66.
Dobson, The Dictator’s Learning Curve.
- 67.
Scheppele, „Autocratic Legalism“.
- 68.
Madlovics und Magyar, „Populism as a Challenge to Legal-Rational Legitimacy“.
- 69.
Haraszti, „Illiberal State Censorship“.
- 70.
Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda.
- 71.
Ripp, „The Opposition of the Mafia State“.
- 72.
Naím, „Missing Links“.
- 73.
Minzarari, „Disarming Public Protests in Russia“.
- 74.
Hoffman, The Oligarchs.
- 75.
Hale, Patronal Politics, 66–76.
- 76.
Escribà-Folch, „Accountable for what?“
- 77.
White und Hill, „Russia, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe“.
- 78.
Huskey, „A Framework for the Analysis of Soviet Law“.
- 79.
Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State, 117–122.
- 80.
Frye, Property Rights and Property Wrongs.
- 81.
Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?
- 82.
Mizsei, „The New East European Patronal States and the Rule-of-Law“.
- 83.
Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works, 60.
- 84.
Szilágyi, „Kompromat and Corruption in Russia“.
- 85.
Gessen, Words Will Break Cement.
- 86.
Savage, „The Russian National Guard“.
- 87.
Politkovskaya, A Russian Diary.
- 88.
Kis, „Demokráciából autokráciába [From Democracy to Autocracy]“.
- 89.
Olson, Power And Prosperity.
- 90.
Scheppele, „Autocratic Legalism“.
- 91.
Karl, „The Hybrid Regimes of Central America“.
- 92.
Madison, „Federalist No. 51“.
- 93.
Vörös, „A ‚Constitutional‘ Coup in Hungary between 2010–2014“.
- 94.
Hale, Patronal Politics, 76–80.
- 95.
Gerlach, Color Revolutions in Eurasia.
- 96.
Pop-Eleches und Robertson, „After the Revolution“.
- 97.
Bunce und Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries.
- 98.
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
- 99.
Hale, Patronal Politics, 84–85, 178–306.
- 100.
Mearman, Berger, und Guizzo, What Is Heterodox Economics?
- 101.
Holcombe, „Make Economics Policy Relevant“.
- 102.
Holcombe, Political Capitalism.
- 103.
Jancsics, „“A Friend Gave Me a Phone Number”“.
- 104.
Hellman, Jones, und Kaufmann, „Seize the state, seize the day“.
- 105.
Kornai, „Hidden in an Envelope: Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors in Hungary“.
- 106.
Polanyi, Ökonomie und Gesellschaft.
- 107.
Kornai, The Socialist System, 90–109.
- 108.
Szelényi und Mihályi, Rent-Seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality.
- 109.
Stigler, „The Theory of Economic Regulation“.
- 110.
North, Wallis, und Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 112.
- 111.
Rojansky, „Corporate Raiding in Ukraine“.
- 112.
Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection, 62.
- 113.
Madlovics und Magyar, „Post-Communist Predation“.
- 114.
Vahabi, The Political Economy of Predation.
- 115.
Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works, 142.
- 116.
Holcombe, Political Capitalism.
- 117.
Csanádi, Self-Consuming Evolutions.
- 118.
Heilmann, China’s Political System.
- 119.
Bauer, „Investment Cycles in Planned Economies“.
- 120.
Csanádi, „Systemic Background of Local Indebtedness and Investment Overheating during the Global Crisis in China“.
- 121.
Zhu, „Corruption Networks in China: An Institutional Analysis“.
- 122.
Heilmann, „4.8. ‚Cadre Capitalism‘ and Corruption“.
- 123.
Zhu, „The Rise and Fall of Ruling Oligarchs“.
- 124.
Heilmann, China’s Political System, 228–29.
- 125.
Mayfair, „Guanxi (China)“.
- 126.
Granovetter, „The Strength of Weak Ties“.
- 127.
Barabási, Linked.
- 128.
Müller und Strøm, Policy, Office, Or Votes?
- 129.
Csepeli, „The Ideological Patchwork of the Mafia State“.
- 130.
Norris und Inglehart, Cultural Backlash.
- 131.
Granville, „‚Dermokratizatsiya‘ and „Prikhvatizatsiya“ “.
- 132.
Laclau, On Populist Reason.
- 133.
Pappas, Populism and Liberal Democracy.
- 134.
Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 50.
- 135.
Anderson und Albini, „Ukraine’s SBU and the New Oligarchy“.
- 136.
Shlapentokh und Woods, Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society, 128–30.
- 137.
„ГAйзepгEйт [Gaizergate]“.
- 138.
Csaba, Válság-gazdaság-világ [Crisis-Economy-World].
- 139.
Gros, „From Transition to Integration“.
- 140.
Antonova, „Ex-IKEA Boss Bares Russia’s ‚Chaotic Reality‘“.
- 141.
Scheiring, The Retreat of Liberal Democracy.
- 142.
Chayes, Thieves of State.
- 143.
Stephenson, „It Takes Two to Tango“.
- 144.
Cooley und Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders.
- 145.
Gaddy und Ickes, „Russia’s Dependence on Resources“; Franke, Gawrich, und Alakbarov, „Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States“.
- 146.
Karl, „Understanding the resource curse“.
- 147.
Vahabi, „The Resource Curse Literature as Seen through the Appropriability Lens“.
- 148.
Tóth und Hajdu, „Cronyism in the Orbán Regime“.
- 149.
Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State; Magyar und Vásárhelyi, Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State.
- 150.
Petrov, Lipman, und Hale, „Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance“.
- 151.
Levitsky und Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 14.
- 152.
Magyar und Madlovics, The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes, 622–634.
- 153.
Hale, Patronal Politics, 87–88.
Literatur
„The Rise of Kleptocracy [Special section]“. Journal of Democracy 29, Nr. 1 (2018): 20–95.
Anderson, Julie, und Joseph L. Albini. „Ukraine’s SBU and the New Oligarchy“. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 12, Nr. 3 (1999): 282–324.
Antonova, Maria. „Ex-IKEA Boss Bares Russia’s ‚Chaotic Reality‘“. The Moscow Times, 25. März 2010. http://old.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/ex-ikea-boss-bares-russias-chaotic-reality/402494.html.
Åslund, Anders. Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019.
Bach, Daniel C., und Mamoudou Gazibo. Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. Routledge, 2011.
Baez-Camargo, Claudia, und Alena V. Ledeneva. „Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania“. Slavonic & East European Review 95, Nr. 1 (2017): 49–75.
Banfield, Edward C. Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Underlining edition. New York: Free Press, 1967.
Barabási, Albert-László. Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2002.
Bauer, Tamás. „Investment Cycles in Planned Economies“. Acta Oeconomica 21, Nr. 3 (1978): 243–60.
Bokros, Lajos. Accidental Occidental: Economics and Culture of Transition in Mitteleuropa, the Baltic and the Balkan Area. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2013.
Bunce, Valerie J., und Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. 1 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Carothers, Thomas. „The End of the Transition Paradigm“. Journal of Democracy 13, Nr. 1 (2002): 5–21.
Cassani, Andrea. „Hybrid What? Partial Consensus and Persistent Divergences in the Analysis of Hybrid Regimes“. International Political Science Review 35, Nr. 5 (1. 0 2014): 542–58.
Chayes, Sarah. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. W. W. Norton & Company, 2015.
Chehabi, Houchang E., und Juan J. Linz. Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
Choi, Young Back. „Industrial Policy as the Engine of Economic Growth in South Korea: Myth and Reality“. In The Collapse of Development Planning, herausgegeben von Peter J. Boettke, 231–55. New York; London: NYU Press, 1994.
Collins, Kathleen. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Collins, Kathleen. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Cooley, Alexander A., und John Heathershaw. Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2017.
Csaba László. Válság-gazdaság-világ: Adalék Közép-Európa három évtizedes gazdaságtörténetéhez (1988–2018) [Crisis-economy-world: Additions to the economic history of the last three decades of Central Europe (1988–2018)]. Budapest: Éghajlat Könyvkiadó, 2018.
Csanádi, Mária. „Systemic Background of Local Indebtedness and Investment Overheating during the Global Crisis in China“. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 13 (2015): 147–74.
Csanádi, Mária. Self-Consuming Evolutions: A Model on the Structure, Self-Reproduction, Self-Destruction And Transformation of Party-State Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary, and China. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2006.
Csepeli, György. „The Ideological Patchwork of the Mafia State“. In Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar und Júlia Vásárhelyi, 27–40. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2017.
Dobson, William J. The Dictator’s Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy. New York: Anchor, 2013.
Eisenstadt, S. N., und Louis Roniger. „Patron—Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange“. Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, Nr. 1 (1980): 42–77.
Escribà-Folch, Abel. „Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004“. Democratization 20, Nr. 1 (2013): 160–85.
Fishman, Robert M. „Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy“. World Politics 42, Nr. 3 (April 1990): 422–40.
Fisun, Oleksandr. „Neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet Eurasia“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 75–96. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Földi, András. „A római család jogi rendje [The legal order of the Roman family]“. Rubicon, Nr. 3–4 (1997). http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/a_romai_csalad_jogi_rendje/.
Friedrichs, David O. Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime In Contemporary Society. 4 edition. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2009.
Frye, Timothy. Property Rights and Property Wrongs: How Power, Institutions, and Norms Shape Economic Conflict in Russia. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Gaddy, Clifford G., und Barry W. Ickes. „Russia’s Dependence on Resources“. In The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy, herausgegeben von Michael Alexeev und Shlomo Weber, 309–40. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Gerlach, Julia. Color Revolutions in Eurasia. London: Springer, 2014.
Gessen, Masha. Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot. New York: Riverhead Books, 2014.
Graber, Mark A., Sanford Levinson, und Mark V. Tushnet, Hrsg. Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Granovetter, Mark. „The Strength of Weak Ties“. American Journal of Sociology 78, Nr. 6 (1. Mai 1973): 1360–80.
Granville, Johanna. „‚Dermokratizatsiya‘ and Prikhvatizatsiya“: the Russian kleptocracy and rise of organized crime“. Demokratizatsiya 11, Nr. 3 (2003): 449–58.
Gros, Daniel. „From Transition to Integration: The Role of Trade and Investment“. In The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism over Communism, herausgegeben von Anders Åslund und Simeon Djankov, 233–50. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014.
Hale, Henry E. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Haraszti, Miklós. „Illiberal State Censorship: A Must-have Accessory for Any Mafia State“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 371–84. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Heilmann, Sebastian, Hrsg. China’s Political System. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Heilmann, Sebastian. „4.8. ‚Cadre Capitalism‘ and Corruption“. In China’s Political System, herausgegeben von Sebastian Heilmann, 226–34. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Hellman, Joel S, Geraint Jones, und Daniel Kaufmann. „Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies“. Journal of Comparative Economics 31, Nr. 4 (1. 0 2003): 751–73.
Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press, 1970.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Primitive Rebels. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965.
Hoffman, David E. The Oligarchs: Wealth And Power In The New Russia. Revised, Updated ed. edition. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011.
Holcombe, Randall G. „Make Economics Policy Relevant: Depose the Omniscient Benevolent Dictator“. The Independent Review 17, Nr. 2 (2012): 165–76.
Holcombe, Randall G. Political Capitalism: How Economic and Political Power Is Made and Maintained. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Huskey, Eugene. „A Framework for the Analysis of Soviet Law“. The Russian Review 50, Nr. 1 (1991): 53–70.
Jancsics, Dávid. „“A Friend Gave Me a Phone Number”: Brokerage in Low-Level Corruption“. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 1, Nr. 43 (2015): 68–87.
Jancsics, Dávid. „From Local Cliques to Mafia State: The Evolution of Network Corruption“. In Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar und Júlia Vásárhelyi, 129–47. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2017.
Karl, Terry Lynn. „The Hybrid Regimes of Central America“. Journal of Democracy 6, Nr. 3 (1. Juli 1995): 72–86.
Karl, Terry Lynn. „Understanding the resource curse“. In Covering Oil: A Guide to Energy and Development, herausgegeben von Svetlana Tsalik und Anya Schiffrin, 21–27. New York: Open Society Institute, 2005.
Katzenstein, Peter J., Hrsg. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. London; New York: Routledge, 2010.
Kis, János. „Demokráciából autokráciába: A rendszertipológia és az átmenet dinamikája [From Democracy to Autocracy: Regime Typology and the Dynamics of Transition]“. Politikatudományi Szemle 28, Nr. 1 (2019): 45–74.
Klíma, Michal. Informal Politics in Post-Communist Europe: Political Parties, Clientelism and State Capture. 1 edition. Routledge, 2019.
Kommersant. „Гaйзepгeйт [Gaizergate]“, 20. September 2015. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2814839.
Kopecký, Petr, und Cas Mudde. „What Has Eastern Europe Taught Us about the Democratization Literature (and Vice Versa)?“ European Journal of Political Research 37, Nr. 4 (1. Juni 2000): 517–39.
Kornai, János. „Hidden in an Envelope: Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors in Hungary“. In The Paradoxes of Unintended Consequences, herausgegeben von L. Dahrendorf und Y. Elkana. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000.
Kornai, János. „The system paradigm revisited“. Acta Oeconomica 66, Nr. 4 (1. 0 2016): 547–96.
Kornai, János. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Kryshtanovskaya, Olga, und Stephen White. „Inside the Putin court: A research note“. Europe-Asia Studies 57, Nr. 7 (1. 0 2005): 1065–75.
Laclau, Ernesto. On Populist Reason. London ; New York: Verso, 2005.
Ledeneva, Alena V. How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. New York: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Ledeneva, Alena. Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Levitsky, Steven, und Lucan Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Madison, James. „Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments“. In The Federalist Papers, von Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, und John Jay, 317–21. herausgegeben von Clinton Rossiter und Charles R. Kessler, 1 edition. New York, NY: Signet, 2003.
Madlovics, Bálint, und Bálint Magyar. „Populism as a Challenge to Legal-Rational Legitimacy: The Cases of Orbán and Trump“. Social Research: An International Quarterly 88, Nr. 4 (2021): 827–55.
Madlovics, Bálint, und Bálint Magyar. „Post-Communist Predation: Modeling Reiderstvo Practices in Contemporary Predatory States“. Public Choice 187 (2021): 247–73.
Magyar, Bálint, Hrsg. Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Magyar, Bálint, und Bálint Madlovics. The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes: A Conceptual Framework. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2020.
Magyar, Bálint, und Júlia Vásárhelyi, Hrsg. Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State. Budapest: CEU Press, 2017.
Magyar, Bálint. Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. Budapest: CEU Press, 2016.
Markus, Stanislav. „The Atlas That has Not Shrugged: Why Russia’s Oligarchs are an Unlikely Force for Change“. Dædalus – Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 146, Nr. 2 (2017): 101–12.
Markus, Stanislav. Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Mayfair, Yang. „Guanxi (China)“. In The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, herausgegeben von Alena Ledeneva, Volume 1:75–79. UCL Press, 2018.
Mearman, Andrew, Sebastian Berger, und Danielle Guizzo, Hrsg. What Is Heterodox Economics? Conversations with Leading Economists. Routledge, 2019.
Minakov, Mikhail. „Republic of Clans: The Evolution of the Ukrainian Political System“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 217–45. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Minzarari, Dumitru. „Disarming Public Protests in Russia: Transforming Public Goods into Private Goods“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 385–411. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Mizsei, Kálmán. „The New East European Patronal States and the Rule-of-Law“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 531–610. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Murphy, Walter F. „Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy“. In Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, herausgegeben von Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Steven C. Wheatley, und Melanie Beth Oliviero, 3–25. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Müller, Jan-Werner. What is populism? University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
Müller, Wolfgang C., und Kaare Strøm, Hrsg. Policy, Office, Or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Naím, Moisés. „Missing Links: What Is a GONGO?“ Foreign Policy, Nr. 160 (2009): 95–96.
Norris, Pippa, und Ronald Inglehart. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, und Barry R. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Nureev, Rustem. „Power-Property as a Path-Dependence Problem: The Russian Experiance“. Paper presented at the 24th Annual Conference of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE). Krakow, 2012.
Offe, Claus. „Political Corruption: Conceptual and Practical Issues“. In Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition, herausgegeben von János Kornai und Susan Rose-Ackerman, 77–99. Political Evolution and Institutional Change. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2004.
Okara, Andrey. „Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?“ Russia in Global Affairs 5, Nr. 3 (2007): 8–20.
Olson, Mancur. Power And Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist And Capitalist Dictatorships. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.
Pakulski, Jan, und Malcolm Waters. „The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society“. Theory and Society 25, Nr. 5 (1996): 667–91.
Pappas, Takis S. Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Petrov, Nikolay, Maria Lipman, und Henry E. Hale. „Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin“. Post-Soviet Affairs 30, Nr. 1 (2014): 1–26.
Petrov, Nikolay. „Putin’s Neo-Nomenklatura System and its Evolution“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 179–215. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Polanyi, Karl. Ökonomie und Gesellschaft. 1. Aufl. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft. Frankfurt (am Main) : Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch-Verl., 1979.
Politkovskaya, Anna. A Russian Diary: A Journalist’s Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin’s Russia. London: Random House Publishing Group, 2009.
Pomerantsev, Peter. This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2019.
Pop-Eleches, Grigore, und Graeme Robertson. „After the Revolution“. Problems of Post-Communism 61, Nr. 4 (2014): 3–22.
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Ripp, Zoltán. „The Opposition of the Mafia State“. In Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar und Júlia Vásárhelyi, 575–609. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2017.
Rojansky, Matthew A. „Corporate Raiding in Ukraine: Causes, Methods and Consequences“. Demokratizatsiya; Washington 22, Nr. 3 (Summer 2014): 411–43.
Ryabov, Andrey. „The Institution of Power&Ownership in the Former U.S.S.R.: Origin, Diversity of Forms, and Influence on Transformation Processes“. In Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Post-Communist Regimes, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar, 415–35. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2019.
Ryabov, Andrey. „The Reasons for the Rise of Populism in Developed Countries and Its Absence in the Post-Soviet Space“. In Populism as a Common Challenge, herausgegeben von Claudia Crawford, Boris Makarenko, und Nikolay Petrov, 37–46. Moscow: Political encyclopedia, 2018.
Savage, Patrick. „The Russian National Guard: An Asset for Putin at Home and Abroad“. American Security Project, 0 2017. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Ref-0208-Russian-National-Guard.pdf.
Scheiring, Gábor. The Retreat of Liberal Democracy: Authoritarian Capitalism and the Accumulative State in Hungary. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
Scheppele, Kim Lane. „Autocratic Legalism“. University of Chicago Law Review 85, Nr. 2 (2018): 545–83.
Schmitter, Philippe C., und Terry Lynn Karl. „The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?“ Slavic Review 53, Nr. 1 (1994): 173–85.
Schmitter, Philippe C., und Terry Lynn Karl. „What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not“. Journal of Democracy 2, Nr. 3 (1991): 3–16.
Shilling, H. Gordon. „‘People’s democracy’ in soviet theory‐I“. Soviet Studies 3, Nr. 1 (Juli 1951): 16–33.
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, und Joshau Woods. Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, und Joshau Woods. Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Stephenson, Svetlana. „It Takes Two to Tango: The State and Organized Crime in Russia“. Current Sociology 65, Nr. 3 (1. Mai 2017): 411–26.
Stigler, George J. „The Theory of Economic Regulation“. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, Nr. 1 (1971): 3–21.
Szabó Miklós. A jó kommunista szilárdan együtt ingadozik a párttal: Előadások a kommunista pártok történetéről és a fekete–piros-fehér-zöld színre festett sztálinizmusról [The Good Communist Firmly Fluctuates with the Party: Lectures on the History of Communist Parties and the Black–Red-White-Green Stalinism]. Herausgegeben von Jankó Attila. JATEPress Kiadó, 2013.
Szelényi, Iván, und Péter Mihályi. Rent-Seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality: The Top 20%. Pivot. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Szelényi, Iván, und Szonja Szelényi. „Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction“. Theory and Society 24, Nr. 5 (1995): 615–38.
Szilágyi, Ákos. „Kompromat and Corruption in Russia“. In Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic’s Handbook, herausgegeben von Stephen Kotkin und András Sajó, 207–31. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2002.
Szűcs, Jenő. „The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An outline“. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29, Nr. 2/4 (1983): 131–84.
Tóth, István János, und Miklós Hajdu. „Cronyism in the Orbán Regime: An Empirical Analysis of Public Tenders, 2005–2021“. In Dynamics of an Authoritarian System: Hungary, 2010–2021, von Mária Csanádi, Márton Gerő, Miklós Hajdu, Imre Kovách, István János Tóth, und Mihály Laki, 230–74. Budapest–Vienna–New York: CEU Press, 2022.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. „A Positive Theory of the Predatory State“. Public Choice 168, Nr. 3 (1. September 2016): 153–75.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. „The Resource Curse Literature as Seen through the Appropriability Lens: A Critical Survey“. Public Choice 175, Nr. 3 (1. Juni 2018): 393–428.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. The Political Economy of Predation: Manhunting and the Economics of Escape. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Volkov, Vadim. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. 1 edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
Vörös, Imre. „A ‚Constitutional‘ Coup in Hungary between 2010–2014“. In Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State, herausgegeben von Bálint Magyar und Júlia Vásárhelyi, 41–68. Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2017.
Vörös, Imre. „Hungary’s Constitutional Evolution During the Last 25 Years“. Südosteuropa 63, Nr. 2 (2015): 173–200.
Wade, Robert H. „The Developmental State: Dead or Alive?“ Development and Change 49, Nr. 2 (2018): 518–46.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An outline of interpretative sociology. Herausgegeben von Guenther Roth und Claus Wittich. University of California Press, 1978.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An outline of interpretative sociology. Herausgegeben von Guenther Roth und Claus Wittich. University of California Press, 1978.
Wedel, Janine R. „Clans, cliques and captured states: rethinking ‘transition’in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union“. Journal of International Development 15, Nr. 4 (2003): 427–40.
White, Stephen, und Ronald J. Hill. „Russia, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The Referendum as a Flexible Political Instrument“. In The Referendum Experience in Europe, herausgegeben von Michael Gallagher und Pier Vincenzo Uleri, 153–70. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996.
Wright, Erik Olin. „Understanding Class: Towards an Integrated Analytical Approach“. American Sociological Review 67, Nr. 6 (2009): 832–53.
Zhu, Jiangnan. „Corruption Networks in China: An Institutional Analysis“. In Routledge Handbook of Corruption in Asia, herausgegeben von Ting Gong und Ian Scott, 27–41. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2017.
Zhu, Jiangnan. „The Rise and Fall of Ruling Oligarchs: Fighting “Political Corruption” in China“. China Review 22, Nr. 2 (2022): 49–79.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 Der/die Autor(en), exklusiv lizenziert an Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Magyar, B., Madlovics, B. (2023). Der begriffliche Rahmen: 120 Thesen. In: Postkommunistische Regime. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40729-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40729-2_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-40728-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-40729-2
eBook Packages: Social Science and Law (German Language)