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Neue Märkte, neue Risiken

New markets, new risks Empirical evidence regarding the corruption risk of SMEs operating abroad

Empirische Evidenz zum Korruptionsrisiko für den international aktiven Mittelstand

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Mittelständische Unternehmen

Part of the book series: ZfB Special Issue ((ZFB,volume 4/2013))

Zusammenfassung

Basierend auf der Argumentationslogik des verhandlungstheoretischen Ansatzes analysiert der vorliegende Beitrag, (1) wie häufig mittelständische Unternehmen im Ausland mit Korruption konfrontiert werden, (2) wie häufig diese informelle Zahlungen unter der Hand leisten, wenn dies von ihnen gefordert wird, und (3) welche Höhe diese Zahlungen haben. Die Schätzungen erfolgen mittels diverser Regressionsmodelle anhand eines originären Datensatzes international aktiver Schweizer Unternehmen aller Größen und Branchen. Im Gegensatz zur Mehrzahl der existierenden Studien zur Inlandskorruption, zeigen die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Untersuchung, dass die Unternehmensgröße und die Eigentümerstruktur im Fall der Auslandskorruption keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf das Korruptionsrisiko eines Unternehmens haben. Gleichzeitig macht die große Anzahl an Unternehmen, die im Ausland Bestechungsgelder bezahlt, deutlich, dass auch der international tätige Mittelstand von Korruptionsrisiken unmittelbar betroffen ist und entsprechende Präventionsmaßnahmen ergreifen muss.

Abstract

Based on the concepts of the bargaining theory this paper analyzes how frequently SMEs are confronted with corruption when operating abroad, how frequently they make informal payments if requested, and how high these informal payments are. We estimate several regression models for a unique data set of internationally active Swiss firms with different sizes and from different industries. In contrast to earlier findings on domestic corruption, the results of this study show that company sizes as well as ownership structure do not have a significant influence on the foreign corruption risk. At the same time, the large number of firms, which make bribery payments abroad, proves that internationally active SMEs are severely affected by corruption risks and need to take precautionary measures.

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Petra Moog Peter Witt

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Hauser, C., Kronthaler, F. (2014). Neue Märkte, neue Risiken. In: Moog, P., Witt, P. (eds) Mittelständische Unternehmen. ZfB Special Issue, vol 4/2013. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04092-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04092-5_3

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