Abstract
Simple games are a most succinct description of the power structure induced by the decision procedures, focusing on winning — i.e. all-powerful — coalitions.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
S. Barbera’, B. Dutta (1982): “Implement ability via Protective Equilibria,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 49–65.
S. Barbera’, B. Dutta (1986): “General, Direct and Self-implementation of Social Choice Functions via Protective Equilibria,” Mathematical Social Sciences 11, 109–127.
S. Barbera’, M. Jackson (1988): “Maximin, Leximin, and Protective Criterion: Characterizations and Comparisons,” Journal of Economic Theory 46, 34–44.
D. S. Bernheim (1986): “Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environments,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88, 473–488.
A. Brandeburger, E. Dekel (1986): “On an Axiomatic Approach to Refinements of Nash Equilibrium,” University of Cambridge Economic Theory Discussion Paper no. 104.
P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, E. Maskin (1979): “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility,” Review of Economic Studies 46, 185–216.
C. D’Aspremont, B. Peleg (1988): “Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Representations of Committees,” Social Choice and Welfare 5, 261–279.
B. Dutta (1980): “Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework,” Econometrica 48, 447–456.
B. Dutta (1984): “Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms,” Econometrica 52, 1151–1166.
J. A. Ferejohn, D. M. Grether, R. D. McKelvey (1982): “Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions,” Review of Economic Studies 49, 439–446.
R. Holzman (1986): “The Capacity of a Committee,” Mathematical Social Sciences 12, 139–157.
L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler (1978): “Construction of Oucome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria,” Econometrica 46, 1447–1474.
E. Kalai, D. Samet (1984): “Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games,” Internetional Journal of Game Theory 13, 129–144.
E. Kalai, D. Samat (1985): “Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality,” International Journal of Game Theory 14, 41–50.
E. Kohlberg, J. F. Mertens (1986): “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,” Econometrica 54, 1003–1037.
E. Maskin (1977): “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,” Mimeo, M.I.T.
R. D. McKelvey: “Game forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences,” Social Choice and Welfare 6, 139–156.
J. Moore, R. Repullo (1988): “Subgame Perfect Implementation,” Econometrica 56, 1191–1220.
H. Moulin (1983): The Strategy of Social Choice,” North Holland, Amsterdam.
K. Nakamura (1979): “The vetoers in a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences,” International Journal of Game Theory 8, 55–61.
T. Palfrey, S. Srivastava (1986): “Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies,” Mimeo, Carnegie-Mellon University.
B. Peleg (1984): “Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees,” C.V.P., Cambridge.
B. Peleg (1987): “Cores and Capacities of Compound Simple Games,” Social Choice and Welfare 4, 307–316.
E. Van Damme (1987): “Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria,” Springer, Berlin Heidelberg.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Vannucci, S. (1991). Noncooperative Capacities of Simple Games. In: Ricci, G. (eds) Decision Processes in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 353. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45686-2_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53592-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45686-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive