Abstract
A central question in group decision theory is the existence of a simple mechanism that necessarily leads to Pareto optimal outcomes despite noncooperative behavior of the participants. It is shown that the multistage unanimity game is such a mechanism if we assume that the non-cooperative players end at an equilibria which is symmetric and persistent.
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This research was partly supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-8208880).
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Kalai, E., Samet, D. Unanimity games and Pareto optimality. Int J Game Theory 14, 41–50 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770226
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770226