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The Role of Investor Networks in Transnational Corporate Governance

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Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law

Abstract

Charlotte Villiers, writing on The Role of Investor Networks in Transnational Corporate Governance, focuses on the role of shareholders in transnational governance, particularly through institutional mechanisms such as the UN Principles for Responsible Investment. Shareholders enjoy particular salience in corporate governance but their role is limited by problems such as confusion over their fiduciary position, resource and information deficits, regulatory uncertainty, and a persistently short-term, profit oriented perspective. Networking has the potential to overcome some of these problems and the UN PRI has had a positive influence, but a fully transformative contribution requires engagement with and active participation of citizens and non-shareholder experts. Such involvement is necessary for a genuinely democratic and legitimate international governance system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a balanced account that sets out the benefits and the evils brought about by large companies in a globalized context see Stiglitz (2006), especially chapter 7, pp. 187–210.

  2. 2.

    King and Pearce (2010), p. 252.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    For a discussion of the power of the modern corporation and its ability to work in association with the bureaucracy, see Galbraith (1970).

  5. 5.

    Scherer and Palazzo (2008).

  6. 6.

    See the website at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHR2012.aspx. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  7. 7.

    Cadman (2010); Haufler (2001), p. 1.

  8. 8.

    See Ruggie (2003) and further Ruggie (2004).

  9. 9.

    Waddock (2008).

  10. 10.

    Ibid., p. 87.

  11. 11.

    Overdevest (2004), p. 192.

  12. 12.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 155, citing King (2008).

  13. 13.

    Stoker (1998).

  14. 14.

    Gray (2009).

  15. 15.

    Scholte (2008).

  16. 16.

    Andonova et al. (2009), p. 53.

  17. 17.

    For an early discussion on shareholders acting collectively as a social movement in the context of corporate control see Davis and Thompson (1994).

  18. 18.

    King and Pearce (2010), p. 257.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    For an overview of the theoretical role of institutional investors see e.g. Gillan and Starks (2003).

  21. 21.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 153.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p. 152.

  23. 23.

    Gillan and Starks (2003) above.

  24. 24.

    Cadbury Committee Review (1992).

  25. 25.

    Myners Review (2000, 2001).

  26. 26.

    Sandberg (2011), p. 143.

  27. 27.

    Sparkes (2002), p. 4.

  28. 28.

    Hawley and Williams (2005).

  29. 29.

    Seitchik (2007).

  30. 30.

    Hebb et al. (undated). On shareholder salience see Gifford (2010). See also Mitchell et al. (1997).

  31. 31.

    Hebb et al. (undated).

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Arjaliès (2010), p. 59.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., pp. 59–60.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 60.

  40. 40.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 155, citing Reid and Toffel (2009).

  41. 41.

    Sjostrom (2008), p. 150.

  42. 42.

    Sparkes and Cowton (2009), p. 49.

  43. 43.

    See Waddock (2008); O’Rourke (2003), pp. 229–230.

  44. 44.

    Gray (2009), p. 7.

  45. 45.

    Sørensen and Pfeifer (2011), p. 60.

  46. 46.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 153.

  47. 47.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 154, citing O’Rourke (2003).

  48. 48.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), pp. 153–154.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 153, citing Vogel (1978).

  50. 50.

    Renneboog et al. (2008).

  51. 51.

    Haigh and Hazelton (2004).

  52. 52.

    Wen (2009). See also Guyatt (2005), pp. 142–144.

  53. 53.

    This is clearly articulated in a number of statements as well as policy documents. See e.g., Black (2010). See also World Economic Forum (2011), p. 11, and UNEP FI and UN PRI (2011).

  54. 54.

    Generally, in such textbooks, shareholder wealth is defined as the discounted value of after-tax cash flows paid out by the firm; the stream of dividends aid to the shareholders. See e.g. Copeland et al. (2005), pp. 19–20. Others define shareholder wealth as being measured by stock price, which is safeguarded against the manipulation possible for accounting profits. See e.g. Boatright (2008), pp. 190–191. However, stock price is also influenced by a variety of factors beyond management’s control, such as investor psychology and market irrationality. Stock price may reflect the preferences of shareholders with little stake in the firm and thus may not be a good guide for managing a firm in the long run. Other terminology representing shareholder wealth include the ‘blissful shareholder model’, and the ‘extended balance sheet model’ (Boatright 2008).

  55. 55.

    Wen (2009).

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Boatright (2008), pp. 121–122.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., p. 122.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., p. 123.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 123.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., pp. 132–134.

  63. 63.

    Wen (2009), citing Ingley and Van Der Walt (2004), p. 535.

  64. 64.

    Richardson and Cragg (2010), p. 32.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 32.

  66. 66.

    Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005).

  67. 67.

    Ibid., p. 13. For a further progressive view of the fiduciary duty see Hawley et al. (2011).

  68. 68.

    See, for example, the observation by UNEP FI that some investors remain uncertain about how they may exercise their discretion to consider ESG issues: UNEP FI (2009), p. 64.

  69. 69.

    See e.g. in the UK the case of Cowan v Scargill [1985] 1 Ch 270.

  70. 70.

    Woods and Urwin (2010), p. 15.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., p. 3. See also Richardson (2009).

  72. 72.

    Villiers and Mahönen (2014).

  73. 73.

    See UNEP FI/UN PRI, Universal Ownership (2011), p. 38.

  74. 74.

    Sørensen and Pfeifer (2011), p. 67.

  75. 75.

    Scholte (2008).

  76. 76.

    Baccaro and Mele (2011), p. 452.

  77. 77.

    Bendell and Ellersiek (2009), p. 2.

  78. 78.

    Ruggie (2002).

  79. 79.

    Bendell and Ellersiek (2009), p. 9.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Baccaro and Mele (2011), pp. 452 and 462.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., p. 465.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., p. 453.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., p. 10.

  85. 85.

    Hebb et al. (undated).

  86. 86.

    Baccaro and Mele (2011), p. 464.

  87. 87.

    Letter from Wolfgang Engshuber, Chair of UN PRI, in UN PRI Annual Report 2012.

  88. 88.

    Most recent PRI annual list of signatories, November 2012, available at http://www.unpri.org/press/pri-publishes-annual-lists-of-new-and-delisted-signatories/. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  89. 89.

    Sievänen et al. (2012), p. 1.

  90. 90.

    Gond and Piani (2013).

  91. 91.

    Kahler (2009), pp. 4–5.

  92. 92.

    Podolny and Page (1998).

  93. 93.

    UN PRI Annual Report 2012.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    See interview with the Executive Director of the UN PRI, James Gifford, in UN PRI Annual Report 2012, p. 6.

  96. 96.

    Gray (2009).

  97. 97.

    The PRI has created a new framework for requiring mandatory disclosure of some indicators from 2013. Failure to report could result in being publicly delisted from the Initiative. Other than this there are no sanctions for non-compliance with the principles. The UN PRI relies on reputational risks as an incentive to ensure active compliance by signatories.

  98. 98.

    Hebb et al. (undated).

  99. 99.

    Gray (2009).

  100. 100.

    Clark and Crawford (2012). See also Cho et al. (2006).

  101. 101.

    Clark and Crawford (2012), p. 171.

  102. 102.

    Macleod and Park (2011).

  103. 103.

    UNEP FI and UN PRI Joint document 2011.

  104. 104.

    For doubts on the delivery of the promises of SRI see Schepers and Sethi (2003), pp. 11–32.

  105. 105.

    MacLeod and Park (2011), p. 56.

  106. 106.

    Letter, Wolfgang Engshuber, Chair, UN PRI, UN PRI Annual Report 2012.

  107. 107.

    Foreword to UN PRI Annual Report 2012.

  108. 108.

    Ibid.

  109. 109.

    Boatright (2008), p. 124.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., 125.

  111. 111.

    Sjostrom (2008), p. 146.

  112. 112.

    O’Rourke (2003), p. 237.

  113. 113.

    Ibid.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    See further Clapp (2005), p. 31.

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Welker and Wood (2011), p. S65.

  118. 118.

    Richardson and Cragg (2010), p. 21.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., p. 36.

  120. 120.

    Kahler (2009), pp. 12–13.

  121. 121.

    Bull et al. (2004), pp. 486–488.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., pp. 492–494.

  123. 123.

    See further Andonova (2010).

  124. 124.

    See e.g. Slaughter (2004).

  125. 125.

    Ibid., p. 9.

  126. 126.

    Strange (2000), p. 149.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., p. 154.

  128. 128.

    Caporaso and Madeira (2012), p. 97.

  129. 129.

    Ibid., p. 97.

  130. 130.

    See Pitts III (2009), note 107, citing Friends of the Earth 2002 at http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/business/2002/0802type2.htm. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  131. 131.

    See further McGrew (2000).

  132. 132.

    Monbiot (2003), p. 1.

  133. 133.

    Singer (2004), p. 144.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., p. 146.

  135. 135.

    Monbiot (2003), p. 22.

  136. 136.

    Ibid., 75.

  137. 137.

    Andonova (2010).

  138. 138.

    Bexell et al. (2010), pp. 90–91.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., p. 91.

  140. 140.

    Ibid.

  141. 141.

    Ibid.

  142. 142.

    Caporaso and Madeira (2012), p. 93.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., p. 95.

  144. 144.

    Ibid., p. 97.

  145. 145.

    Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin define democracy in terms of representative democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy: See Bexell et al. (2010). See further on representative democracy: Dahl (1967); on participatory democracy see Pateman (1970); Barber (2003). On deliberative democracy see Fishkin (1991) and Habermas (1996).

  146. 146.

    Ibid., p. 122.

  147. 147.

    Bexell et al. (2010), pp. 86–87.

  148. 148.

    Ibid.

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    Ibid.

  151. 151.

    Caporaso and Madeira (2012), p. 96.

  152. 152.

    Pitts III (2009), p. 335.

  153. 153.

    Dickens (2004), p. 148.

  154. 154.

    Ibid.

  155. 155.

    Ibid., p. 163.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., p. 164.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., p. 165.

  158. 158.

    Della Porta and Diani (2006), p. 9.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., p. 21.

  163. 163.

    King and Pearce (2010), pp. 254–256.

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

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  1. Bristol University Law School, Wills Memorial Building, Queens Road, Bristol, BS8 1RJ, UK

    Charlotte Villiers

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  1. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Mark Fenwick

  2. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Steven Van Uytsel

  3. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Stefan Wrbka

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Villiers, C. (2014). The Role of Investor Networks in Transnational Corporate Governance. In: Fenwick, M., Van Uytsel, S., Wrbka, S. (eds) Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41212-7_13

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