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Article 6 [Fundamental Rights – The Charter and the ECHR]

(ex-Article 6 TEU)

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Abstract

Art. 6 TEU is the cornerstone of fundamental rights protection in the Union. It contains the “three-tier architecture” of Union fundamental rights: Art. 6.1 TEU forms the framework for the integration of the EUCFR into EU primary law , Art. 6.2 TEU envisages accession of the Union to the ECHR, and Art. 6.3 TEU refers to fundamental rights as general principles of Union law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 11; Winkler, in Mayer and Stöger (2011), Art. 6 EUV, para 2; Stumpf, in Schwarze et al. (2009), Art. 6 EUV para 1; for a general overview of different aspects of fundamental rights protection in the EU cf. e.g. Jarass (2005); Zucca (2008); Kühling (2009); Mayer, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Grundrechtsschutz und rechtsstaatliche Grundsätze; Bleckmann (2011).

  2. 2.

    Blanke (2012), p. 163; Pernice (2008), p. 240.

  3. 3.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 2, is critical of this endeavour.

  4. 4.

    Cf. European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 4.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 15.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Knecht, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Preamble of EUCFR para 4.

  7. 7.

    1951 ECSC Treaty; 1957 EEC Treaty.

  8. 8.

    Cf. in particular Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Cie v High Authority of the ECSC (ECJ 4 February 1959); Joined Cases, 36, 37, 38–59 and 40-59/58, Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH et al. v High Authority of the ECSC (ECJ 17 July 1959).

  9. 9.

    Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt (ECJ 12 November 1969).

  10. 10.

    Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 17 December 1970).

  11. 11.

    European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79.

  12. 12.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) Case 2 BvL 52/71 (29 May 1974), BVerfGE 37, 221; an English translation is available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=588, accessed 10 July 2012.

  13. 13.

    Italian Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale), Decision No. 183/73, Foro italiano, 1974, I, 314; for an English translation cf. Oppenheimer, A. (Ed., 1994). The Relationship between European Community law and National Law: The Cases. Volume I. Cambridge: Grotius Publishing, p. 629.

  14. 14.

    Haltern (2007), para 1030 et seq.; cf. Chalmers et al. (2011), p. 232 et seq.; Stumpf, in Schwarze et al. (2009), Art. 6 EUV para 12.

  15. 15.

    Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission (ECJ 14 May 1974) para 2.

  16. 16.

    Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v The Minister for the Interior (ECJ 28 October 1975) para 32.

  17. 17.

    Case C-299/95, Friedrich Kremzow v Austria (ECJ 29 May 1997) para 14; cf. in that respect Weiß (2011), p. 77 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Case 136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission (ECJ 26 June 1980); Case C-249/86, Commission v Germany (ECJ 28 May 1989).

  19. 19.

    Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE et al. v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis et al. (ECJ 18 June 1991); Case C-250/06, United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium SA et al. v Belgium (ECJ 13 December 2007).

  20. 20.

    Case C-117/01, K.B. v National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health (ECJ 7 January 2004).

  21. 21.

    Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005).

  22. 22.

    Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (ECJ 13 December 1979).

  23. 23.

    Case C-344/08, Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach (ECJ 16 July 2009).

  24. 24.

    Case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission (ECJ 17 December 1998) para 21.

  25. 25.

    For an extended overview cf. for instance Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 21 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the Protection of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, O.J. C 103/1 (1977).

  27. 27.

    For details on the genesis of the EUCFR cf. e.g. De Búrca (2001), p. 126; Bernsdorff and Borowsky (2002); Barriga (2003).

  28. 28.

    Cf. e.g. recital 3, 4 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 831/2002 of 17 May 2002 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 322/97 Community Statistics, concerning access to confidential data for scientific purposes O.J. L 133/7 (2002); recital 21 of Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements O.J. L 168/43 (2002).

  29. 29.

    Streinz et al. (2010), p. 127; Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 4.

  30. 30.

    Cf. e.g. Opinion of AG Alber delivered on 1 February 2001, Case C-340/99 TNT Traco SpA v Poste Italiane SpA and Others (ECJ 17 May 2001) para 94.

  31. 31.

    Opinion of AG Tizzano delivered on 8 February 2001, Case C-173/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) (ECJ 26 June 2001); opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 11 July 2002, Case C-466/00, Arben Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ 6 March 2003) fn. 74.

  32. 32.

    Case T-112/98, Mannesmannrühren-Werke AG v Commission (CFI 20 February 2001) para 76.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Case T-54/99, max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v Commission, (CFI 30 January 2002) para 48, 57; Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission (CFI 3 May 2002) para 42, 47; Streinz et al. (2010), p. 127; Borowsky, in Meyer (2011), Vorbemerkungen zu Titel VII, para 6 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council (ECJ 27 June 2006) para 38.

  35. 35.

    E.g. Case C-12/08, Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis et al. (ECJ 16 July 2009) para 47.

  36. 36.

    Case C-403/09 PPU, Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia (ECJ 23 December 2009) para 53 et seq.; note that the ECJ mentions the requirements in para 53 “which follow from recital 33 in the preamble to Regulation No 2201/2003, which states that the regulation recognises the fundamental rights and observes the principles of the Charter, seeking in particular to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the child as set out in Article 24 of the Charter.” The reference to the EUCFR in the preamble justifies the application of the (non-retroactive) fundamental rights of the EUCFR to the facts of a case which has arisen prior to the entry into force of the EUCFR. This is the more so as the EUCFR only reaffirms rights which existed prior their codification in the EUCFR. For aspects of the application of the EUCFR ratione temporis cf. Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique v Préfet de la region Centre, para 73–74, and the references in fn. 33 and 34.

  37. 37.

    Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (ECJ 19 January 2010) para 22; cf. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 598. Art. 21 EUCFR was not applicable in Kücükdeveci ratione temporis; cf. Fischinger (2011), p. 206; Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique v Préfet de la region Centre fn. 34.

  38. 38.

    Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 601 et seq.

  39. 39.

    Cf. e.g. Case C-400/10, PPU J. McB v L. E. (ECJ 5 October 2010).

  40. 40.

    Cf. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 604 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Germany (ECJ 22 December 2010).

  42. 42.

    Cf. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 602 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (ECJ 9 November 2010); cf. Nanopoulos (2011), p. 306.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Kilian (2011), p. 1325.

  45. 45.

    Blanke (2012), p. 168; Terhechte (2011), p. 87 and note 321; cf. e.g. Case C-340/00 P, Commission v Michael Cwik (ECJ 13 December 2001).

  46. 46.

    Although some details leave room for criticism, cf. Guckelberger (2011), p. 130.

  47. 47.

    Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (2011), p. 609; the ECJ has had the opportunity to apply the EUCFR in privacy-related cases on several occasions already, cf. recently Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, ASNEF and FECEMD v Administración del Estado (ECJ 24 November 2011); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) (ECJ 24 November 2011).

  48. 48.

    Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL et al. v Council (ECJ 1 March 2011) para 30.

  49. 49.

    Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL et al. v Council (ECJ 1 March 2011) para 32.

  50. 50.

    Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 4 para 7 et seq.; Pabel (2010), p. 150 et seq.

  51. 51.

    Cf., for instance, Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission (ECJ 22 October 2002).

  52. 52.

    13645/05 Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v the Netherlands (ECtHR 20 January 2009); 73274/01 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union (ECtHR 9 December 2008); 51717/99 Guérin Automobiles v 15 Member States of the European Union (ECtHR 4 July 2000); 24833/94 Matthews v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 18 February 1999) para 32; Grabenwarter and Pabel (2006), p. 85; Berka (2006), p. 879.

  53. 53.

    24833/94 Matthews v the United Kingdom (ECtHR18 February 1999) para 32; cf. Pabel, in Österreichische Juristenkommission (2010), p. 146.

  54. 54.

    45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005) para 155; cf. Berka (2006), p. 883; Haratsch (2006), p. 927; Merli (2007), p. 339 et seq.; Oeter (2007), p. 361 et seq.; Pellonpää (2007), p. 347 et seq.; Pabel, in Österreichische Juristenkommission (2010), p. 146 et seq.

  55. 55.

    45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR30 June 2005) para 156; 30696/09 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (ECtHR 21 January 2011) para 338.

  56. 56.

    Cf. e.g. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupančič and Steiner in the case 36022/97 Hatton and Others v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 8 July 2003); cf. Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 16 et seq.

  57. 57.

    28957/95 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 11 July 2002).

  58. 58.

    25680/94 I. v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 11 July 2002).

  59. 59.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni joined by Judge Kovler in the case 30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, (ECtHR 24 June 2010); partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nicolaou, joined by Judges Bratza, Lorenzen, Jočiené, Villiger and Sajó in case 10249/03 Scoppola v Italy (no. 2) (ECtHR 17 September 2009); cf. in particular, Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 18; Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 4 para 11.

  60. 60.

    10249/03 Scoppola v Italy (no. 2) (ECtHR 17 September 2009) para 106; cf. Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 24 para 145.

  61. 61.

    10249/03 Scoppola v Italy (no. 2) (ECtHR 17 September 2009) para 105.

  62. 62.

    Cf. for criticism on Scoppola, Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 24 para 145.

  63. 63.

    30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (ECtHR 24 June 2010) para 61; cf. also Concurring Opinon in Schalk and Kopf of Judge Malinverni joined by Judge Kovler and Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 22 para 72. Another recent example of the influence of the Charter on the ECtHR’s case law is 23459/03 Bayatyan v Armenia (ECtHR 7 July 2011) para 106.

  64. 64.

    For details on the genesis of Art. F.2 TEU cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 3.

  65. 65.

    Cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 4 et seq.; Stumpf, in Schwarze et al. (2009), Art. 6 EUV para 44.

  66. 66.

    Praesidium of the European Convention, Draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03 of 6 February 2003.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Art. I-9.2 TCE and Art. 6.2 TEU: “The Union shall accede […]”.

  68. 68.

    Cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 8.

  69. 69.

    Cf. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 1 et seq.

  70. 70.

    European Commission, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, SEC (2011) 396 final, p. 3.

  71. 71.

    Cf. only Lenaerts and de Smijter (2001); Davis (2005), p. 449; Williams (2010), p. 663; Zetterquist (2011), p. 3 et passim.

  72. 72.

    Frequently, the reference suggests to point at the US Bill of Rights. In a more general context, a bill of rights is a codification of rights deemed to be “fundamental” for individuals with respect to their relation to a state. Hence, the Magna Charta, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms might be considered as being bills of rights.

  73. 73.

    Cf. Haltern (2007), para 1144; the Preamble of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen reads: “Les représentants du peuple français, constitués en Assemblée nationale, considérant que l’ignorance, l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics et de la corruption des gouvernements, ont résolu d’exposer, dans une déclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l’homme, afin que cette déclaration, constamment présente à tous les membres du corps social, leur rappelle sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs” (emphasis added). The Preamble of the French Version of the Charter reads: “Le Parlement européen, le Conseil et la Commission proclament solennellement en tant que Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne le texte repris ci-après” (emphasis added).

  74. 74.

    De Búrca (2001), p. 133; Balaguer Callejón (2012), p. 271, claims that “the Charter is the seed of the final constitutionalisation of Europe”.

  75. 75.

    The Fifth Virginia Convention; cf. the Preamble of the Virginia Bill of Rights: “A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS made by the Representatives of the good people of VIRGINIA, assembled in full and free Convention; which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of Government.”

  76. 76.

    De Búrca (2001), p. 133.

  77. 77.

    Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3/4 June 1999, Annex IV.

  78. 78.

    De Búrca (2001), p. 130.

  79. 79.

    Cf. Haltern (2007), para 1140; Blanke (2012), p. 167, refers to the Charter as “a manifestation of shared European values”.

  80. 80.

    European Commission, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final p. 3.

  81. 81.

    European Commission, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final p. 3.: “In 2010, the Commission received more than 4,000 letters from the general public regarding fundamental rights. Approximately three quarters of these concerned cases outside the remit of EU law. This reflects a frequent misunderstanding about the purpose of the Charter and the situations where the Charter applies or does not apply.”

  82. 82.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, O.J. L 53/1 (2007).

  83. 83.

    European Commission, 2009 Report on the practical operation of the methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM (2009) 205 final, p. 8.

  84. 84.

    Cf. European Commission, 2010 Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final; European Commission, 2011 Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM (2012) 169 final.

  85. 85.

    Art. 4.1 (a) of Regulation 168/2007/EC establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

  86. 86.

    Art. 4.1 (h) of Regulation 168/2007/EC establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

  87. 87.

    For instance the online tools “Charterpedia”, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/charterpedia/charterpedia_en.htm (accessed 6 June 2013).

    For the role of the EUCFR as a key reference document for the Agency for Fundamental Rights Ludwig 2011(2001), p. 730 et seq.

  88. 88.

    Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (ECJ 9 November 2010); cf. → para 9.

  89. 89.

    Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL et al. v Council (ECJ 1 March 2011); cf. → para 9.

  90. 90.

    Cf. “Insurance and pension costs hit by ECJ gender ruling”, BBC online, 1 March 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12606610 (accessed 6 June 2013); “This insurance ruling trivialises human rights”, The Guardian online, 1 March 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/01/insurance-human-rights-premiums-europe (accessed 6 June 2013); “Lower insurance premiums for women unfair, European court rules”, The Telegraph online, 1 March 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/motorinsurance/8354074/Lower-insurance-premiums-for-women-unfair-European-court-rules.html (accessed 6 June 2013); “E. U. Court to Insurers: Stop Making Men Pay More”, The Times online, 1 March 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2056409,00.html (accessed 6 June 2013); “EU judges drive up car insurance and pension costs for men with equality ruling”, Daily Mail online, last updated 3 March 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361750/Car-insurance-women-soar-25-men-face-10-CUT-EU-rules.html (accessed 6 June 2013); “Combining Everything That Is Wrong With The EU’s Judicial System”, Open Europe Blog, 1 March 2011, available at http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/combining-everything-that-is-wrong-with.html (accessed 6 June 2013).

  91. 91.

    For an evaluation of the impacts of the Charter before it became legally binding cf. Gianfrancesco (2012), p. 295 et seqq.

  92. 92.

    Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 9, 28; Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 12.

  93. 93.

    Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 20.

  94. 94.

    Winkler, in Mayer and Stöger (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 2.

  95. 95.

    Annex I to Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21/22 June 2007, Doc. No. 11177/1/01.

  96. 96.

    Annex I to Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21/22 June 2007, Doc. No. 11177/1/01. The incorporation of the Charter into the TEU failed because of the resistance of the UK, cf. Pache and Rösch (2009), p. 775.

  97. 97.

    Especially by Poland, the UK and the Czech Republic; cf. Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 3 et seq.; Barnard (2010), p. 8 et seq.

  98. 98.

    With special regard to the UK cf. Barnard (2010), p. 15 et seq.; European Union Committee (House of Lords) 2008, in particular para 5.84 et seq.

  99. 99.

    European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 4 et seq.

  100. 100.

    The impact assessment is not to be mistaken for the examination of the draft act’s legal compliance with fundamental rights which is carried out at a later stage of the legislative process, cf. European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 6.

  101. 101.

    European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 7.

  102. 102.

    European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 7.

  103. 103.

    European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 9.

  104. 104.

    European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 10.

  105. 105.

    Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 9, states that in particular the UK insisted that primary law refers to the 2007 version of the Charter and the explanations thereto.

  106. 106.

    Streinz et al. (2010), p. 119; Knecht, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Preamble EUCFR para 1, 17.

  107. 107.

    Streinz et al. (2010), p. 120 et seq.

  108. 108.

    Pache and Rösch (2008), p. 519.

  109. 109.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 12; Schulte-Herbrüggen (2009), p. 348 et seq.

  110. 110.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 4.

  111. 111.

    Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 6.

  112. 112.

    Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (ECJ 5 February 1963).

  113. 113.

    Cf. for the determination of the field of application of the Charter the opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 in Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) (ECJ 8 March 2011) in particular para 151 et seq. and Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 16.

  114. 114.

    Chalmers et al. (2011), p. 230.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 5, note 35, who claim that “perhaps the closest to a ‘new’ right is Article 13”; cf. in that respect European Union Committee (House of Lords) 2008, para 5.37 et seq.; Winkler, in Mayer and Stöger (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 30.

  116. 116.

    O.J. C 303/17 (2007).

  117. 117.

    O.J. C 303/17 (2007).

  118. 118.

    Blanke (2012), p. 172; cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 31 et seq; Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 9.

  119. 119.

    Cf. in this respect Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 16.

  120. 120.

    Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 in Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) (ECJ 8 March 2011) para 163 (emphasis in the original); cf. for a discussion of that aspect of the Zambrano case Wiesbrock (2011), p. 2091 et seq.

  121. 121.

    Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) (ECJ 8 March 2011) para 42.

  122. 122.

    Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) (ECJ 8 March 2011); cf. Hinarejos (2011), p. 309; but cf. Case C-256/11, Murat Dereci et al. v Bundesministerium für Inneres (ECJ 15 November 2011), para 74.

  123. 123.

    Case C-617/10, klagaren v Hans kerberg Fransson (ECJ 26 February 2013) para 21.

  124. 124.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) Case 1 BvR 1215/07 (24 April 2013) para 91.

  125. 125.

    Blanke (2012), p. 166, rightly notes that “[t]he principles pursuant to Art. 6.1 TEU are to be distinguished from the ‘general principles’ of Art. 6.3 TEU”.

  126. 126.

    Cf., for instance, only the headings of the following provisions: Art. 2 EUCFR: Right to life; Art. 3 EUCFR: Right to the integrity of the person; Art. 6 EUCFR: Right to liberty and security; Art. 9 EUCFR: Right to marry and to found a family; Art. 14 EUCFR: Right to education; Art. 17 EUCFR: Right to property; Art. 18 EUCFR: Right to asylum, etc.

  127. 127.

    Cf., for example, Title II: Freedoms; Art. 10 EUCFR: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Art. 11: Freedom of expression and information; Art. 12: Freedom of assembly and of association; Art. 13: Freedom of arts and science; Art. 15 EUCFR: Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work; Art. 16 EUCFR: Freedom to conduct a business; outside the scope of Title II cf. Art. 45 EUCFR: Freedom of movement and of residence.

  128. 128.

    Jarass (2010), Einleitung para 46; Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 6. Cf. Art. 11.1 EUCFR: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”.

  129. 129.

    Bonichot (2011), p. 53 et seq.

  130. 130.

    Borowsky, in Meyer (2011), Art. 52 EUCFR para 45 et seq.; De Schutter (2006), Art. 52 EUCFR p. 405.

  131. 131.

    Borowsky, in Meyer (2011), Art. 52 EUCFR para 45c; De Schutter (2006), Art. 52 EUCFR p. 406.

  132. 132.

    Blanke (2012), p. 165 et seq.; European Union Committee (House of Lords) 2008, para 5.22.

  133. 133.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 6.

  134. 134.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 6.

  135. 135.

    Emphasis added.

  136. 136.

    Cf. European Union Committee (House of Lords) 2008, in particular at para 5.103, lit. c; cf. also Case C-411/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ 21 December 2011) para 116 et seqq.

  137. 137.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 12. For instance: Art. 33.1 EUCFR (“The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection”), appears to be a principle. Hence, it is not justiciable, be it in Poland, the UK or any other MS. As the distinction between principles and rights is rather obscure, it might happen that the ECJ comes to the conclusion that Art. 33.1 EUCFR is justiciable. In that case, Art. 1.2 of Protocol No. 30 would hinder the application of this right in Poland or the UK insofar as the legal order of these states did not provide for such rights.

  138. 138.

    Cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 54.

  139. 139.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 13 (“politische Angstklausel”).

  140. 140.

    The precise scope of application of the Charter is contested, → para 29 and para 97 et seq.

  141. 141.

    The term “incorporation” describes the process of the extension of applicability of certain rights of the US Bill of Rights to the states. The Bill of Rights was applicable to the federal government alone. By “incorporation” of parts of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment the US Supreme Court held these rights also to be applicable to the states, cf. Weiler (1986), p. 1136 et seq.; “incorporation” in the Union context means in general the application of EU fundamental rights on acts of the MS; cf. in that respect also the opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010 in Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) (ECJ 8 March 2011) para 172 et seq.

  142. 142.

    → para 29 and para 93; Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 14 et seq.

  143. 143.

    Alonso García (2002), p. 492.

  144. 144.

    Preamble, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. C 303/17 (2007).

  145. 145.

    Preamble, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. C 303/17 (2007); → para 28.

  146. 146.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 13.

  147. 147.

    Cf., e.g., Blanke (2012), p. 164; Obwexer (2012), p. 116 et seq.; Jacqué (2011a), p. 144; Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 37; De Schutter (2010), p. 538; European Parliament, Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, recital G; Appendix III (Draft Explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; in the following: Draft Explanatory report) to Report of the CDDH to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of the legal instruments for the accession of the EU to the ECHR, CDDH(2011)009, 14 October 2011, para 2; Bonichot (2011), p. 58 et seq., does not share this opinion.

  148. 148.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 25.

  149. 149.

    Final report to the CDDH, 47+1 (2013) 008, 5 April 2013. The Draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, among them the Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (in the following: Draft Accession Agreement), in its final version are reproduced in the appendix of this report.

  150. 150.

    Both parties to the envisaged agreement expressed their will to ensure a “rapid” conclusion of the latter on several occassions, cf., e.g., The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens O.J. C115/1 (2010), para 2.1., on part of the EU and the Resolution 1982 (2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE, adopted on 5 October 2011, para 4.1., on part of the CoE.

  151. 151.

    Final report to the CDDH, 47+1 (2013) 008, 5 April 2013, para 8.

  152. 152.

    Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v The Minister for the Interior (ECJ 28 October 1975) para 32.

  153. 153.

    Art. F.2 TEU-Maastricht = Art. 6.2 TEU-Amsterdam.

  154. 154.

    Grabenwarter (2004b), p. 470 et seq.

  155. 155.

    The Draft Accession Agreement refers to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); as it is well-known, the Court of Justice (ECJ), the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal form the CJEU.

  156. 156.

    For the “added value” of an EU accession to the ECHR, cf. Lock (2011), p. 1026.

  157. 157.

    Cf. European Parliament, Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, recital K.1.; cf. Art. 49 TEU; being a party to the ECHR is one of the preconditions for EU membership in accordance with the “Copenhagen criteria”, cf. Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen, 21/22 June 1993, Doc. No. SN 180/1/93 REV 1; “The Union must be above reproach when it comes to fundamental rights”, cf. European Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 4; cf. also the Preamble of the Draft Accession Agreement. Cf. for the expected positive effects of the envisaged accession on the ECHR-system e.g. Kuijer (2011), p. 30 et seqq.; O’Boyle (2011), p. 1876.

  158. 158.

    Jacqué (2011b), p. 995, notes that the 1953 draft treaty establishing the EC contained a provision integrating the substantive provisions of the ECHR into the Treaty; Art. 3 of the 1953 Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community reads: “The provisions of Part I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4th November 1950, together with those of the protocol signed in Paris on 20th March 1952, are an integral part of the present Statute.” The draft treaty never entered into force; cf. also Art. 4 of the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union O.J. C77/33 (1984); for the discussion on the accession of the EC/EU to the ECHR cf. European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79; for an overview of the debate cf. the selected publications listed by Jacqué (2011b), in the first footnote of his article.

  159. 159.

    Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECJ 28 March 1996) para 6; cf. Haltern (2007), para 1044: the ECJ denied a competence of the Union to accede to the ECHR in its Opinion 2/94 “without compelling reason”.

  160. 160.

    E. g. Blanke (2012), p. 164; Obwexer (2012), p. 116 et seq.; Jacqué (2011a), p. 144; Pache and Rösch (2008), p. 520; De Schutter (2010), p. 538; cf. European Parliament, Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, recital G; Draft Explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Annex V of the Final report to the CDDH, 47+1 (2013) 008, 5 April 2013 (in the following: Draft Explanatory report) para 2; Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 37, claims that the Union is not obliged to accede to the ECHR “at any cost” but only insofar as compliance with conditions for an accession within EU law can be achieved; Bonichot (2011), p. 58, does not understand Art. 6.2 TEU as to oblige the Union to accede to the ECHR.

  161. 161.

    Cf. Obwexer (2010), p. 1029; Obwexer (2012), p. 117 et seq.

  162. 162.

    Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights O.J. C 303/17 (2007); but cf. also Grabenwarter (2001), p. 2.

  163. 163.

    The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens O.J. C 115/1 (2010) para 2.1; European Parliament, Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, para 21; cf. the Preamble of the Draft Accession Agreement.

  164. 164.

    Cf. also Obwexer (2012), p. 117; for the scope of accession in the Draft Accession Agreement → para 55 et seqq.

  165. 165.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 570; thus, the EU ratified for instance the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities on 23 December 2010; with regard to CoE conventions, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE invited the EU in its Resolution 1836 (2011), adopted on 5 October 2011, to join a number of key CoE conventions beyond the ECHR.

  166. 166.

    Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties form an integral part thereof (Art. 51 TEU).

  167. 167.

    Art. 1 of Protocol No. 8.

  168. 168.

    Art. 1 lit. a, b of Protocol No. 8.

  169. 169.

    Cf. Case C-233/97, KappAhl Oy. (ECJ 2 December 1998) para 23; Obwexer (2012), p. 119.

  170. 170.

    O. J. C83/337 (2010).

  171. 171.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 28 et seq.

  172. 172.

    Cf. Jacqué (2011b), p. 1003. Cf. with regard to the “twofold dimension” of the division of competences also Gragl (2011) p. 162.

  173. 173.

    Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, CETS No. 194.

  174. 174.

    Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 4 para 15.

  175. 175.

    Art. 4 of the Statute of the CoE.

  176. 176.

    For the most relevant adaptions to the ECHR cf. Draft Explanatory report para 3.

  177. 177.

    Even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council called for a “rapid accession” of the EU to the ECHR as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon would create the legal base for it, cf. The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens O.J. C115/1 (2010), para 2.1.

  178. 178.

    Explanatory report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, CETS No. 194, para 101.

  179. 179.

    Cf. Explanatory report to the Draft Agreement, Section I.

  180. 180.

    Cf. Explanatory report to Protocol No.1, para 101.

  181. 181.

    CDDH, Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, DG-II(2002)006, p. 6.

  182. 182.

    The VCLT and the nearly identical VCLT-IO (not yet in force) broadly reflect customary international law.

  183. 183.

    European Commission, SEC(2010) 305 final/3 (public version).

  184. 184.

    Cf. Press release “EU Justice Council: Statement by Vice-President Viviane Reding”, 4 June 2010, MEMO/10/236; the negotiation mandate formulated in the Draft Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Council of the European Union Document 10602/10, is classified; a partially declassified version was made public on 8 June 2010 and 27 September 2010 respectively, cf. Council of the European Union, Document No. 10817/10 EXT2; the declassified version of the negotiation mandate omits the relevant guidelines on the negotiations; nevertheless, the main elements of these guidelines can be found in an information of the Austrian Government to the Austrian Nationalrat on the respective Council Decision which is publicly available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/III/III_00050/imfname_153386.pdf (Austrian Parliament, III-50 der Beilagen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP; accessed 6 June 2013); Schilling (2011), para 4 et seq., provides an insightful analysis of the negotiation process; cf. also Obwexer (2012), p.

  185. 185.

    O’Meara (2011), p. 1818; Millner (2011), p. 15; Schilling (2011), para 5; cf. also Report of the CDDH to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of the legal instruments for the accession of the EU to the ECHR, CDDH(2011)009, 14 October 2011, recital 10.

  186. 186.

    On the role of the CDDH in the negotiations process cf. Kuijer (2011), p. 24 et seq.

  187. 187.

    CM/Del/Dec(2010)1085, of 26 May 2010.

  188. 188.

    Press Release of the Directorate of Communication of the CoE of 7 June 2010, document 545a2010.

  189. 189.

    Report of the CDDH to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of the legal instruments for the accession of the EU to the ECHR, CDDH(2011)009, 14 October 2011.

  190. 190.

    Cf. the decisions taken in the course of the 1145th meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE of 13 June 2012, Item 4.5, Doc. No. 47+1(2012)001.

  191. 191.

    Art. 218.10 TFEU provides that the EP be “immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure”.

  192. 192.

    Cf. Obwexer (2012), p. 118.

  193. 193.

    For example: The second sentence of Art. 23.1 German Basic Law provides for the transfer of sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechte) of the German Federation (Bund) to the EU by way of a statute passed with simple majority provided that the transfer does not touch on the German Constitution. The third sentence of Art. 23.1 German Basic Law stipulates that transfers of sovereign rights to the EU with an impact on the German Constitution need to be approved by a statute passed with a majority of two thirds in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Streinz et al. (2010), p. 55, argue that an approval “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements” in the case of Germany would fall within the scope of the second sentence of Art. 23.1 German Basic Law. But every single case would need to be scrutinized with respect to its impact on the German Constitution and hence the application of the provision in the third sentence of Art. 23.1 German Basic Law.

  194. 194.

    Cf. Obwexer (2012), p. 118.

  195. 195.

    Cf. for the EU in particular → para 81.

  196. 196.

    The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens O.J. C115/1 (2010), para 2.1.

  197. 197.

    Cf. Art. 216.2 TFEU; for a detailed analysis of the binding force of the ECHR towards the EU after the accession → para 61 et seqq.

  198. 198.

    Cf. e.g. O’Meara (2011), p. 1817. Whether the “equivalent protection test” developed by the ECtHR in the Bosphorus case (→ para 10), which privileges the conduct based on the implementation of EU measures by MS in comparison with the other High Contracting Parties to the ECHR, will be upheld after an EU accession to the ECHR — or even extended to the EU as a party to the ECHR — remains unclear, cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 4 and 9, O’Meara (2011), p. 1816 et seq.; Kuijer (2011), p. 21, seems to indicate that the “equivalent protection test” will not apply post-accession: “The EU’s accession to the ECHR would thus expand the legal protection afforded by Strasbourg in two ways: (a) by making it possible to complain about alleged human rights violations by EU institutions themselves; and (b) by making it possible to complain about alleged human rights violations committed by Member States in their implementation of Community law (without having to take account of the Bosphorus ruling)”; cf. also Kuijer (2011), p. 22; Obwexer (2012), p. 147; for the sake of equality among the parties to the ECHR, applying the same standard of scrutiny to all parties would be most appropriate in our view.

  199. 199.

    Cf. fn. 146, 158.

  200. 200.

    European Parliament, Resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184, para 4.

  201. 201.

    European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Doc. No. 7668/10 EXT 2, p. 4.

  202. 202.

    Cf. Obwexer (2012), p. 117.

  203. 203.

    Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 009.

  204. 204.

    Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, CETS No. 114.

  205. 205.

    This speculation is supported by the report of the Austrian Government about the negotiation mandate (Austrian Parliament, III-50 der Beilagen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP, p. 2, available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/III/III_00050/imfname_153386.pdf; accessed 10 July 2012): According to this document, a main element of the mandate is that for the time being, the Union should accede only to those protocols which were ratified by all EU MS; cf. also Groussot et al. (2011), p. 4 et seq.

  206. 206.

    The Draft Council Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Doc. No. 10602/10 EXT 2, speaks of “accession of the European Union to that Convention”. Note that parts of this document including the negotiations directives are classified and hence not accessible.

  207. 207.

    Jacqué (2011b), p. 1003 et seq.; cf. also Groussot et al. (2011), p. 4.

  208. 208.

    Cf. Explanatory report to the Draft Agreement, para 20; Groussot et al. (2011), p. 9; Obwexer (2012), p. 142; this outcome of the negotiations on the accession of the Union to the ECHR is in line with what is known of the negotiation guidelines in the (classified) negotiation mandate: The relevant report of the Austrian Government (Austrian Parliament, III-50 der Beilagen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP, p. 2, available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/III/III-00050/imfname_153386.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013) states that one of the main elements of the mandate was to provide for the accession of the Union to existing or future protocols to the ECHR.

  209. 209.

    As for the relationship of the additional protocols to the Convention, provisions in the protocols stipulate that the substantial law of the protocol is to be regarded as additional articles to the Convention and all the provisions of the Convention are to apply, cf. e.g. Art. 6 Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR.

  210. 210.

    According to Art. 11 of the Draft Accession Agreement, reservations to the latter are not allowed.

  211. 211.

    Cf. Art. 2 of the Draft Accession Agreement.

  212. 212.

    Reich (2010), p. 641.

  213. 213.

    Explanatory report to the Draft Agreement, para 57.

  214. 214.

    Explanatory report to the Draft Agreement, para 17.

  215. 215.

    The principle of pacta sunt servanda is a basic principle of customary international law. Schmalenbach, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 216 AEUV para 25.

  216. 216.

    Cf. for instance 24833/94 Case of Matthews v the United Kingdom (ECtHR 18 February 1999); 45036/98 Bosphorus v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005); 30696/09 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (ECtHR 21 January 2011); for the situation post-accession cf. in particular fn. 197.

  217. 217.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 569.

  218. 218.

    Cf. for a detailed analysis of the problems which might occur in that respect Vondung (2012), p. 131 et seqq.

  219. 219.

    Cf. Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 16 para 2.

  220. 220.

    Opinion 1/91 para 39; confirmed in Opinion 1/09 para 74; cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 26.

  221. 221.

    Opinion 1/09 para 76; cf. already Opinion 1/91 para 35.

  222. 222.

    Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgium (ECJ 30 April 1974) para 2 et seq.

  223. 223.

    The fact that international agreements from their entry into force form an integral part of Union law is distinct from the question whether the content of the agreement is self-executing; cf. Moser (2008), p. 95 footnote 17.

  224. 224.

    The ECJ scrutinises the effects of international agreements in Union law on case-by-case approach, cf. Moser (2008), p. 91.

  225. 225.

    Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A (ECJ 26 October 1982) para 15 et seq.; Obwexer (2012), p. 143; The most prominent example for an international agreement which the ECJ held not to be directly effective (again with exceptions) is the WTO Agreement; cf. Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council (23 November 1999).

  226. 226.

    For instance: Knauff (2010), p. 148, argues that the ECHR is incorporated as part of primary law by way of Art. 6.3 TEU. An accession of the EU to the ECHR “does not cause any changes [to that fact] within Union law”; Obwexer (2010), p. 1031 et seq., states that the ECHR becomes part of primary law with its “ratification” by the MS cf. also Obwexer 2012, p. 143 et seq., 148); Pache and Rösch (2009), p. 785, see the ECHR after the accession of the Union as being part of secondary law, whereas the fundamental rights guaranteed in the ECHR have the rank of primary law (“Unionsverfassungsrecht”) as general principles of Union law according to Art. 6.3 TEU; cf. also Uerpmann-Wittzack (2009), p. 186 et seqq. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 27; Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 11.

  227. 227.

    Nettesheim (2006), p. 761. Blanke (2012), p. 180 et seq., argues that the ECHR will thus rank between secondary and primary law; but any conflict between ius cogens provisions of the ECHR and primary and secondary law “would lead to the relevant provision of Union law being invalid (Art. 53 VCLT)”.

  228. 228.

    Art. 3.2 and 3.3 Draft Accession Agreement; Draft Explanatory report, para 48, 49; cf. with respect to the review of EU primary law by the ECtHR e.g. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 3 et seq. and p. 9 and para 73 et seq.

  229. 229.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 22.

  230. 230.

    Jacqué (2011b), p. 1003.

  231. 231.

    Cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 47.

  232. 232.

    For a general overview of the different aspects of the autonomy of EU law cf. Pernice (2010); Barents (2004); Schilling (1996), p. 410.

  233. 233.

    Cf. in particular the Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 5 May 2010, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_64350/ (accessed 6 June 2013).

  234. 234.

    Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (ECJ 5 February 1963).

  235. 235.

    Case 314/85 Foto-Frost (ECJ 22 October 1887).

  236. 236.

    Cf. Gragl (2011), p. 162.

  237. 237.

    Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (ECJ 15 July 1964).

  238. 238.

    Opinion 1/91 (ECJ 14 December 1991); Opinion 1/00 (ECJ 18 April 2002); Opinion 1/09 (ECJ 8 March 2011).

  239. 239.

    Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant decision) (ECJ 30 May 2006) para 123, 124; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008) para 285.

  240. 240.

    Opinion 1/00 (ECJ 18 April 2002) para 12.

  241. 241.

    Opinion 1/00 (ECJ 18 April 2002) para 13.

  242. 242.

    Opinion 1/09 (ECJ 8 March 2011).

  243. 243.

    Opinion 1/09 (ECJ 8 March 2011) para 89.

  244. 244.

    Lock (2011), p. 1032.

  245. 245.

    Cf. Final report to the CDDH, 47+1 (2013) 008, 5 April 2013, para 8; Groussot et al. (2011), p. 17; O’Meara (2011), p. 1832.

  246. 246.

    Lock (2011), p. 1025, elaborates extensively on the issue.

  247. 247.

    Thus, the ECtHR “will be recognised as the single final authority in the field of human rights in Europe”, according to Piris (2010), p. 166.

  248. 248.

    High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights — Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 2010, para 9.

  249. 249.

    For many instances: 20689/08 W. v The Netherlands (ECtHR 20 January 2009): “The Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. More specifically, it is not for the Court to rule on the validity of national laws in the hierarchy of domestic legislation (see also Kruslin v France, 24 April 1990, § 29, Series A no. 176-A). This also applies where international treaties are concerned; it is for the implementing party to interpret the treaty, and in this respect it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own judgment for that of the domestic authorities, even less to settle a dispute between the parties to the treaty as to its correct interpretation (see Slivenko v Latvia, no. 48321/99, § 105, ECHR 2003-X)”. Cf. also 11105/84 Huvig v France (ECtHR 24 April 1990) para 28; one of the latest reports of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Guaranteeing the authority and effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights, AS/Jur (2011) 44 of 4 November 2011, para 24 et seq., strongly emphasizes the importance of the concept of subsidiarity for ECHR-system; Cf. for the subsidiarity-issue in the context of the EU accession e.g. Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg 24 January 2011 (available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013), p. 2; Kuijer (2011), p. 31.

  250. 250.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 62; Groussot et al. (2011), p. 5.

  251. 251.

    In the Case no. 13645/05 Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands (ECtHR 20 January 2009), the ECtHR closely analysed provisions of the ECJ’s procedural law and came to the conclusion that the procedure before the ECJ provided equivalent protection to Art. 6 ECHR.

  252. 252.

    Cf. e.g. Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 13.

  253. 253.

    Lock (2011), p. 1037.

  254. 254.

    Cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 3 et seq. and p. 9.

  255. 255.

    Cf. Streinz et al. (2010), p. 145; Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 275 AEUV para 2 et seq. The fact that the CFSP is fully covered by the jurisdiction of the ECtHR is in line with what is known of the negotiation guidelines in the (classified) negotiation mandate: The relevant report of the Austrian Government (Austrian Parliament, III-50 der Beilagen des Nationalrates XXIV. GP, p. 2, available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/III/III-00050/imfname_153386.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013) names as a main element of the negotiation mandate that “an exclusion of the CFSP from the jurisdiction of the ECtHR was opposed by Austria as well as by a wide majority of Member States”; cf. in that respect also Schilling (2011), para 8; Kuijer (2011), p. 29 et seq.

  256. 256.

    Note the range of protocols which influence the application of Art. 276 TFEU: Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; Protocol No. 22 on the position of Denmark; cf. in particular Art. 10.1–10.3 of Protocol No. 36 on transitional provision which suspends the application of Art. 276 TFEU in certain circumstances until 30 November 2014; cf. with respect to all aspects of these protocols Suhr, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 276 AEUV para 16 et seq.

  257. 257.

    The avoidance of situations in which the ECtHR might have “to adjudicate on the conformity of an EU act with human rights, without the CJEU having had to opportunity to do so” (Draft Explanatory report para 65) was behind the idea to establish a mechanism which should allow the prior involvement of the CJEU in such situations; → para 81 et seq.; thus, this mechanism is intended to guarantee the autonomy of EU law.

  258. 258.

    Cf. with respect to the provisions of Protocol No. 8 and inter-party applications Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 40; Obwexer (2012), p. 121; for the time being, Art. 33 ECHR is titled “Inter-State cases”; with the entry into force of the Accession Agreement, it would be titled “Inter-Party cases” (Art. 4.2 Draft Accession Agreement).

  259. 259.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 70.

  260. 260.

    Cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 72; Obwexer (2012), p. 121.

  261. 261.

    Cf. Berger (2010), p. 58.

  262. 262.

    Cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 74.

  263. 263.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 10; cf. also Kuijer (2011), p. 30; cf. also Obwexer (2012), p. 135 et seq.

  264. 264.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 38.

  265. 265.

    The co-respondent mechanism is not to be confused with the third party intervention of Art. 36 ECHR. Notably, the Draft Explanatory report, para 46, states with respect to the latter instrument: “It is understood that a third party intervention may often be the most appropriate way to involve the EU in a case. […] The issue of the EU requesting leave to intervene will be dealt in separate Memoranda of understanding between the EU and the concerned States, upon their request.”. The more, the ECHR offers the possibility to nominate an application against more than one respondent; thus an individual application could also be directed both against the EU and one or more MS after the envisaged accession (this would require that domestic remedies are exhausted in all of the respondent’s jurisdictions, i.e. on Union level and on the level of the MS), cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 10 et seq.

  266. 266.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 39.

  267. 267.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 62.

  268. 268.

    Cf. Lock (2011), p. 1043.

  269. 269.

    Schilling (2011), para 46, argues that the interpretation of the notion “notably” will be crucial with respect to the initiation of the co-respondent mechanism; cf. also Obwexer (2012), p. 131.

  270. 270.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 11.

  271. 271.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 12.

  272. 272.

    For the limited role this provision might play in practice, cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 12.

  273. 273.

    Obwexer (2012), p. 129.

  274. 274.

    Cf. also Obwexer (2012), p. 128.

  275. 275.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 52; cf. Kuijer (2011), p. 27, for practical aspects of this issue.

  276. 276.

    Cf. also Groussot et al. (2011), p. 13, who welcome the co-respondent mechanism as such but see it as “considerable weakness in the proposal […] to make it voluntary for the co-respondent to join proceedings”; O’Meara (2011), p. 1821, expresses the same concern.

  277. 277.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 53.

  278. 278.

    Obwexer (2012), p. 129.

  279. 279.

    Cf. for criticism of the involvement of the ECJ cf. Schilling (2011), para 22 et seq.

  280. 280.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 15, rightly criticize that it might prove cumbersome for the ECtHR to establish, whether the ECJ has already ruled on the compatibility of EU with Convention rights, especially in cases where there is case-law of the ECJ based solely on the EUCFR (the ECtHR then would have to establish, in how far that case-law applies to Convention rights) and in cases, where there is case-law of the ECJ concerning Charter rights which correspond to rights in ECHR protocols, which have not been ratified by the EU.

  281. 281.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 65, 66.

  282. 282.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 66.

  283. 283.

    Ibid.

  284. 284.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 67.

  285. 285.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 69; It is important to note that the Draft Accession Agreement itself does not establish such an accelerated procedure and only notes that such a procedure already exists (the so-called procedure préjudicielle d’urgence [PPU], cf. in that respect O’Meara 2011, p. 1825). As Lock (2011), p. 1048 et seq., points out, the introduction of such a procedure by way of an accession agreement would be incompatible with the autonomy of EU law.

  286. 286.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 68.

  287. 287.

    Cf. in detail Schilling (2011), para 26 et seq.

  288. 288.

    O’Meara (2011), p. 1824, finds the fact that Art. 3.6 of the Draft Accession Agreement leaves open the finer details “disappointing (though perhaps inevitable)”.

  289. 289.

    Cf. also Groussot et al. (2011), p. 15 et seq.; critically towards the prior involvement due to the threat that the ECJ will be in a privileged position in comparison with the national courts of last resort of the High Contracting Parties to the ECHR: Kohler and Malferrari (2011), p. 850; Groussot et al. (2011), p. 16, Schilling (2011), para 26 et seq.; Obwexer (2012), p. 132, does not share this criticism.

  290. 290.

    Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (ECJ 9 November 2010) para 52.

  291. 291.

    45036/98 Bosphorus v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005); 65731/01, 65900/01 Stec et al. v UK (ECtHR 12 April 2006).

  292. 292.

    Cf. O’Meara (2011), p. 1815 et seq., for a selection of the recent legal literature on the dialogue between ECtHR and ECJ.

  293. 293.

    Cf. e.g. Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg 24 January 2011 (available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf, accessed 21 November 2011) and Explanatory report to the Draft Accession Agreement, para 14, O’Meara (2011), p. 1818 et seqq. on the role of this document; Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 41, 45. Cf. for instance Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission (ECJ 22 October 2002); 10249/03 Scoppola v Italy No. 2) (ECtHR 17 September 2009) para 106; cf. Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 24, para 145; 30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (ECtHR 24 June 2010) para 61, and Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 22 para 72.

  294. 294.

    Cf. Art. 1b of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaty of Lisbon.

  295. 295.

    Cf. Schilling (2011), para 16 et seq.

  296. 296.

    This might prove problematic although it is to be expected that situations in which the co-respondent mechanism would apply, will occur scarcely; cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 50; fn 18 of the Draft Explanatory report in its version of July 2011, CDDH-UE(2011)16fin, reads as follows: “During the negotiations, the view was expressed that in recent years, the only cases which might have certainly required the application of the co-respondent mechanism would have been Matthews v. United Kingdom, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland and Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v the Netherlands.”; This remark was omitted in the October 2011 version of the Draft Explanatory report submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the CoE and in the Final report of the CDDH.

  297. 297.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 16; as it is the case with the co-respondent mechanism, it is also to be expected that cases, where a prior involvement of the ECJ will apply, will be rare; cf. e.g. Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg 24 January 2011 (available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf, accessed 21 November 2011), p. 2.

  298. 298.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 65; Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, Strasbourg and Luxembourg 24 January 2011 (available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf, accessed 6 June 2013), p. 2.

  299. 299.

    Groussot et al. (2011), p. 14; Lock (2011), p. 1045; Reich (2010), p. 641; O’Meara (2011), p. 1823, argues that “[d]espite the loosening of the standing test offered by the Lisbon Treaty, access to the ECJ remains challenging to obtain for many non-privileged applicants” and claims that there is a certain likelihood that “creative lawyers” “seek to argue that Article 263(4) TFEU itself violates the principles guaranteed in Article 6 and 13 ECHR”; given the established case-law of the ECtHR (cf. Grabenwarter and Pabel 2012, § 24 para 175 and 184) it is not to expect that the latter finds Art. 263.4 TFEU to be in violation of Art. 6 and 13 ECHR (see also Thalmann 2011, p. 28 and p. 108, the latter with respect to a possible violation of Art 47.1 EUCFR).

  300. 300.

    On the relevance of institutional matters with respect to the accession of the EU cf. Engel (2010), p. 259; on the part of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE, there is a great interest in an enhanced cooperation between CoE and EU beyond the scope of the EU accession, cf. Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE, Resolution 1836 (2011) adopted on 5 October 2011; in this resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly also notes that it “expects that the role of the Council of Europe as ‘the benchmark for human rights, rule of law and democracy in Europe’ will be further enhanced, fully reaffirmed and effectively recognised by all EU institutions” (para 5).

  301. 301.

    Kuijer (2011), p. 28, notes that the envisaged participation in the CoE Committee of Ministers could help to improve compliance with ECtHR judgments as the EU has several instruments at hand (e.g. infringement proceedings against MS, economic sanctions against non-MS) which might prove to be powerful in that respect; cf. also Obwexer (2012), p. 139 et seq.

  302. 302.

    The contribution of the EU is equal to 34 % of the highest amount contributed in the previous year by any State to the Ordinary Budget of the CoE (Art. 8.1 Draft Accession Agreement); for 2011, the EU’s contribution would have amounted to € 9.34 million (Draft Explanatory report, fn. 20). As for the difficult financial situation of the CoE cf. the report of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Guaranteeing the authority and effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights, AS/Jur (2011) 44 of 4 November 2011.

  303. 303.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 7.

  304. 304.

    Schilling (2011), para 10 et seq., argues that a treatment of the Union “on equal footing” with the other High Contracting Parties is inappropriate and that contrary to the intention of equal treatment, the Union was granted exclusive rights which are not justified.

  305. 305.

    Draft Explanatory report, para 77; thus, proposals that the judge elected in respect of the EU should only sit in cases where the EU is (co-)respondent where not taken up; cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 3.

    Cf. Art. 20 ECHR which sets out the rule “one party one judge”; Groussot et al. (2011), p. 8, note the fact, that a future EU judge will most probably have the nationality of an EU MS will result in that MS having two of its nationals represented on the ECtHR. Although judges on the ECtHR act independently from the High Contracting Party in respect of which they have been elected (Grabenwarter and Pabel 2012, § 7 para 1), according to Groussot et al. (2011), p. 8, this may lead to a revision of the internal procedure of the ECtHR especially with respect to situations where the two judges with the same nationality would sit on the same case brought against the High Contracting Party of which they are citizens; Schilling (2011), para 20, opposes the idea of the EU having its own judge at the ECtHR.

  306. 306.

    Cf. Draft Explanatory report, para 75 and Statement by co-chairs of PACE-European Parliament joint informal body, available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ID=991, accessed 6 June 2013; cf. also Groussot et al. (2011), p. 8.

  307. 307.

    47+1 (2013) 008.

  308. 308.

    Cf. Groussot et al. (2011), p. 8 et seq.

  309. 309.

    Cf. with respect to the nature of the general principles of EU law Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique Préfet de la region Centre, para 91 et seq.

  310. 310.

    Art. F TEU-Maastricht = Art. 6 TEU-Amsterdam, cf. Art. 12 of and the Annex to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

  311. 311.

    Praesidium of the European Convention, Draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03 of 6 February 2003.

  312. 312.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 568; Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 17.

  313. 313.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 568 et seq.; cf. also Hatje, in Schwarze et al. (2012), Art. 6 EUV para 6.

  314. 314.

    Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 4 para 2 et seq.

  315. 315.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 569.

  316. 316.

    Grabenwarter (2004a), p. 569. Cf. with respect to the risk of an inconsistence between fundamental rights and general principles and the EUCFR in particular the Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique Préfet de la region Centre para 127 et seqq.

  317. 317.

    Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique v Préfet de la region Centre para 127 et seq.

  318. 318.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 17; Pabel (2010), p. 149; Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 50; cf. also Ludwig (2011), p. 726 et seqq., who claims that primacy of the application of the Charter-rights over the general principles of Art. 6.3 TEU is a consequence of the purpose of the creation of the EUCFR.

  319. 319.

    Cf. the fifth paragraph of the Preamble of the EUCFR: “This Charter reaffirms […] the rights […]”.

  320. 320.

    Chalmers et al. (2011), p. 230.

  321. 321.

    Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 18; for a wider understanding of the legal value of Art. 6.3 TEU, Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 52 et seq.

  322. 322.

    Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008) para 283.

  323. 323.

    Cf. for instance Case C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration (ECJ 28 July 2011) para 49; Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Germany (ECJ 22 December 2010) para 29 et seq.; Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien (ECJ 22 December 2010) para 89.

  324. 324.

    Pabel (2010) p. 150; cf. Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 53, who is critical of that approach; Ludwig (2011), p. 729, rejects this approach.

  325. 325.

    Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (ECJ 19 January 2010).

  326. 326.

    Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (ECJ 19 January 2010) para 21; cf. very recently Case C-447/09, Prigge et al. v Deutsche Lufthansa AG (ECJ 13 September 2011) para 38.

  327. 327.

    Cf. in that context Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005).

  328. 328.

    Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005) para 27.

  329. 329.

    Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005) para 53; cf. Wiesbrock (2010), p. 546.

  330. 330.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 15

  331. 331.

    Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique Préfet de la region Centre, para 146.

  332. 332.

    Cf. in particular Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique Préfet de la region Centre, para 153 et seq.; the Kücükdeveci judgment lead to heated debates in particular within German scholarship: cf. Seifert (2010); Ziegenhorn (2010); Preis and Temming (2010); Wackerbarth and Kreße (2010).

  333. 333.

    Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre information du Centre Ouest Atlantique Préfet de la region Centre, para 156.

  334. 334.

    Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (ECJ 19 January 2010) para 53.

  335. 335.

    Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Sabine Hennings v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin v Alexander Mai (ECJ 8 September 2011).

  336. 336.

    Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Sabine Hennings v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin v Alexander Mai (ECJ 8 September 2011) para 34, 44.

  337. 337.

    Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10, Sabine Hennings v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin v Alexander Mai (ECJ 8 September 2011) para 78.

  338. 338.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 16.

  339. 339.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 15.

  340. 340.

    Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom; cf. Declaration No. 61 by the Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Declaration No. 62 by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom.

  341. 341.

    Cf. Declaration No. 62: this Declaration refers to the prominent role of the Polish trade union federation Solidarność (cf. the German version of the Declaration where the name of the union is not translated into German but left in the Polish original version) in Polish history and manifests in this context that Poland “fully respects social and labour rights, as established by European Union law, and in particular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”; cf. also Blanke (2012), p. 176.

  342. 342.

    With respect to the term “extension” cf. in particular Lindner (2008), p. 793.

  343. 343.

    Cf. Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 11.

  344. 344.

    Piris (2010), p. 161, points out that the recitals of Protocol No. 30 express the opinion of all MS and commit not only the UK and Poland but also the other 25 MS.

  345. 345.

    Mehde (2008), p. 272.

  346. 346.

    Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ 21 December 2011) para 120; Lindner (2008), p. 789; note the differentiated approach of Lindner (2008), p. 794.

  347. 347.

    Lindner (2008), p. 797, argues that it follows from the use of the notion “for the avoidance of doubt” that Art. 1.2 of Protocol No. 30 must be taken into account when interpreting the Art. 27 et seq. EUCFR with respect to all MS.

  348. 348.

    Art. 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36 EUCFR.

  349. 349.

    Art. 33, 37, 38 EUCFR.

  350. 350.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 12; cf. the example given → para 33.

  351. 351.

    Blanke (2012), p. 175, argues with a view to the UK’s submission in the Viking Case (Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [ECJ 11 December 2007]) that Art. 28 and Art. 30 EUCFR “appear to be drafted in terms of rights, not principles, and are thus potentially justiciable”; cf. also Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 6; Barnard (2010), p. 4; → para 31 et seq.

  352. 352.

    Mehde (2008), p. 273.

  353. 353.

    Cf. eg Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ 21 December 2011) para. 64 et seqq.

  354. 354.

    Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 17 December 1970) para 3.

  355. 355.

    Cf. also Piris (2010), p. 163.

  356. 356.

    Chalmers et al. (2011), p. 258.

  357. 357.

    Cf. also Piris (2010), p. 162 et seq.

  358. 358.

    Mehde (2008), p. 273.

  359. 359.

    Pernice (2008), p. 245 et seq.; Ludwig (2011), p. 729, rejects this approach.

  360. 360.

    With respect to Ireland note also Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008, Council of the EU Doc. No. 17271/1/08 REV 1 (revised version of 13 February 2009) and Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 18 and 19 June 2009, Council of the EU Doc. No. 11225/2/09 REV 2 (revised version of 10 July 2009) and the Draft Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, European Council, EUCO 92/11of 6 October 2011; cf. in particular Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 26, who points out that the legal consequences which the “guarantee” (“[T]he Treaty of Lisbon will not affect the continued application of the provisions of the Irish Constitution in relation to the right to life, education and the family”) given by the Council to Ireland might have, are unclear. The proposed protocol was agreed and signed by all MS on 16 May 2012. At the moment it is awaiting ratification by the MS in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

  361. 361.

    Anderson and Murphy (2011), p. 12.

  362. 362.

    The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 29/30 October 2009, Doc. No. 15265/1/09 REV 1, state: “The European Council recalls that the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon requires ratification by each of the 27 Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. It reaffirms its determination to see the Treaty enter into force by the end of 2009, thus allowing it to develop its effects in the future. On this basis, and taking into account the position taken by the Czech Republic, the Heads of State or Government have agreed that they will, at the time of the conclusion of the next Accession Treaty and in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, attach the [Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic] (in Annex I) to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” Cf. Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 29/30 October 2009, Doc. No. 15265/1/09 REV 1; cf. Declaration by the Czech Republic on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] O.J. C 83/355.

  363. 363.

    Streinz et al. (2010), p. 126 and fn. 723; cf. Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Judgment of 26 June 2008), whereas inter alia the EUCFR is not inconsistent with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, available in English at http://www.concourt.cz/view/pl-19-08 (accessed on 6 June 2013).

  364. 364.

    Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic, Annex I to Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 29/30 October 2009, Doc. No. 15265/1/09 REV 1.

  365. 365.

    Croatia is the most recent state to become a member of the EU on 1 July 2013. The Accession Treaty was signed on 9 December 2011 and published in the O.J. on 24 April 2012, O.J.L 112/10 (2012).

  366. 366.

    EP (Committee on Constitutional Affairs), Second draft report on the draft protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic (Article 48 (3) of the Treaty on European Union), Doc. No. 2011/0817 (NLE).

  367. 367.

    European Commission, Commission Opinion on a draft European Council decision in favour of examining the proposed amendment of the Treaties concerning the addition of a Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic, COM(2012) 197 final.

  368. 368.

    Declaration No. 53 by the Czech Republic on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

  369. 369.

    Declaration No. 61 by the Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

  370. 370.

    Pernice (2008), p. 249.

  371. 371.

    Lindner (2008), fn. 14.

Table of Cases

ECJ

  • ECJ 04.02.1959, 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Cie v High Authority of the ECSC, ECR 17 [cit. in para 3]

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 6 [Fundamental Rights – The Charter and the ECHR]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_7

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