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The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe

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The European Union after Lisbon

Abstract

Since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on 1 December 2009 the people of Europe, the citizens of the European Union (EU), have taken a great leap forward in terms of their codified legal rights and liberties. For a long time they have been living mostly under judge-made law, be it as a result of the interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg or of the creation or recognition of fundamental rights by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg. While the Strasbourg Court grants legal protection as measured by human rights with universal character, the ECJ in its established case law guaranteed the protection of fundamental rights which the relevant parties sought within the scope of application of the Community Treaties. Now the Treaty of Lisbon recognises rights, freedoms and principles at Union level in a more comprehensive understanding – beyond the mere market-based context – setting them out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) and giving its provisions binding legal force (Art. 6.1 TEU).

Translated by Robert Böttner, assistant at the Chair for Public Law, International Public Law and European Integration at the University of Erfurt. The author would like to thank Professor Eileen Denza for reviewing the translation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. the first paragraph of the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: “The people of Europe […].”

  2. 2.

    Cf. Müller (2005), p. 15, 25; Skouris (2005), p. 31, compares the ECJ in its function with a “supreme specialised court”.

  3. 3.

    Cf. for this analysis the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 349/2007 (22 October 2007), Legal considerations sub 6.1.

  4. 4.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvL 52/71 (Order of 29 May 1974) para 44 et seqq. (in: BVerfGE 37, 271, 280 et seqq.) – Solange I (English translation in: Bundesverfassungsgericht (1992), pp. 270 et seqq.): “As long as the integration process […].”

  5. 5.

    Resolution adopting the Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms, O.J. C 120/51 (1989); in a modified version reconsidered as Title VIII of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 10 February 1994, O.J. C 61/155 (1994).

  6. 6.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) para 104 (in: BVerfGE 73, 339, 376) – Solange II (English translation in: Bundesverfassungsgericht (1992), pp. 613 et seqq.): “In so far as sovereign power is accorded to an international institution within the meaning of Article 24 (1) which is in a position within the sovereign sphere of the Federal Republic to encroach on the essential content of the fundamental rights recognized by the Basic Law, it is necessary, if that entails the removal of legal protection existing under the terms of the Basic Law, that instead, there should be a guarantee of the application of fundamental rights which in substance and effectiveness is essentially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law […].”; in the same way the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvL 1/97 (Order of 7 June 2000) para 61 (in: BVerfGE 102, 147, 164) – Banana Market (English translation available online).

  7. 7.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) (in: BVerfGE 73, 339) – Solange II – Headnote 2: “As long as the European Communities, in particular European Court case law, generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard essential content of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law; references to the Court under Article 100 (1) Basic Law for those purposes are therefore inadmissible.”

  8. 8.

    For the term “judicial dialogue” cf. Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his Opinion submitted to the Court (ECJ, Case C-127/07, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 21 May 2008, para 15–17): “On the contrary, it is inherent in the very nature of the constitutional values of the Union as constitutional values common to the Member States that they must be refined and developed by the Court in a process of ongoing dialogue with the national courts, in particular those responsible for determining the authentic interpretation of the national constitutions. The appropriate instrument of that dialogue is the reference for a preliminary ruling and it is in that context that the question raised here must be understood” (para 17). Cf. further the contributions by Oeter (2007) and Merli (2007).

  9. 9.

    Callewaert (2008).

  10. 10.

    Wildhaber (2005b), p. 43.

  11. 11.

    Garlicki (2008), pp. 511 et seq.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Rodriguez Iglesias (1995), pp. 1271 et seqq.; Blanke (2006), pp. 267 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm (ECJ 12 November 1969) para 7; see also Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (ECJ 13 December 1979) para 15: “[…] that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the law, the observance of which [the Court] ensures […]”.

  14. 14.

    Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 17 December 1970) para 4.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Mayer (2009), p. 89; see also Rodriguez Iglesias (1998).

  16. 16.

    For the first time the ECJ explicitly referred to the ECHR in Case 36/75 Roland Rutili v Ministre de l’intérieur (ECJ 28 October 1975) para 32.

  17. 17.

    Cf. Case 4/73 Nold KG v Commission (ECJ 14 May 1974) para 13.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Rodriguez Iglesias (1995), p. 1273, 1275, 1280, with an interpretation of the references in the various cases to the ECHR.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Kühling (2003), p. 586.

  20. 20.

    See also Pernice (2008), p. 240: “three pillars”; contrary to this systematisation, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 35 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 283) – Lisbon (English translation available online), considers the protection of fundamental rights in the TEU as based on two foundations, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Union’s unwritten fundamental rights, both complemented by the authorisation and obligation of the Union to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

  21. 21.

    Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 303/1 (2007).

  22. 22.

    Hilf and Schorkopf, in Grabitz and Hilf (2002), Art. 6 EUV para 46; also – regarding the common constitutional traditions of the Member States – Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 65 et seqq.

  23. 23.

    For the concept of a source for the interpretation of the law (Rechtserkenntnisquelle) cf. Kühling (2003), p. 589.

  24. 24.

    See the Considerations of Working Group II of the Constitutional Convention, CONV 354/02 of 22 October 2002, p. 9.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 16 et seqq.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Kirchhof (2003), p. 902; cf. also p. 928 (our translation).

  27. 27.

    Updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention, in the light of the drafting adjustments made to the text of the Charter by that Convention – notably to Art. 51 and 52 EUCFR.

  28. 28.

    See Cologne Presidency Conclusions 1999, Annex IV.

  29. 29.

    Schmidt (2010), pp. 55 et seqq., 112 et seqq., 178 et seqq.

  30. 30.

    House of Lords Constitution Committee, European Union (Amendment) Bill and the Lisbon Treaty: Implications for the UK Constitution, 6th Report, 2007-8, HL Paper 84, para 60–61. See also Goldsmith (2001), p. 1212.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Hogan, Der Einfluß der Europäischen Grundrechte-Charta auf die irische Verfassung, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), A VI para 41; with the same result Schmidt (2010), pp. 90 et seqq., 198 et seqq., who favours a judicial review competence in so far as the observing of all guarantees of these principles within this balancing of objectives can be subject to review; Mik, The Charter of Fundamental Rights: determinants of Protective Standards, in Barcz (2009), Sect. 12 II pp. 66 et seqq.; Bodnar, The Charter of Fundamental Rights: Differentiated Legal Character of Charter’s Provisions, Their Consequences for Individuals, Courts and Legislator (2009), Sect. 33 IV pp. 155 et seqq.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 98 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 6 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 78.

  35. 35.

    Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364/1 (2000).

  36. 36.

    Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. C 310/1 (2004) with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union at p. 41 et seqq.

  37. 37.

    Cf. the Declaration concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Declaration 12) annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. C 310/424 (2004), updated once more in O.J. C 303/17 (2007).

  38. 38.

    See the first clause of the Declaration (1) concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, O.J. C 83/337 (2010).

  39. 39.

    Cf. the Preamble of the EUCFR (3rd consideration).

  40. 40.

    Pernice (2008), p. 238.

  41. 41.

    As one of the few cases Mayer (2009), p. 97, mentions the decision in Case C-340/00 Commission v Cwik (ECJ 13 December 2001).

  42. 42.

    Nickel (2009), p. 334, criticises that “not all EU Member State constitutions contain a legal concept of human dignity which guarantees it as an individual right, and to some – such as the UK – such a concept is completely alien to the legal system. Additionally, only few Member States would interpret the protection of human dignity in a way that it could also be used against its bearers (in the Omega case, the players of Gotcha). In the end, the ECJ created a “new” common constitutional concept in the name of constitutional pluralism.”

  43. 43.

    Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (ECJ 14 October 2004) para 34, 36.

  44. 44.

    Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (ECJ 14 October 2004) para 37.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Schwarze (2005), pp. 41 et seq.

  46. 46.

    Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications et al. (ECJ 30 July 1996) para 21, 26.

  47. 47.

    Blanke (2006), pp. 271 et seq.; Kühling (2003), pp. 613 et seqq.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Blanke (2006), pp. 273 et seq.

  49. 49.

    Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission (CFI 21 September 2005), appealed by Joined Cases 402/05 P and 415/05 P Kadi et al. v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008).

  50. 50.

    Case T-306 Yusf et al. v Council and Commission (CFI 21 September 2005), appealed by Joined Cases 402/05 P and 415/05 P Kadi et al. v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008).

  51. 51.

    According to Art. 52.3 EUCFR “the meaning and scope of those rights [i.e. Charter rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR] shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.”

  52. 52.

    In German terminology it describes the normative obligation for the protection of individual interests, giving the beneficiary the legal power to enforce those interests in a court of law.

  53. 53.

    See for the differentiation of these three categories Blanke, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, in this Volume, sub. 5.1.

  54. 54.

    Cf. Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 68, 77 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Cf. Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 37.

  56. 56.

    Cf. Selmer (1998), pp. 81 et seqq.; critical Mayer (2009), p. 98; see also v. Arnauld (2008).

  57. 57.

    Cf. Schroeder (2011), pp. 465 et seqq.

  58. 58.

    Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Schecke GbR and Eifert v Land Hessen (ECJ 9 November 2010) para 77, 86.

  59. 59.

    This can be inferred from Case C-58/08 Vodafone et al. v Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ECJ 8 June 2010) para 63 et seqq., 68 et seqq.

  60. 60.

    Cf. the Declaration concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Declaration 12) annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. C 310/424 (2004), updated once more in O.J. C 303/17 (2007). Following Pernice (2008), p. 242, the explanations will have at least symbolically “more weight” by reason of their new position within the Treaty compared to the Constitutional Treaty where they have been situated amongst the basic principles and objectives.

  61. 61.

    Cf. the Introduction to the explanations (O.J. C 303/17 (2007)): These explanations “do not as such have the status of law, they are a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter”.

  62. 62.

    Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 127; Kornobis-Romanowska, Strengthening of an Individual’s Status in the EU after the EU’s Accession to the ECHR – Consequences for the Legislator and National Courts – Practical Results, in Barcz (2009), Sect. 65 I pp. 305 et seqq.

  63. 63.

    See Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 52 GrCh para 21, 37 et seq.

  64. 64.

    See Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 52 GrCh para 27 et seqq.

  65. 65.

    Cf. Frenz (2009), para 132 et seqq.

  66. 66.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 226 et seqq.

  67. 67.

    Cf. European Scrutiny Committee, Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2006-07, European Union Intergovernmental Conference, HC 1014; cf. in this sense also: Pernice (2008), p. 245; Mayer (2009), p. 94. See also Barnard (2008), p. 258, according to whom “for Eurosceptic audiences, the UK government has been willing to let it be referred to as an opt-out. Yet for more informed audiences the UK government insists that it is not an opt-out but merely clarification.”

  68. 68.

    ‘The paper tiger that is no threat to Britain’s fundamental rights’ Parliamentary Brief, 10 March 2008 (http://www.thepolitician.org/articles/the-paper-tiger-646.html).

  69. 69.

    See e.g. the UK’s submissions to the Court in the Viking case (Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line ABP [2007] ECR I-000) discussed in Bercusson, ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’ (2007) 13 ELJ 279, 300; see also Mik, The Charter of Fundamental Rights: determinants of Protective Standards, in Barcz (2009), Sect. 14 I p. 75.

  70. 70.

    See for the following interpretation Barnard (2008), p. 269 et seqq.

  71. 71.

    Declaration (No. 62) by the Republic of Poland concerning the Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in relation to Poland and the United Kingdom annexed to the TEU, O.J. C 83/358 (2010).

  72. 72.

    With regard to gay marriage the Charter is concerned in so far as the anti-discrimination clause (Title III: Art. 21 EUCFR) prohibits also discriminations on grounds of “sexual orientation”.

  73. 73.

    Convincingly Barnard (2008), p. 258.

  74. 74.

    Article 28.1 GG reads: “The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this Basic Law. In each Land, county and municipality the people shall be represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. In county and municipal elections, persons who possess citizenship in any member state of the European Community are also eligible to vote and to be elected in accord with European Community law […].” See also Tettinger and Schwarz, in v. Mangoldt et al. (2010), Art. 28 GG para 11 et seqq. (26 et seqq.) with further reference.

  75. 75.

    Cf. Krüger and Polakiewicz (2001), p. 97.

  76. 76.

    Case T-191/98 R DSR-Senator Lines v Commission (CFI 21 July 1999), appealed by Case C-364/99 P(R) DSR-Senator Lines v Commission (ECJ 14 December 1999).

  77. 77.

    Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line et al. v Commission (CFI 30 September 2003).

  78. 78.

    Case 56672/00 SENATOR LINES GmbH v Members of the EC (ECtHR 10 March 2004).

  79. 79.

    Case 13710/88 Niemietz v Germany (ECtHR 16 December 1992).

  80. 80.

    Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission (ECJ 21 September 1989) para 57 et seqq.

  81. 81.

    Cf. Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 29 April 2010, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission et al., para 45 et seqq. (in appeal procedures of Akzo Ltd. Against a judgment of the General Court – (former Court of First Instance), Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd und Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission (CFI 17 September 2007).

  82. 82.

    Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott delivered on 29 April 2010, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission et al., para 75 et seqq. (82).

  83. 83.

    See Schwarze (2005), p. 43 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Ress (2002), p. 3.

  85. 85.

    Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECJ 28 March 1996).

  86. 86.

    Draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16 final of 19 July 2011.

  87. 87.

    Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany (ECJ 10 September 1996) para 52; Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (ECJ 20 September 1990) para 9.

  88. 88.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 259 et seqq., who, regarding primary law, takes a view that differs from the position represented in this text.

  89. 89.

    In this sense Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECJ 28 March 1996) para 4.

  90. 90.

    Cf. Schmalenbach, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 216 para 50.

  91. 91.

    Cf. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 27; see also DRAFT Explanatory report the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE (2011) 16 final of 19 July 2011, p. 11 para 5.

  92. 92.

    Cf. H. Mosler, Schlussbericht, in: I. Meier, Europäischer Rechtsschutz, Schranken und Wirkungen, 1982, p. 355, cited in Ress (2002), p. 4.

  93. 93.

    Case 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005) para 152 et seq.: While the Convention “does not prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign power to an international (including a supranational) organization [each] Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations.”

  94. 94.

    Case 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005) para 156: “[T]he presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organization. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of the Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a constitutional instrument of European public order.” Unlike the Bundesverfassungsgericht (“Solange II”) the ECtHR does not a priori abstain from an evaluation of the justification and holds complaints, which claim an insufficient level of protection of fundamental rights of the Union, inadmissible pursuant to Art. 35 ECHR; cf. Haratsch (2006), p. 935.

  95. 95.

    Ress (2002), p. 5 (our translation); Kingreeen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 23 holds that divergences in case law are “not very likely anymore.”

  96. 96.

    See the third consideration of the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH-UE(2011)16 final of 19 July 2011, p. 2.: “Considering that the accession of the European Union to the Convention will enhance coherence in human rights protection in Europe.” Cf. also Kornobis-Romanowska, in Barcz (2009), Sect. 65 I pp. 305 et seqq.

  97. 97.

    Case 24833/94 Matthews v United Kingdom (ECtHR 18 February 1999).

  98. 98.

    Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom relating to the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, O.J. L 278/1 (1976), corr. O.J. L 326/32 (1976).

  99. 99.

    Cf. Merli (2007); Ch. Menè, Judicial review of the relationship between the European courts and the national constitutional courts (Germany, Italy and Spain), PhD thesis 2008.

  100. 100.

    Cf. Krüger and Polakiewicz (2001), p. 98; Oeter (2007).

  101. 101.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 241 et seqq.

  102. 102.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 180 et seqq.

  103. 103.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 184 et seqq.

  104. 104.

    See Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 52 GrCh para 28, 38.

  105. 105.

    Explanation on Article 52 – Scope and interpretation of rights and principles, no. 1 and 2, O.J. C 303/32 et seqq. (2007).

  106. 106.

    See Callewaert (2003), p. 200; v. Danwitz, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 51.

  107. 107.

    Cf. Braibant (2001), Art. 52, p. 264; v. Danwitz, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 GrCh para 4, 51 et seqq.

  108. 108.

    Case 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005) para 155: “State action taken in compliance with legal obligations [flowing from the membership in a supranational organization] is justified as long as the relevant organization is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides.” Cf. with regard to the assumption of equivalence Haratsch (2006), pp. 927 et seqq. Also Garlicki (2008), p. 509, must concede that “the manifest deficiency test may not be easy to meet and that the burden of proof seems to be placed upon an applicant […]”.

  109. 109.

    Case 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005) para 156.

  110. 110.

    Cf. Wildhaber (2005b), pp. 47 et seq.

  111. 111.

    Similarly the expectations of Kingreeen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 EUV para 23.

  112. 112.

    Cf. Frenz (2009), para 146 et seqq.

  113. 113.

    Limbach (2000), p. 420.

  114. 114.

    Case 17851/91 Vogt v Germany (ECtHR 26 September 1995), EuGRZ 1995, 590 para 60 et seq. and 66 et seqq.

  115. 115.

    Cited in German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 17 (in: BVerfGE 111, 307, 312 et seq.) – Görgülü I (English translation available online).

  116. 116.

    Cf. Tomuschat (2010), pp. 524 et seq.

  117. 117.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 34 (in: BVerfGE 111, 307, 318) – Görgülü I.

  118. 118.

    Cf. Lübbe-Wolff (2006), para 8.

  119. 119.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 50 (in: BVerfGE 111, 307, 324 et seq.) – Görgülü I.

  120. 120.

    Cf. Papier (2005), p. 124, who (p. 123) bases the use of the term “to take into account” and “to consider” also on Art. 46.1 ECHR; this Article, Papier argues, provides that final judgments of the Strasbourg Court are only binding on the contracting party, and has no universal validity or bindingness (in the meaning of Sect. 31.1 Statute of the Federal Constitutional Court – BVerfGG). Tomuschat (2010), p 523, criticises this passage of the pronouncement of the Constitutional Court as “unfortunate”. In his opinion the conclusion drawn at the end of the legal grounds to the effect that the relevant domestic court “is not bound regarding the actual outcome” of the further proceedings (German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 [Order of 14 October 2004] para 69) “fails grossly in reflecting the correct legal position”.

  121. 121.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 731/80 (Order of 17 May 1983) para 63 (in: BVerfGE 64, 135, 157) and 2 BvR 209/84 (Order of 13 January 1987) para 90 (in: BVerfGE 74, 102, 128); a limited constitutional review on the application of the Convention by the specialised courts was for the first time affirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in the order in the case of Pakelli, 2 BvR 336/85 (Order of 11 November 1985) (in: NJW 1986, 1425) and then again in 2 BvR 1226/83, 101, 313/84 (Order of 12 May 1987) para 191 et seq. (in: BVerfGE 76, 1, 78) – Family Reunification.

  122. 122.

    Cf. Schilling (2010), pp. 253 et seqq. (255).

  123. 123.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 47 (in: BVerfGE 111, 307, 323 et seq.) – Görgülü I: “[T]he binding effect of decisions of the [ECtHR] depends on the area of competence of the State bodies and the relevant law. Administrative bodies and courts may not free themselves from the constitutional system of competencies and the binding effect of statute and law by relying on a decision of the [ECtHR]. Both, a failure to consider a decision of the [ECtHR] and the ‘enforcement’ of such a decision in a schematic way, in violation of prior-ranking law, may therefore violate fundamental rights in conjunction with the principle of the rule of law” (Art. 20.3 GG).

  124. 124.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 62 (in: BVerfGE 111, 307, 329) – Görgülü I.

  125. 125.

    Following Lübbe-Wolff (2006), para 17, “this latter possibility should normally never come to be realized, because, as the Constitutional Court has stressed, courts and other state organs are obliged to do anything legally possible to interpret German law in such a way as to avoid its realization”.

  126. 126.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 1664/04 (Order of 5 April 2005) para 25 – Görgülü II (English translation available online).

  127. 127.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2790/04 (Order of 10 June 2005) para 35 – Görgülü III (English translation available online), referring to German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1481/04 (Order of 14 October 2004) para 30, 60 et seqq. – Görgülü I.

  128. 128.

    Article 117 of the Italian Constitution (as of 18 October 2001) states: “Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations […].”

  129. 129.

    Cf. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 349/2007 (22 October 2007), Legal considerations sub 6.2 (our translation): “[…] l’obbligo del legislatore ordinario di rispettare dette norme, con la conseguenza che la norma nazionale incompatibile con la norma della CEDU e dunque con gli ‘obblighi internazionali’ di cui all’art. 117, primo comma, viola per ciò stesso tale parametro costituzionale.”

  130. 130.

    Cf. Italian Constitutional Court judgment 349/2007 (22 October 2007), Legal considerations sub 6.2 (our translation): “[…] che deve essere preso in considerazione e sistematicamente interpretato l’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in quanto parametro rispetto al quale valutare la compatibilità della norma censurata con l’art. 1 del Protocollo addizionale alla CEDU, così come interpretato dalla Corte dei diritti dell’uomo di Strasburgo […]. Ne consegue che al giudice comune spetta interpretare la norma interna in modo conforme alla disposizione internazionale, entro i limiti nei quali ciò sia permesso dai testi delle norme. Qualora ciò non sia possibile, ovvero dubiti della compatibilità della norma interna con la disposizione convenzionale ‘interposta’, egli deve investire questa Corte della relativa questione di legittimità costituzionale rispetto al parametro dell’art. 117, primo comma […]”.

  131. 131.

    Cf. Italian Constitutional Court judgment 349/2007 (22 October 2007), Legal considerations sub 6.1.1 (our translation): “In linea generale, è stato anche riconosciuto valore interpretativo alla CEDU, in relazione sia ai parametri costituzionali che alle norme censurate […]”. The Court thereby refers to judgment n. 505/1995 and ordinanza n. 305/2001.

  132. 132.

    Lübbe-Wolff (2006), para 9 and 3 with references to Kadelbach (2005), 480, 484, and Cremer (2004), p. 688.

  133. 133.

    Cf. also Papier (2006), p. 2; Dörr (2006), p. 1092; Meyer-Ladewig and Petzold (2005), p. 19; Roller (2004).

  134. 134.

    Garlicki (2008), p. 521.

  135. 135.

    Cf. Grabenwarter (2009a), Sect. 3; Hoffmeister (2001), pp. 357 et seqq., 364 et seqq.

  136. 136.

    Case 15318/89 Loizidou v Turkey (ECtHR 18 December 1996) para 70, 75, 93; cf. Hoffmeister (2001), p. 353: ECHR as “fundamental rights constitution [Grundrechtsverfassung]”; see already Frowein (1988), p. 152, who calls the ECHR a “European partial constitution [europäische Teilverfassung]” which has formed a “common European area of fundamental rights [gemeineuropäischer Grundrechtsfreiraum]”.

  137. 137.

    Cf. Case 71503/01 Assanidze v Georgia (ECtHR 8 April 2004) para 198: “[A] judgment in which it finds a breach [of the convention] imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and to make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach.” In the Görgülu case the ECtHR awarded the applicant 15.000 € in damages: Case 74969/01 Görgulü v Germany (ECtHR 26 February 2004). Lübbe-Wolff (2006), para 11 et seq., has stressed – in reference to the Görgülü I decision of the FCC (para 34) – that “the statement that the national constitution has precedence is a statement made from the point of view of domestic law. […] From the point of view of international law, the matter looks very different. Obviously, a national court which, in a case of conflict between the national constitution and an international agreement, gives precedence to the constitution, will, in doing so, produce a violation of international law […]. In such a case, future conflicts of the same type can be avoided by changing the relevant law.” See also Weber (2007), p. 1759, critically distancing from the Görgülü I decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

  138. 138.

    See remarks of former Advocate General at the ECJ C. O. Lenz to the Gibraltar judgment of the ECtHR, EuZW 1999, pp. 311 et seq.; critical Limbach (2000), pp. 417 et seqq.; the term is also used by Garlicki (2008), p. 512, but in the sense of “collisions [within] the triangle of cooperation [that] may degenerate into a ‘Bermuda triangle’ in which individual rights and liberties might simply disappear”.

  139. 139.

    Cf. Garlicki (2008), pp. 511 et seq.

  140. 140.

    Caroline von Hannover had on several occasions unsuccessfully applied to the German courts for an injunction preventing any further publication of a series of photographs of herself with her children on the ground in the German magazines “Bunte”, “Freizeit Revue” and “Neue Post”. Caroline claimed that they infringed her right to protection to control the use of her image. The Federal Constitutional Court granted the applicant’s injunction regarding the photographs in which she appeared with her children on the ground that their need for protection of their intimacy was greater than that of adults. However, the German Constitutional Court considered that the applicant, who was undeniably a contemporary “public figure”, had to tolerate the publication of photographs of herself in a public place, even if they showed her in scenes from her daily life rather than engaged in official duties. The Constitutional Court referred in that connection to the freedom of the press and to the public’s legitimate interest in knowing how such a person generally behaved in public.

  141. 141.

    Cf. Case 59320/00 Hannover v Germany (ECtHR 24 June 2004).

  142. 142.

    Nickel (2009), pp. 337 et seq.

  143. 143.

    Cf. Papier (2005), p. 126 (our translation); agreed on by Müller (2005), p. 23.

  144. 144.

    Case 22028/04 Zaunegger v Germany (ECtHR 3 December 2009).

  145. 145.

    BGBl. 1997 I, p. 2942.

  146. 146.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 420/09 (Order of 21 July 2010) Headnote 1.

  147. 147.

    In this sense the evaluation of Voßkuhle, in: v. Mangoldt et al. (2010), Art. 93 GG para 87 et seq.

  148. 148.

    Cf. Ingrid Leijten (2011)

  149. 149.

    Case 19359/04 M. v Germany (ECtHR 17 December 2009).

  150. 150.

    Case 17792/07 Kallweit v Germany (ECtHR 13 January 2011).

  151. 151.

    Case 30493/04 Schmitz v Germany (ECtHR 9 June 2011).

  152. 152.

    Case 31047/04 and 43386/08 Mork v Germany (ECtHR 9 June 2011)

  153. 153.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2365/09 et al. (Judgment of 4 May 2011) para 88, 89 (our translation).

  154. 154.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2365/09 et al. (Judgment of 4 May 2011) para 89 (our translation)

  155. 155.

    Case 30493/04 Schmitz v Germany (ECtHR 9 June 2011) para 41; Case 31047/04 and 43386/08 Mork v Germany (ECtHR 9 June 2011) para 54.

  156. 156.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) para 104, 107, 130 (in: BVerfGE 73, 339, 376, 378, 384) – Solange II: “There are no decisive factors to lead one to conclude that the standard of fundamental rights which has been achieved under Community law is not adequately consolidated and is only of a transitory nature […]. Nor is it to be expected in the view of the state of European Court case law achieved at the present stage that a decline in the standards of fundamental rights under Community law might result through the legal connection of Community law with the constitutions of member states to an extent that makes it impossible on constitutional grounds to regard a reasonable protection of fundamental rights as being generally available.” Cf. the comment of Rupp (1987), pp. 241 et seq.

  157. 157.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) paras 106, 157 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 188, 210) – Maastricht (English translation in Oppenheimer 1994, pp. 527–575): “If, for instance, European institutions or authorities were to apply or extend the Union Treaty in some way which was no longer covered by the Treaty in the form which constituted the basis of the German law approving it, the resulting legal act would not be binding on German sovereign territory. The German organs of State would be prevented, on constitutional grounds, from applying those legal acts in Germany. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court examines whether legal acts of the European institutions and bodies keep within or exceed the limits of the sovereign rights granted to them (cf. BVerfGE 58, 1 [30f.]; 75, 223 [235, 242]). […] Hitherto a dynamic extension of the existing Treaties has been based on a liberal application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, along the lines of a ‘competence to perfect the Treaty’ [i.e. the lacuna-filling competence], on the idea of the inherent competences of the European Communities (‘implied powers’) and on an interpretation of the Treaty as implying the fullest possible utilisation of Community powers (‘effet utile’) (cf. Zuleeg, in: von der Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlermann, EWG-Vertrag, 4th edition 1991, Art. 2, para 3). In future, however, when Community institutions and bodies interpret rules conferring competence, it will have to be borne in mind that the Union Treaty draws a fundamental distinction between the exercise of a sovereign power granted on a limited basis and amendment of the Treaty. Any interpretation of that Treaty must not, therefore, amount in effect to an extension of it. Such an interpretation of rules conferring competences would not give rise to any binding effect for Germany”; in its decision on the Treaty of Lisbon (German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 338 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 399 et seq.) – Lisbon) the Federal Constitutional Court underlines that it had already found in its decision on the Treaty of Maastricht “whether legal instruments of the European institutions and bodies remain within the limits of the sovereign powers conferred on them or if the Community jurisdiction interprets the treaties in an extensive manner that is tantamount to an inadmissible autonomous Treaty amendment.”

  158. 158.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 70 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 174 et seq.) – Maastricht: “The Federal Constitutional Court guarantees, by virtue of its jurisdiction […], that persons resident in Germany are assured in general of effective protection of basic rights, even in relation to the sovereign power of the Communities, and that this protection is essentially to be regarded as substantively equivalent to the protection of basic rights laid down as inalienable by the Basic Law, especially as the Court guarantees in general the substance of the basic rights. The Federal Constitutional Court thus also safeguards that substance vis-à-vis the sovereign power of the Community (cf. BVerfGE 37, 339 [386]). The acts of a special public authority of a supranational organization, which is separate from the State authority of the Member States, also concern those entitled to basic rights in Germany. They thus affect the guarantees contained in the Basic Law and the tasks of the Federal Constitutional Court which have as their object the protection of basic rights in Germany and, to that extent, not only in relation to German State organs […]. However, the Federal Constitutional Court exercises its jurisdiction over the applicability of secondary Community law in Germany in a ‘relationship of cooperation’ with the European Court of Justice. The European Court of Justice guarantees the protection of basic rights in each individual case for the entire territory of the European Communities and the Federal Constitutional Court is therefore able to confine itself to providing a general guarantee of the unalterable standard of basic rights (cf. BVerfGE 73, 339 [387]).”

  159. 159.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvL 1/97 (Order of 7 June 2000) para 61 (in: BVerfGE 102, 147, 164) – Banana Market; Cf. the comment of Classen (2000), pp. 1157 et seqq.

  160. 160.

    Article 23.1, first sentence, GG: “With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.”

  161. 161.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240 et seq. (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 353 et seq.) – Lisbon; see also para 339: “[…] in any case in the clear absence of a constitutive order to apply the law […]” (emphasis added).

  162. 162.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240 et seq. (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 353 et seq.) – Lisbon. The Court thereby refers to its judgment 2 BvR 2236/04 (18 July 2005) para 70 (in: BVerfGE 113, 273, 296) – European Arrest Warrant.

  163. 163.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 106 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 188) – Maastricht; previously in: German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1107, 1124/77 and 195/79 (Order of 23 June 1981) para 91 et seq. (in: BVerfGE 58, 1, 30 et seq.) – Eurocontrol I; German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 687/85 (Order of 8 April 1987) para 43, 58 (in: BVerfGE 75, 223, 235, 242) – Kloppenburg.

  164. 164.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 70 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 175) – Maastricht.

  165. 165.

    Article 90.1 of the Polish Constitution provides: “The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters.”

  166. 166.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. K 32/09 (24 November 2010 English translation available online) pp. 22, 40, referring to K. Działocha, Commentary to Art. 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, in L. Garlicki (ed.), Konstytucja RP, Komentarz, Warszawa 2007, vol. 5, p. 14. The Polish Constitutional Court (p. 23) includes the following matters in the concept of the constitutional identity, thus prohibiting a conferral of “decisions specifying the fundamental principles of the Constitution and decisions concerning the rights of the individual which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the requirement of protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, the principle of statehood, the principle of democratic governance, the principle of a state ruled by law, the principle of social justice, the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the requirement of ensuring better implementation of constitutional values and the prohibition to confer the power to amend the Constitution and the competence to determine competences.”

  167. 167.

    Critical with regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU Körner (2009), p. 359 et seqq.

  168. 168.

    See Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. K 32/09 (24 November 2010) p. 23: “The constitutional identity remains in a close relation with the concept of national identity, which also includes the tradition and culture.”

  169. 169.

    Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Germany (ECJ 11 January 2000).

  170. 170.

    Tomuschat (2005), p. 872 (our translation).

  171. 171.

    Herzog and Gerken (2008); Bauer and Arnold (2006); Preis (2006).

  172. 172.

    Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, O.J. L 303/16 (2000).

  173. 173.

    Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005) para 60 et seqq.

  174. 174.

    Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005) para 67 et seqq.

  175. 175.

    Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 22 November 2005) para 74.

  176. 176.

    Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (ECJ 19 January 2010) para 20, 21, 50, 51, 54.

  177. 177.

    Cf. Gerken et al. (2009), p. 67.

  178. 178.

    Papier (2009), p. 114 with reference to the criticism in Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA (Opinion of Advocate General Jàn Mazák 15 February 2007) para 79 et seqq., 87 et seqq., 138.

  179. 179.

    Cf. Gerken et al. (2009), pp. VII et seq., 17 et seqq., 67 et seqq.

  180. 180.

    German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), 7 AZR 500/04 (Judgment of 26 April 2006) and press release no. 27/06 – Honeywell.

  181. 181.

    Cf. Bauer (2006).

  182. 182.

    Herzog and Gerken (2008), p. 2 (our translation).

  183. 183.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) – Honeywell. (English translation available online)

  184. 184.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 66 – Honeywell.

  185. 185.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 60 et seq. – Honeywell.

  186. 186.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 66 – Honeywell: “[…] the task and status of the independent suprastate case-law must be safeguarded. This means, on the one hand, respect for the Union’s own methods of justice to which the Court of Justice considers itself to be bound and which do justice to the ‘uniqueness’ of the Treaties and goals that are inherent to them […]. Secondly, the Court of Justice has a right to tolerance of error. It is hence not a matter for the Federal Constitutional Court in questions of the interpretation of Union law which with a methodical interpretation of the statute can lead to different outcomes in the usual legal science discussion framework, to supplant the interpretation of the Court of Justice with an interpretation of its own. Interpretations of the bases of the Treaties are also to be tolerated which, without a considerable shift in the structure of competences, constitute a restriction to individual cases and either do not permit impacts on fundamental rights to arise which constitute a burden or do not oppose domestic compensation for such burdens.”

  187. 187.

    Cf. Gerken et al. (2009), p. 58.

  188. 188.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 100, 104 et seq. – dissenting opinion of Justice Landau in the case of Honeywell.

  189. 189.

    For this double foundation – though with regard to the obligation of the specialised courts to refer – cf. Papier (2009), p. 117.

  190. 190.

    Schwarze (2005), pp. 47 et seq.; for basic remarks on the obligation to refer, see Mayer (2003), pp. 232 et seqq. The then President of the German Federal Constitutional Court, H.-J. Papier, considered “especially the national specialised courts [to be] called upon” to seize the opportunity for cooperation with the ECJ, which is necessary for effective legal protection. “Meanwhile it is not improbable that one day even the Bundesverfassungsgericht will refer to the Court a question concerning the validity of a Community legal act, namely when proceedings before a specialised court have not been required or possible” (our translation) – cf. Papier (2009), p. 116 with FN 49. References for preliminary ruling pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU have already been made by the Austrian Constitutional Court (Case C-465/00 Österreichischer Rundfunk et al. (ECJ 20 May 2003)) as well as the Italian Constitutional Court (Sentenza No. 102 (13 December 2008) – Tasse di Lusso Sardegna); see also Huber (2009), p. 582.

  191. 191.

    Therefore, the Lisbon decision could be described as the “Solange III” decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.

  192. 192.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 191 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 335) – Lisbon, emphasis added. This principle was repeated by the German Court in its decision: German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08 and 1 BvR 586/08 (Judgment of 2 March 2010) para 181 – Data Retention: “The Federal Constitutional Court, however, generally no longer exercises its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of Community law or now Union law cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign sphere of the Federal Republic of Germany, and no longer reviews this legislation against the standard of the fundamental rights of the Basic Law as long as the European Communities (now the European Union), especially the case law of the European Court, generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights, which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE 73, 339, 387; 102, 147, 162 et seq.). These principles apply to domestic legal provisions as well which transpose mandatory requirements of a directive into German legislation. Constitutional Complaints that challenge the application of binding legislation of the European Union in this sense are generally inadmissible (cf. BVerfGE 118, 79, 95; 121, 1, 15)” (our translation).

  193. 193.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 337 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 399) – Lisbon, referring to German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) para 76 (in: BVerfGE 73, 339, 367) – Solange II.

  194. 194.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 337 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 399) – Lisbon.

  195. 195.

    With the same result Gärditz and Hillgruber (2009), pp. 873 seq.

  196. 196.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 241 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 354 et seq.) – Lisbon.

  197. 197.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, BvL 52/71 (Order of 29 May 1974) para 55 (BVerfGE 37, 271, 280 et seqq.) – Solange I; Daiber (2010), p. 29; differently Hillgruber and Goos (2006), para 598.

  198. 198.

    In Solange II (German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) para 132 (in: BVerfGE 73, 339, 387)) the Bundesverfassungsgericht dissociates itself from Solange I (supra footnote 5) and declares that it “will no loner exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Union law cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights contained in the Bais Law”; reference pursuant to Art. 100.1 GG it holds “inadmissible”.

  199. 199.

    Cf. Schlaich and Korioth (2007), para 214.

  200. 200.

    Correctly Pache (2009), p. 297; also Classen (2009), p. 888: “remarkable and unnecessary” as well as “contrary to European law” (our translation); characteristic of the position of Gärditz and Hillgruber (2009), p. 874, vis-à-vis this axiom of European integration is their recommendation to the legislator (both ordinary and with the power to change the constitution) to “follow this advice [of the Bundesverfassungsgericht]” (our translation).

  201. 201.

    Cf. Gerken et al. (2009), p. 58, 68 (our translation).

  202. 202.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 244 et seqq. (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 356) – Lisbon.

  203. 203.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 253, 364 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 359 et seq., 413) – Lisbon.

  204. 204.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 260 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 363) – Lisbon.

  205. 205.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 338 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 399 et seq.) – Lisbon with reference to German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 106, 157 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 188, 210) – Maastricht.

  206. 206.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 337 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 399) – Lisbon.

  207. 207.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 339 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 400) – Lisbon (emphasis added).

  208. 208.

    In this sense the evaluation of Voßkuhle, in: v. Mangoldt et al. (2010), Art. 93 GG para 84a to 84c; Gerken et al. (2009), p. 69.

  209. 209.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, BvL 52/71 (Order of 29 May 1974) para 55 (BVerfGE 37, 271, 280 et seqq.) – Solange I.

  210. 210.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 353) – Lisbon.

  211. 211.

    See also Pache (2009), pp. 297 et seq.; Broß (2008), p. 229, prefers the term “complementary relationship [Komplementärverhältnis]”, so that “the Bundesverfassungsericht […] does not put itself in the subordinate position of an institution with a reserve competence, but rather […] actively and strategically signals that it will always consider taking actions if, from the perspective of German constitutional law, a development at Community level gives a reason to complain” (our translation).

  212. 212.

    Cf. Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007a), pp. 830 et seq. (our translation); Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007b), para 34 et seqq.

  213. 213.

    Cf. Dederer (2006); Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007a), pp. 825 et seqq.; Mayer et al. (2008); Niedobitek (2008); Grabenwarter (2009b), pp. 123 et seqq. has comprehensively covered the relationship between Union law and national constitutional law in his contribution.

  214. 214.

    Niedobitek (2008), p. 82; Dederer (2006) p. 582, on the other hand, speaks of “primacy” as a “rule of hierarchy” without any further explanation. Nonetheless, national constitutional law and Union law are not connected in a hierarchical relation, but rather both areas of law are to be distinguished with regard to the principle of their respective competences.

  215. 215.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 241 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 354 et seq.) – Lisbon.

  216. 216.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 339 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 400) – Lisbon.

  217. 217.

    Case 6/64 Flamino Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ 15 July 1964).

  218. 218.

    Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 17 December 1970).

  219. 219.

    Broß (2008), pp. 230 et seq. (our translation).

  220. 220.

    See Opinion 1/91 European Economic Area (ECJ 14 December 1991) para 21.

  221. 221.

    Cf. Mangiameli, Impulse aus dem italienischen Verfassungsrecht für den europäischen Grundrechtsschutz, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), A VII para 35 (our translation); Broß (2008), p. 231 “replies” to this argument that “the ECJ has only been able to develop the protection of fundamental rights at Community level by claiming for itself a Kompetenz-Kompetenz [i.e. the power to set one’s own competences] which it has actually not been entitled to” (our translation).

  222. 222.

    Pernice (2008), p. 236, 239 et seq.

  223. 223.

    Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (ECJ 17 December 1970).

  224. 224.

    Ipsen (1972), p. 289, 720.

  225. 225.

    Cf. Gerken et al. (2009), pp. 53 et seqq. (57).

  226. 226.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 353 et seq.) – Lisbon.

  227. 227.

    Gerken et al. (2009), p. 58.

  228. 228.

    Gerken et al. (2009), p. 58 (our translation).

  229. 229.

    Correctly Kühling (2003), p. 585.

  230. 230.

    Article I-6 TCE: “La Constitution et le droit adopté par les institutions de l’Union dans l’exercise des compétences qui lui sont attribués ont la primauté sur le droit des États membres”.

  231. 231.

    Cf. Denza (2004), pp. 267 et seqq.

  232. 232.

    Grimm (1995), pp. 49 et seq., – as opposed to mere “constitutionality” – holds that the point of no return to a “nationalisation of the European Union [i.e. its becoming a state]” has been reached once “those elements have been included in the Treaties that so far they lack to actually call them a constitution in the proper meaning of the word.” Then, “primacy of Community law over national law would no longer be the result of an order for the Member States to apply the principle contained in the Treaties but rather a constitutional order rooted in the constitution of the Community” (our translation).

  233. 233.

    Cf. Niedobitek (2008), pp. 102 et seq.

  234. 234.

    Doc. 1197/07.

  235. 235.

    Cf. Mayer (2007), who raises the question whether this postulated primacy over the constitutional law of the Member States “is confirmed by primary law”. At the same time he points out that there is no limitation by the Opinion of the Council Legal Service; cf. also Mayer (2006).

  236. 236.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 331, 335 (in: BVerfGE 123, 267, 396 et seq. and 398) – Lisbon. Previously in German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 197/83 (Order of 22 October 1986) para 103 (in: BVerfGE 73, 339, 375) – Solange II and 2 BvR 687/85 (Order of 8 April 1987) para 61 (in: BVefGE 75, 223, 244) – Kloppenburg.

  237. 237.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 53 et seqq. – Honeywell.

  238. 238.

    Cf. Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (ECJ 9 March 1978), Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.'90 Srl et al. (ECJ 22 October 1998); for this see Niedobitek (2008), p. 80, who rightly holds that – counter to the majority’s opinion – “in the end” the effect of “the primacy of application is the same as an absolute or unrestricted primacy without, however, directly questioning the formal validity of conflicting national law” (our translation). For an interpretation of Art. I-6 TCE with regard to national constitutional provisions (“Federal law shall take precedence over Land law”) cf. di Salvatore (2006). As a result and taking into account the grammatical-lexical, the systematic and the teleological interpretation of the European Constitutional Treaty, he only assumes (p. 397) an inapplicability of the domestic provision. He thereby opposes the thesis of E. Grabitz, Gemeinschaftsrecht bricht nationales Recht, 1966, pp. 113 et seqq., according to which the conflicting relationship between national law and law of the Community leads to the voidness of the national provision.

  239. 239.

    In Germany the ECHR has the rank of a federal law (Art. 59.2, first sentence, GG) and in Italy that of a “legge ordinaria”; for the legal situation in Italy, where there is no respective constitutional provision, cf. Italian Constitutional Court, judgments n. 388/1999, n. 315/1990, n. 188/1980, n. 349/2007; ordinanza n. 464/2005.

  240. 240.

    Dederer (2006), p. 591, speaks of a “‘tectonic’ movement between the international and national level” (our translation).

  241. 241.

    Schneiders (2010), pp. 255 et seqq., who talks of a comprehensive primacy, irrespective of the reservations of a Member State and the lack of ratification of a Protocol.

  242. 242.

    Primacy of Union law over ordinary law has been expressly provided for by a series of acceding states from central and eastern Europe in their national constitutions: Lithuania (Art. 2 of the constitutional act on the membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union) as well as Slovakia (Art. 7 of the Slovak Constitution in the version of the constitutional act 90/2001). The constitutional situation in Malta (similar to Art. 117 of the Italian Constitution in the version of the amendment of 2001) is in need of interpretation. According to Art. 65 of the Maltese Constitution the Parliament makes laws in full accordance with inter alia “the international and regional obligations of Malta, especially those that result from the Treaty on the accession to the European Union signed in Athens on 16 April 2003.”

  243. 243.

    Grabenwarter (2009b), pp. 123 et seqq.

  244. 244.

    House of Lords, Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State, (1991) 1AC 603.

  245. 245.

    Cf. Everling (2005), pp. 70 et seq.

  246. 246.

    Italian Constitutional Court, 170/1984 (8 June 1984) – Granital, in: Giurs. Cost. 1984, pp. 1222 et seqq., with reference to judgment 183/1973 (27 December 1973) – Frontini, in: Giur. Cost. 1973, pp. 2401 et seqq. (part 9 of the grounds); see for this Tizzano (2010) and Mangiameli (2008), pp. 15 et seqq., 30 et seqq.

  247. 247.

    Cf. to judgment 183/1973 (27 December 1973) – Frontini, Foro italiano 1974, para 9; to judgment 170/1984 (8 June 1984) – Granital, Foro italiano 1984 I, para 7.

  248. 248.

    The Corte thereby referred to its judgments for giving substance to the inviolable rights of the person (Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution), the right to life (judgments no. 27/1975, no. 35/1997; 223/1996), the right to personal identity, the right of privacy (judgment no. 13/1999), the right to liberty, the right to self-determination (judgment no. 30/1962) as well as the right to information (judgments no. 84/1969 and no. 348/1990). Cf. Mangiameli (2006), p. 476, who talks about a circular process of the development of fundamental rights in the relationship between the European and the Italian legal order.

  249. 249.

    Cf. Randazzo (2008) and Ruggeri (2005).

  250. 250.

    Cf. the references and critical objections in Panara (2007), para 37 et seqq.

  251. 251.

    Printed in Journal des Tribunaux 1992, p. 6670 as well as EuGRZ 1993, p. 285; see on this also Lopez Castillo and Polakiewicz (1993), p. 281; Estella de Noriega (1999), p. 279; Garcia de Enterria and Alonso Garcia (2000), p. 298.

  252. 252.

    Cf. Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, DTC No. 1/2004 (13 December 2004) fundamentos 3 and 4, in: EuR 2005, 339, 343 et seqq. (English translation available online).

  253. 253.

    Cf. Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, DTC No. 1/2004 (13 December 2004) fundamento 2; Grabenwarter (2009b), pp. 126 et seq.

  254. 254.

    Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, DTC No. 1/2004 (13 December 2004) fundamento 4: “En el caso difícilmente concebible de que en la ulterior dinámica del Derecho de la Unión Europea llegase a resultar inconciliable este Derecho con la Constitución española, sin que los hipotéticos excesos del Derecho europeo respecto de la propia Constitución europea fueran remediados por los ordinarios cauces previstos en ésta, en última instancia la conservación de la soberanía del pueblo español y de la supremacía de la Constitución que éste se ha dado podrían llevar a este Tribunal a abordar los problemas que en tal caso se suscitaran, que desde la perspectiva actual se consideran inexistentes, a través de los procedimientos constitucionales pertinentes […].”

  255. 255.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004-496 (10 June 2004) consideration 7 – Loi pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique (E-commerce). In the Arcelor case, the French Conseil d’Etat decided in accordance with these decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel that a legal challenge of the validity of an EC directive based on the French constitutional right to equality should be referred instead to the ECJ so that it could examine the question in the light of the common European principle of equality: French Conseil d’Etat, Decision No. 287110 DC (8 February 2007) – Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autre (EuR 2008, pp. 57 et seqq.): “La suprématie conférée par les dispositions de l’article 55 de la Constitution aux engagements internationaux ne saurait s’imposer, dans l’ordre interne, aux principes et dispositions à valeur constitutionnelle. Eu égard aux dispositions de l’article 88-1 de la Constitution, dont découle une obligation constitutionnelle de transposition des directives, le contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes réglementaires assurant directement cette transposition est appelé à s’exercer selon des modalités particulières dans le cas où sont transposées des dispositions précises et inconditionnelles. Dans ce cas, si le contrôle des règles de compétence et de procédure ne se trouve pas affecté, il appartient au juge administratif, saisi d’un moyen tiré de la méconnaissance d’une disposition ou d’un principe de valeur constitutionnelle, de rechercher s’il existe une règle ou un principe général du droit communautaire qui, eu égard à sa nature et à sa portée, tel qu’il est interprété en l’état actuel de la jurisprudence du juge communautaire, garantit par son application l’effectivité du respect de la disposition ou du principe constitutionnel invoqué. Dans l’affirmative, il y a lieu pour le juge administratif, afin de s’assurer de la constitutionnalité du décret, de rechercher si la directive que ce décret transpose est conforme à cette règle ou à ce principe général du droit communautaire. Il lui revient, en l’absence de difficulté sérieuse, d’écarter le moyen invoqué ou, dans le cas contraire, de saisir la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes d’une question préjudicielle, dans les conditions prévues par l’article 234 du traité instituant la Communauté européenne. En revanche, s’il n’existe pas de règle ou de principe général du droit communautaire garantissant l’effectivité du respect de la disposition ou du principe constitutionnel invoqué, il revient au juge administratif d’examiner directement la constitutionnalité des dispositions réglementaires contestées.” Once the case had reached the ECJ, the Advocate General Poiares Maduro, in his Opinion submitted to the Court (Case C-127/07, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 21 May 2008, para 15–17), praised the attitude of the French supreme administrative court and underlined the importance of a judicial dialogue between national supreme courts and the ECJ in matters of fundamental rights protection (supra footnote 7). The judgment of the ECJ itself (16 December 2008) did not dwell on the underlying judicial dialogue question and just addressed the substantive question, concluding that the EC directive did not violate the general principle of equality. Cf. de Witte (2009).

  256. 256.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004-497 DC (1 July 2004) consideration 18 – Loi relative aux communications électroniques et aux services de communication audiovisuelle.

  257. 257.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004-498 DC (29 July 2004) consideration 4 – Loi relative à la bioéthique.

  258. 258.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004-499 DC (29 July 2004) consideration 7 – Loi relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel.

  259. 259.

    See French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004–498 DC (29 July 2004) consideration 6, according to which the freedom of communication as set out in Art. 10 of the Declaration of 1789 is not considered specific to the national legal order since it. “estégalement protégée en tant que principe général du droit communautaire sur le fondement de l’;article 10 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarder des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales”

  260. 260.

    French Constitutional Council Décision n° 2006-540 DC (27 July 2006) préc. – Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information (Loi DADVSI) (English translation available online).

  261. 261.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2006-540 DC (27 July 2006) consideration 19 – Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information.

  262. 262.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2006-543 DC (30 November 2006) consideration 6 – Loi relative au secteur de l’énergie (English translation available online).

  263. 263.

    French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2008-564 DC (19 June 2008) consideration 44 – Loi relative aux organismes génétiquement modifiés (English translation available online).

  264. 264.

    Cf. Zinamsgvarov (2008), pp. 5 et seq.

  265. 265.

    Cf. French Constitutional Council, Décision n° 2004-505 DC (19 November 2004) considerations 7 and 13 – Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe (English translation available online; German translation in EuR 2004, 911 et seqq. and in EuGRZ 2005, 45 et seqq.).

  266. 266.

    Cf. French Constitutional Council Décision n° 2004-505 DC (19 November 2004) consideration 18 – Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe.

  267. 267.

    Cf. French Constitutional Council Décision n° 2004-505 DC (19 November 2004) consideration 10 – Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe.

  268. 268.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. K 18/04 (11 May 2005 – English translation available online).

  269. 269.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. .K 32/09 (24 November 2010 – English translation available online).

  270. 270.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision K 18/04 (11 May 2005) No. 1 and 2 as well as 13–16.

  271. 271.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision Ref. No. .K 32/09 K (24 November 2010) p. 33 et seq., 35.

  272. 272.

    Cf. Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 29/09 (3 November 2009) para 172 et seq. – Lisbon Treaty II (English translation available online).

  273. 273.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 66/04 (3 May 2006) – European Arrest Warrant (English translation available online), cited in: Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 94 – Lisbon Treaty I (English translation available online).

  274. 274.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 66/04 (3 May 2006) – European Arrest Warrant, cited in: Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 114 – Lisbon Treaty I.

  275. 275.

    Cf. Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 120 – Lisbon Treaty I (emphasis in the original).

  276. 276.

    Greek Council of State, Decision No. 3242/2004 (16 November 2004), NoB 2005, pp. 1878 et seqq. (1893) (our translation).

  277. 277.

    Cf. Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007a), pp. 835 et seqq.

  278. 278.

    Expressly Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007a), p. 844: “weiterhin offen”; Iliopoulos-Strangas (2007b), para 37 et seqq.; The opinion of Grabenwarter (2009b), p. 131, is thus not shared, for he classifies Greece in one group with France regarding primacy.

  279. 279.

    Cf. Greek Council of State, Decision No. 3457/1998 (25 September 1998), ToS 1998, pp. 961 et seqq.

  280. 280.

    In this respect Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, DTC No. 1/2004 (13 December 2004) fundamentos 5 and 6.

  281. 281.

    Bleckmann (2011), pp. 15 et seqq., 82 et seqq., 131 et seqq.

  282. 282.

    French Constitutional Council, Decision No. 92-308 DC (9 April 1992) – Maastricht I (English translation available online), RUDH 1992, pp. 336 et seqq.; in this respect see also French Conseil d’État, Decision No. 287110 DC (8 February 2007); Fromont (1995), p. 132.

  283. 283.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvG 1/89 (Judgment of 11 April 1989) (in: BVerfGE 80, 74 and NJW 1990, 974) – Broadcasting Directive.

  284. 284.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvF/05 (Order of 13 March 2007) para 72 (in: BVerfGE 118, 79, 95) – Emissions Trading I = DVBl. 2007, pp. 821 et seqq., with reference to Art. 23.1 GG.

  285. 285.

    Cf. Schmal (2008), pp. 16 et seqq.

  286. 286.

    Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, O.J. L 251/12 (2003).

  287. 287.

    Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council (family reunification) (ECJ 27 June 2006) para 60 et seq.

  288. 288.

    Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council (family reunification) (ECJ 27 June 2006) para 22.

  289. 289.

    Cf. Lindner (2007), p. 72.

  290. 290.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2036/05 (Order of 14 May 2007) para 8 – Emissions Trading II.

  291. 291.

    Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council (family reunification) (ECJ 27 June 2006) para 104 et seq.

  292. 292.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2036/05 (Order of 14 May 2007) para 8 – Emissions Trading II (our translation); yet even before: German Federal Administrative Court, NVwZ 2005, 1178 (1181 et seqq., 1183 et seqq.)

  293. 293.

    This position had been emphasised by the then President of the Federal Constitutional Court, Papier, by using the misleading term “complementarity of the protection of fundamental rights” (our translation): cf. Papier (2009), pp. 113 et seqq., 116; affirmative Calliess (2009), p. 486, with reference to the “graduated bindingness [gestufte Verbindlichkeit]” (H. P. Ipsen) of those directives and underlining the fact that the so-called systemic decision of a directive (Bundesverfassungsgericht) works as a corrective; also affirmative Bleckmann (2011), pp. 150 et seqq. (164 et seqq.); critical Blanke (2009), pp. 149 et seq.

  294. 294.

    In this sense the German Federal Administrative Court, NVwZ 2005, 1178 (1181 et seq.).

  295. 295.

    Calliess (2009), p. 485 (our translation).

  296. 296.

    Cf. Thym (2006), p. 3250; Szczekalla (2006), p. 1021; Lindner (2007), p. 73; Calliess (2009), pp. 485 et seqq.

  297. 297.

    Cf. Wildhaber (2005b), p. 45.

  298. 298.

    Nickel (2009), p. 338.

  299. 299.

    Merli (2007), p. 397.

  300. 300.

    Cf. Callewaert (2008).

  301. 301.

    Oeter (2007); Hoffmann-Riem (2002), p. 473: “A minimum of unity of the legal order, at least its systemic consistency, is a widely accepted aim, regardless of the obvious evidence of a pluralisation of values, a fragmentation of living environments and heterogeneity of interests” (our translation).

  302. 302.

    Oeter (2007).

  303. 303.

    Oeter (2007), who states that “without provisions of coherence the compound of judiciaries would be doomed to failure” (our translation); previously Wildhaber (2005b), pp. 45 et seq., who considers a “coherent approach in respect of the rights which are common to most of the legal systems concerned” as “essential” while observing “a clear commitment to ensure harmony between the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg jurisprudence” in the sense of coherence and coordination are to be understood the proposals made by Krüger and Polakiewicz (2001), whereas Papier (2005), p. 117, with regard to the substantive protection of fundamental rights, talks about “a steady convergence” (not coherence) “between the requirements and expectations of national constitutional law on the one hand and the effective protection of fundamental rights by Community law on the other”.

  304. 304.

    Case 14234/88 Open door and Dublin Well Woman v İreland (ECtHR 29 October 1992).

  305. 305.

    Case 159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan et al. (ECJ 4 October 1991) para 21, 32.

  306. 306.

    Wildhaber (2005a), pp. 314, 316, 318.

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    Hermann-Josef Blanke (Chair for Public Law and International Public Law)

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    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Governm, National Research Council - Institute fo, Via dei Taurini 19, Rome, 00185, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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Blanke, HJ. (2012). The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The European Union after Lisbon. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19507-5_7

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