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Lagrangian E-Voting: Verifiability on Demand and Strong Privacy

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Trust and Trustworthy Computing (Trust 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6101))

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Abstract

We propose a new approach to verifiability of Internet e-voting procedures: correct counting of each single ballot can be checked, but verification is a zero-knowledge court procedure. After verification period is over, certain keys are destroyed and breaking vote privacy becomes substantially harder.

Our main goal is to provide a framework for the political situation in which the voters are more concerned about disclosure of their preferences than about the correctness of the results. Our approach also responds to threats of coercion exercised by a physically present coercer.

Our approach can be used on top of most previous schemes to improve their privacy features. It is limited to the cases when the voters hold electronic ID cards.

Partially supported by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, grant N N206 2701 33. The second author has been also supported by Foundation for Polish Science within the MISTRZ Programme.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370, Wrocław, Poland

    Łukasz Krzywiecki & Mirosław Kutyłowski

Authors
  1. Łukasz Krzywiecki
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  2. Mirosław Kutyłowski
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, HBH 2105C, 15213, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Alessandro Acquisti

  2. Department of Computer Science, 6211 Sudikoff Laboratory, Dartmouth College, 03755-3510, Hanover, NH, USA

    Sean W. Smith

  3. System Security Lab, Ruhr University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44780, Bochum, Germany

    Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

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Krzywiecki, Ł., Kutyłowski, M. (2010). Lagrangian E-Voting: Verifiability on Demand and Strong Privacy. In: Acquisti, A., Smith, S.W., Sadeghi, AR. (eds) Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Trust 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6101. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13869-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13869-0_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13868-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13869-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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