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Verifiable Internet Voting Solving Secure Platform Problem

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Advances in Information and Computer Security (IWSEC 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4752))

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Abstract

We present a voter verifiable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter cannot be fully trusted. The ballots cast remain anonymous - even the machine does not know the choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes - the voter can cheat the buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer. Nevertheless, the voter can verity that his vote has been counted.

supported by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, project 3 T11C 011 26.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology,  

    Mirosław Kutyłowski & Filip Zagórski

Authors
  1. Mirosław Kutyłowski
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  2. Filip Zagórski
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Atsuko Miyaji Hiroaki Kikuchi Kai Rannenberg

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kutyłowski, M., Zagórski, F. (2007). Verifiable Internet Voting Solving Secure Platform Problem. In: Miyaji, A., Kikuchi, H., Rannenberg, K. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4752. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75651-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75651-4_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75650-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75651-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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