Abstract
Encrypt-and-sign, where one encrypts and signs a message in parallel, is usually not recommended for confidential message transmission as the signature may leak information about the message. This motivates our investigation of confidential signature schemes, which hide all information about (high-entropy) input messages. In this work we provide a formal treatment of confidentiality for such schemes. We give constructions meeting our notions, both in the random oracle model and the standard model. As part of this we show that full domain hash signatures achieve a weaker level of confidentiality than Fiat-Shamir signatures. We then examine the connection of confidential signatures to signcryption schemes. We give formal security models for deterministic signcryption schemes for high-entropy and low-entropy messages, and prove encrypt-and-sign to be secure for confidential signature schemes and high-entropy messages. Finally, we show that one can derandomize any signcryption scheme in our model and obtain a secure deterministic scheme.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
An, J.H., Dodis, Y., Rabin, T.: On the security of joint signature and encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 83–107. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Baek, J., Steinfeld, R., Zheng, Y.: Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. Journal of Cryptology 20(2), 203–235 (2007)
Bellare, M., Boldyreva, A., O’Neill, A.: Deterministic and efficiently searchable encryption. In: Menezes, A. (ed.) CRYPTO 2007. LNCS, vol. 4622, pp. 535–552. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Bellare, M., Fischlin, M., O’Neill, A., Ristenpart, T.: Deterministic encryption: Definitional equivalences and constructions without random oracles. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 360–378. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: The exact security of digital signatures — how to sign with RSA and Rabin. In: Maurer, U.M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 399–416. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Boldyreva, A., Fehr, S., O’Neill, A.: On notions of security for deterministic encryption, and efficient constructions without random oracles. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 335–359. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Canetti, R.: Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 455–469. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Canetti, R., Micciancio, D., Reingold, O.: Perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions. In: Proc. 30th Symposium on the Theory of Computing – STOC 1998, pp. 131–140. ACM, New York (1998)
Coron, J.-S.: On the exact security of full domain hash. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 229–235. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Dent, A.W., Fischlin, M., Manulis, M., Stam, M., Schröder, D.: Confidential signatures and deterministic signcryption (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/588
Dodis, Y., Gennaro, R., Håstad, J., Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: Randomness extraction and key derivation using the CBC, Cascade and HMAC modes. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 494–510. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Dodis, Y., Smith, A.: Entropic security and the encryption of high entropy messages. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) TCC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3378, pp. 556–577. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Non-malleable cryptography. SIAM Journal on Computing 30(2), 391–437 (2000)
Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Fischlin, M.: Pseudorandom function tribe ensembles based on one-way permutations: Improvements and applications. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 429–444. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Fischlin, M.: Anonymous signatures made easy. In: Okamoto, T., Wang, X. (eds.) PKC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4450, pp. 31–42. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Goldreich, O.: Two remarks concerning the Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest signature scheme. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 104–110. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Howgrave-Graham, N.A., Smart, N.P.: Lattice attacks on digital signature schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 23(3), 283–290 (2001)
Nisan, N., Ta-Shma, A.: Extracting randomness: A survey and new constructions. Journal of Computer and System Science 58(1), 148–173 (1999)
Nisan, N., Zuckerman, D.: Randomness is linear in space. Journal of Computer and System Science 52(1), 43–52 (1996)
Rackoff, C., Simon, D.: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 433–444. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Russell, A., Wang, H.: How to fool an unbounded adversary with a short key. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 133–148. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Yang, G., Wong, D.S., Deng, X., Wang, H.: Anonymous signature schemes. In: Yung, M., Dodis, Y., Kiayias, A., Malkin, T.G. (eds.) PKC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3958, pp. 347–363. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Zheng, Y.: Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost(signature & encryption) ≪ cost(signature) + cost(encryption). In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 165–179. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Dent, A.W., Fischlin, M., Manulis, M., Stam, M., Schröder, D. (2010). Confidential Signatures and Deterministic Signcryption. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Pointcheval, D. (eds) Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2010. PKC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6056. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13013-7_27
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13013-7_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-13012-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-13013-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)