Abstract
Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper we propose realistic security models for signcryption, which give the attacker power to choose both messages/signcryptexts as well as recipient/sender public keys when accessing the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles of attacked entities. We then show that Zheng's original signcryption scheme is secure in our confidentiality model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem and is secure in our unforgeability model relative to a Gap version of the discrete logarithm problem. All these results are shown in the random oracle model.
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Baek, J., Steinfeld, R. & Zheng, Y. Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption. J Cryptology 20, 203–235 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-007-0211-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-007-0211-0