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Don’t Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5143))

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Abstract

At Oakland 2005, Murdoch and Danezis described an attack on the Tor anonymity service that recovers the nodes in a Tor circuit, but not the client. We observe that in a peer-to-peer anonymity scheme, the client is part of the circuit and thus the technique can be of greater significance in this setting. We experimentally validate this conclusion by showing that “circuit clogging” can identify client nodes using the MorphMix peer-to-peer anonymity protocol. We also propose and empirically validate the use of the Stochastic Fair Queueing discipline on outgoing connections as an efficient and low-cost mitigation technique.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science & Engineering, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA

    Jon McLachlan & Nicholas Hopper

Authors
  1. Jon McLachlan
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  2. Nicholas Hopper
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Gene Tsudik

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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McLachlan, J., Hopper, N. (2008). Don’t Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes. In: Tsudik, G. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5143. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85229-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85230-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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