Abstract
This chapter introduces the one-sector neoclassical growth model with overlapping generations. The primary focus of the chapter is growth via private physical capital accumulation. We think of private physical capital as manmade durable inputs to the production process. For our purposes, private capital can be primarily thought of as plant and equipment that is produced in one period and then used in production in the following period. To model production, we introduce firms, economic institutions that combine physical capital and labor to produce goods and services. Later in the chapter, we introduce human capital, the knowledge and skills embodied in workers. Chapter 3 adds public capital, the economy’s infrastructure created by the government, such as roads, laws, and utilities.
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Notes
- 1.
Definitions of physical capital will vary depending on the purpose at hand. In some cases physical capital is defined to include inventories, software, land, and other inputs that extend beyond plant and equipment. Public capital is often lumped together with private capital as if they are close substitutes. Chapter 3 argues that it makes more sense to treat them as complementary inputs.
- 2.
You can think of the value of rt as actually determined in period t−1. In that period households make their saving decision based on the firms’ commitments to rent capital in period t and pay the rental rate rt. In other words, rt is determined in period t−1 based on the savings behavior of households and the planned investment demands of firms.
- 3.
The economy never literally reaches the steady state, although it will get arbitrarily close.
- 4.
The weakening effect of the capital-labor ratio on wages, stems from the diminishing marginal product of capital. As capital accumulates relative to labor, the effect of further capital accumulation on output and wages gets smaller. Formally, note that the effect of an increase in k on the marginal product of labor is (1 − α)αAkα−1 = (1 − α)×marginal product of capital.
- 5.
There are differences of opinion about what qualifies as an appropriate target. Some believe that calibration should not involve previous econometric estimation. According to this view, all parameters within a model should be set to match particular data points or statistical moments of a data set (sample means, variances, and covariances), but not to match econometric estimates found in the literature. Others broaden the targets to include previous statistical estimates of the model’s parameters and behavioral responses, even if the model used in the estimation is not the same as the one used in the calibration . We are comfortable with either approach. The important point from our perspective is that all quantitative models, however calibrated, should be tested by comparing their predictions against observations or statistics not used in the calibration process. The fact that these “tests” or comparisons are not as formal and refined as traditional hypothesis testing in statistics does not particularly concern us. At this stage in the profession’s understanding of macroeconomics, models that even roughly approximate reality are difficult to find. Hopefully, as our approximations become more refined, we will need to worry about more formal testing procedure.
- 6.
For a further discussion of the issues associated with quantifying overlapping generations models see Appendix B.
- 7.
One can think of the financing of public school expenditures as coming from a tax on capital or capital income (similar to the property tax used to finance schooling in the U.S.). When σ = 1, as with our log preferences, a capital tax has no effect on saving and the transition equation.
- 8.
Note that the acquisition of financial assets occurs in the first period of adulthood and the financial transfers are made in the second period of adulthood. Thus, the transfers are made when both generations are alive. Transfers of this type are called inter vivos transfers, as opposed to bequests that are transferred at death. In our model, where we assume (i) perfect certainty, (ii) perfect life-cycle credit markets, and (iii) no strategic interactions between generations, the timing of financial transfers is irrelevant. However, the timing of transfers can matter when these conditions are not met (see for example, Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox 1987).
- 9.
In microeconomics, the maximum attainable utility function is called an indirect utility function. In the pure life cycle version of our model, with no altruism , an indirect utility function is easily obtained. Take the optimal consumption choices of the household (5) and substitute them back into the CES utility function. For example, if we do this for the case of σ = 1, we get the very simple indirect utility function \( {U}_t^{\ast }=\beta \ln \beta +\left(1+\beta \right)\ln \frac{1}{1+\beta }+\left(1+\beta \right)\ln {w}_t+\beta \ln {R}_t \). With altruism, things are not nearly so simple. This is because generation-t’s utility depends on generation-t+1’s utility, which depends on generation-t + 2’s utility, and so on. As we shall see, in this case Vt cannot be found directly. Instead it is implicitly defined by a difference equation in the function Vt— what is known as a Bellman equation . In this case, Vt is called a value function and solving for this function is tricky business. Stokey and Lucas (1989) provide a general discussion of the conditions under which the value function exists, is unique, and is differentiable with respect to initial wealth.
- 10.
Often, when the focus of the analysis is on intergenerational transfers, the life-cycle feature of the model is dropped. Households are modeled as living only a single period of adulthood in which they consume and make transfers to their children. We will see examples of these models in future chapters.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A—Derivative of the Value Function
Substituting (2.22a, 2.22b) back into Ut gives
Next, denote the optimal choices of the intergenerational transfers with an asterisk so that we can write
Note that the optimal intergenerational transfers are in general functions of Wt (in the constrained-case, financial transfers are zero and thus do not depend on Wt). However, because the derivative of the right-hand-side with respect to these choices is zero, then we may ignore these indirect effects of Wt when differentiating Vt with respect to Wt (in the constrained-case, the derivative is taken only with respect to human capital investments). Thus, the derivative of the value function with respect to Wt includes only the direct effect, working through Ut in the first expression above. This result is a general one, and is known as the envelope theorem. Equation (2.24) is the envelope theorem applied to Vt+1(Wt+1).
1.2 B—Many-Period Models
In models that extend beyond two periods, it is easier to proceed by thinking of the equilibrium or market clearing condition in terms of goods rather than capital. The two ways of thinking about things are actually equivalent, but the exposition is easier if we conduct the discussion in terms of goods (see Problem 23). This is especially true if one wants to contrast the infinitely-lived agent approach with the overlapping generations’ approach. To reduce notation, we will limit the discussion to the simple model of physical capital accumulation with no human capital or technical progress . In addition, the key points can be made for the case with σ = 1.
As shown in Problem 23, using the goods market approach allows the transition equation for the economy to be written as
In the overlapping-generations model with two period lifetimes, this equation reduces nicely to a first-order difference equation (Problem 23). This is because the right-hand-side can be reduced to the consumption behavior of a single generation whose consumption depends only on period-t wages and thus only on kt. The old generation consumes all its income. As a result, their income and their consumption are equal and cancel from the right-hand-side of the transition equation.
However, with more periods of life there will be more generations on the right-hand-side, whose income is less than their consumption, i.e. who save by purchasing capital. The consumption behavior of these generations will depend on wages earned before period-t. For example, think of a model with five periods of life—four working periods and one retirement period. The aggregate consumption behavior on the right-side sums over five different generations. In general, it is only the generation who is retired that will “cancel out.” The saving of other generations will generally not be zero, so all variables that affect their consumption behavior will appear in the transition equation.
Consider the next oldest generation, who is in the last period of its working life. This generation’s working life began three periods ago. Their consumption behavior in period-t will depend on the wages they earned in each of those periods. Thus, wages as far back at period t−3 will appear in the transition equation. The wages in each period are determined by the capital-labor ratio from that period. This implies that the transition equation will be a fifth-order difference equation, including the variables, kt+1, kt, kt−1, kt−2, kt−3. The important point is that the state variables, here the capital-labor ratios, characterizing the economy increase as the number of periods of the life-cycle increase. This curse of dimensionality raises the computational complexity of the model when the number of periods in the life-cycle is large.
In contrast, if one assumes that the generations are linked by intergenerational financial transfers, the transition equation of the economy is a second order difference equation , no matter how many periods in the life-cycle are included. To see this, first note that as long as financial intergenerational transfers link the generations together, then we can write Ct = κNt c1t (see Problem 21). As periods in the life-cycle are added, only the value of κ changes. For example, κ = 2, with two periods of life, and κ = 5, if there are five periods of life.
Next, solve for c1t using the goods-market version of the transition equation to get
Now substitute into (2.25b) to get
This is a second-order difference equation in kt that is completely independent of the number of periods in the life-cycle. Thus, the infinitely-lived agent simplification is able to avoid the dreaded curse of dimensionality. A very nifty and useful result.
The lesson is that if you want to do computations, use the infinitely-lived agent approach whenever you can get away with it (e.g. business cycle analysis). Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that for the issues we examine in this book, those that directly focus on private intergenerational transfers and government policies that transfer resources across generations, one must stick with the overlapping generations approach.
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Das, S., Mourmouras, A., Rangazas, P. (2018). Overlapping-Generations Model of Economic Growth. In: Economic Growth and Development. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89755-4_2
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