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Liquid Welfare Maximization in Auctions with Multiple Items

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 10504))

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Abstract

Liquid welfare is an alternative efficiency measure for auctions with budget constrained agents. Previous studies focused on auctions of a single (type of) good. In this paper, we initiate the study of general multi-item auctions, obtaining a truthful budget feasible auction with constant approximation ratio of liquid welfare under the assumption of large market.

Our main technique is random sampling. Previously, random sampling was usually used in the setting of single-parameter auctions. When it comes to multi-dimensional settings, this technique meets a number of obstacles and difficulties. In this work, we develop a series of analysis tools and frameworks to overcome these. These tools and frameworks are quite general and they may find applications in other scenarios.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ITCS, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

    Pinyan Lu

  2. Department of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China

    Tao Xiao

Authors
  1. Pinyan Lu
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  2. Tao Xiao
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Correspondence to Pinyan Lu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Salento, Lecce, Italy

    Vittorio Bilò

  2. University of L'Aquila, L'Aquila, Italy

    Michele Flammini

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Lu, P., Xiao, T. (2017). Liquid Welfare Maximization in Auctions with Multiple Items. In: Bilò, V., Flammini, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10504. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66699-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-66700-3

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