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Social Media Censorship vs. State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations

Case Study of the Arab Spring Uprising in Egypt

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Social Media in Politics

Part of the book series: Public Administration and Information Technology ((PAIT,volume 13))

Abstract

The chapter presents the contemporary international consensus on the limits of the right to free speech online. The author examines state-imposed online filtering in terms of its compliance with international law, especially with human rights treaties granting freedom of expression and access to information. The White House implemented “Internet Freedom” program, whose aim is to introduce software enabling the circumvention of local content control in “filtering countries”, is thus subject to thorough analysis. The analysis covers recent (2011) events in Egypt, where the world’s first successful attempt at shutting down the Internet within state borders was completed. Although enforced through legitimate state actions this first-ever Internet shutdown was circumvented with technology offered by U.S.-based Google. This technology and its use seemed to meet the goals of the “Internet Freedom” program, introduced by the White House a few months prior to the Egypt events. In the course of the argument, the author discusses international responsibility for the possible breach of their international obligations by both: Egypt and the U.S. She provides for the assessment of the legality of the actions of Egyptian authorities’ executing a nationwide ban on Internet that constitutes an infringement of freedom of expression, as well as the responsibility of the United States for their failure to halt a U.S. legal entity enabling users to circumvent Egyptian blocking.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    United Nations 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, further herein: UDHR.

  2. 2.

    United Nations 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, further herein: ICCPR.

  3. 3.

    According to article 29 par. 2 UDHR everyone shall be subject to limitations determined by law states in the exercise of their rights and freedoms. Such limitations may be introduced only to safeguard “due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others” or in order to meet the requirements of “morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”.

  4. 4.

    See e.g.: Deibert (2008) at 81. In the ICCPR regime, the proportionality principle is derived from the word “necessary” used in Article 19 par. 3 discussing the limitative clauses. See e.g.: Yutaka Arai (2002) at 186.

  5. 5.

    United Nations 2009.

  6. 6.

    See generally e.g.: Sadurski (2002).

  7. 7.

    See Sect. 15.4 below.

  8. 8.

    Council of Europe 1950. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is usually referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights, further herein: ECHR. ECHR foresees for the right to free speech in its Article 10. The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) jurisprudence implies a positive obligation of states to prevent any interference with that right, even when such intrusion comes from private third parties, rather than state authorities. See e.g. European Court of Human Rights (2008). In Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden the Court asserted its jurisdiction in a case relating to national court decisions in a case between private parties, where effectively the national court practice disallowed state residents to enjoy rights guaranteed by the convention. See also: European Court of Human Rights (2001), where in VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland the Court asserted that there is an inherent positive obligation of states to ensure the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the convention through their effective implementation in national legal systems.

  9. 9.

    Article 15 ECHR.

  10. 10.

    Article 16 ECHR.

  11. 11.

    The OpenNet Initiative is a collaboration of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, and the SecDev Group seated in Ottawa. See: Open Net Initiatve (2013).

  12. 12.

    Deibert 2008 at 9. The declared grounds for Internet filtering include: “social” filtering enforced for the protection of morality and other social values, filtering done for political reasons, i.e. preventing criticisms of current political model, filtering done for state security reasons, i.e. aimed at preventing internal unrest, and subsequently limiting access to technical tools enabling circumvention of the blocking being imposed by ISPs.

  13. 13.

    See e.g.: Noman and York (2011).

  14. 14.

    See: Deibert (2008) at 32 ff.

  15. 15.

    See e.g. the Italian court’s decision on blocking Access to the Pirate Bay website because of alleged contributory copyright infringement: Doe (2008).

  16. 16.

    Controlling access to various categories of electronic content may be affected by applying a combination of software and legal methods, but also with the use of extra legal tools and undisclosed methods, including ones outsourced to private parties. Internet filtering is being affected through i.e. hacking or the application of computer viruses, as well as DDoS attacks onto websites containing controversial or illegal content and servers hosting it. See: Deibert et al. (2010) at 6–7. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks consists of simultaneous requests for one IP number that is the target of such an attack, sent from various locations and different computers. Consequently, a domain located on a computer with a particular IP number ceases to respond.

  17. 17.

    In China any content that could endanger “national unity” is deemed illegal, in Myanmar, Egypt, or Malaysia any criticism of the governing party is disallowed. Liberia additionally requires the blocking of websites that include “anti-Liberian materials”, while Zimbabwe limits access to any sites that could “raise unease or sorrow”. See: Privacy International, GreenNet Educational Trust (2003) at 20.

  18. 18.

    Filtering software often comes from U.S.-based companies. For example, Cisco software was one of the pillars of the Great Firewall of China, including server-operating programs and ones supporting the national educational networks. Cisco was also working on a Chinese “Next-Generation Network”, the so-called ChinaNet Next Carrying Network, CN2. Doe 2004b.

  19. 19.

    If a domain name or the website include any of the designated keywords, such as “sex” in the case of pornographic content or “Falun Gong” in case of politically motivated one, access to such a website was automatically blocked. Users would usually receive a 404 error message. See: Deibert et al. (2010) at 4–5.

  20. 20.

    See: Deibert et al. (2010) at 529–530.

  21. 21.

    Deibert et al. (2010) at 552.

  22. 22.

    See: Doe (2004a) at 8–9. Yet until 2010 and the U.S. Internet Freedom program, discussed herein below, no state authority directly addressed the filtering policies as undemocratic.

  23. 23.

    Doe 2004a at 8–9.

  24. 24.

    Council of Europe (2011b): “Action by a state that limits or forbids access to specific Internet content constitutes an interference with freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information. In Europe, such an interference can only be justified if it fulfills the conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights.” Furthermore, the Committee emphasized that “states should not, through general blocking or filtering measures, exercise prior control of content made available on the Internet unless such measures are taken on the basis of a provisional or final decision on the illegality of such content by the competent national authorities and in full respect for the strict conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights.” Such measures may only be applied towards “clearly identifiable content” and must be proportionate.

  25. 25.

    See: Deibert (2008) at 120–123.

  26. 26.

    See: Open Net Initiative 2013, Reporters without Borders (2013).

  27. 27.

    But see the recent Delfi v. Estonia case where the ECtHR recognized ISP's editorial liability for user content. ECtHR (2013).

  28. 28.

    See: European Court of Justice (2010). In the case Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) the Court found that a judicial order to enact prior content control of uploaded and downloaded user data, laid upon a Belgian service provider, is against community law.

  29. 29.

    See e.g.: Chilling Effects Clearinghouse (2013).

  30. 30.

    See e.g.: (McNamee 2013).

  31. 31.

    See e.g.: Weckert (2000) at 105–111, who justifies the enactment of Internet filtering in Australia with those very arguments.

  32. 32.

    One of the strongest proponents of Universal Internet filtering has been India, see e.g.: Agence France-Presse (2012).

  33. 33.

    The same method was very likely used repeatedly a year later in Syria also entangled in internal turmoil. See e.g.: Coldewey (2013).

  34. 34.

    According to Renesys, a company specializing in analyzing cyber espionage, Egyptian authorities probably ordered individual ISPs to disconnect all international Internet connections. Enforcing that decision did not however impact the international data flow to and from Egypt. Cowie 2011.

  35. 35.

    Using a technology newly purchased from a start-up company SayNow, working together with Twitter, owned by a U.S.-based company: Obvious.

  36. 36.

    See e.g.: Doe 2011a, b.

  37. 37.

    The system was based on using two particular international telephone numbers—information provided to those numbers was automatically, promptly published on Twitter with a keyword #Egypt. According to a Google representative, delivering information in this way did not require their authors to have Internet connectivity. Information so delivered was also available as audio under the very same telephone numbers or by accessing a devoted website: twitter.com/speak2tweet. See: Doe 2011a, b.

  38. 38.

    Clinton 2010.

  39. 39.

    Such as, primarily, enforcing legislative, executive or judicial jurisdiction, using treaty powers or the legation right.

  40. 40.

    Performing, for instance; commercial activity. For the difficulties in assessing that divergence see e.g. the Libyan assets freeze case discussed in Rutzke 1988 at 241–282.

  41. 41.

    International Law Commission 2001 at 62.

  42. 42.

    There is no doubt that state authorities were not deprived of their power at the time of the Internet blackout, therefore the fact of effectively disabling Internet access ought to be regarded as an act of legitimate state power being enforced. Separate is the issue of proportionality of the enforced limitation.

  43. 43.

    European Court of Human Rights. 2012. Yıldırım v. Turkey.

  44. 44.

    Miniwatts Marketing Group, World Internet Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm#tr (accessed Nov. 19, 2013).

  45. 45.

    United Nations 2009.

  46. 46.

    Egypt is not party to the First Optional Protocol introducing the individual complaint procedure.

  47. 47.

    Evans 2008.

  48. 48.

    See e.g.: Robertson (2006) at 1–40.

  49. 49.

    See: e.g. Newman (2002) at 102–120. Such an intervention might be deemed legal should acts of genocide or war crimes be accompanied by the Internet blackout.

  50. 50.

    Clinton 2010.

  51. 51.

    For the definition of Internet filtering see e.g. Deibert (2008) at 15.

  52. 52.

    Clinton 2011.

  53. 53.

    For critical remarks of the implications of applying territorial jurisdiction over the cyberspace see: Kulesza (2012) at 1–30.

  54. 54.

    See: European Court of Human Rights (2008).

  55. 55.

    See: U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division (2010).

  56. 56.

    Doe 2011b.

  57. 57.

    Thai lese majeste laws mandate a jail term of 3–15 years for anyone who “defames, insults, or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent, or the Regent.” Thai National Administrative Reform Council (1956).

  58. 58.

    Associated Press 2011.

  59. 59.

    Pisillo-Mazzeschi 1992 at 9–51.

  60. 60.

    International Law Commission 2006.

  61. 61.

    United Nations 1945.

  62. 62.

    Vark 2006 at 192.

  63. 63.

    International Court of Justice 1980 at 3.

  64. 64.

    International Court of Justice 1980 at 31.

  65. 65.

    International Court of Justice 1980 at 32.

  66. 66.

    Bratspies and Miller 2006 at 233, who conclude that the existence of such a preventive obligation allows attributing to the state the very actions of private individuals. The ILC doctrine on transboundary harm emphasizes however that it is the lack of action of state authorities in preventing harmful events rather than the actions themselves which give ground for state responsibility.

  67. 67.

    International Law Commission 2001 at 62.

  68. 68.

    International Law Commission 1992.

  69. 69.

    Brownlie 1983 at 45 names as criteria for attributing state responsibility the causal link between the negligence of a state authority and a breach of international law.

  70. 70.

    United Nations 1999 at 8.

  71. 71.

    United Nations 1999 at 8.

  72. 72.

    United Nations 1999 at 8 where the issue of responsibility for transboundary damage in international watercourses is discussed.

  73. 73.

    Google’s service was so successful that the very next day after its employment Egypt re-enabled Internet access throughout the country.

  74. 74.

    As already mentioned, the idea of humanitarian intervention remains controversial and therefore still may not be accounted for as one of the universally recognized international law concepts, primarily due to the lacking uniform and universal opinio iuris. See supra 45 above.

  75. 75.

    See e.g.: Council of Europe (2003) or Council of Europe (2011a, b, c).

  76. 76.

    See e.g.: Council of Europe (2007).

  77. 77.

    Internet access is recognized as a fundamental right in Finland or Lithuania.

  78. 78.

    What is meant here would be a situation where blocking the free flow of information online in one state causes significant limitations to Internet access in another jurisdiction, which uses the filtering states’ infrastructure. An example of the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia may be named. Georgian electronic infrastructure was blocked, which was followed by Armenia losing any Internet connectivity, as it was solely dependent on the Fibre Optical Cable System Trans Asia Europe, running through Georgia. See: Council of Europe (2009) at 22.

  79. 79.

    According to Miniwatts Marketing Group, specializing in Internet statistics, 34.3 % of world’s population had Internet access by the end of 2012; see: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Accessed 23 May 2013.

  80. 80.

    See: Council of Europe (2011a, b, c).

  81. 81.

    See generally: Kreijen (2002).

  82. 82.

    See e.g.: Weber (2010) at 19, Perrez (2000) at 264 f. proposing the general duty to cooperate as a principle of international law.

  83. 83.

    See: Krasner (2004) at 19 ff.

  84. 84.

    Weber 2010 at 14.

  85. 85.

    See: United Nations (2005) at 4.

  86. 86.

    See: Kleinwächter (2005) at 79.

  87. 87.

    See: Kulesza (2012) at 152–155 where the author presents the concept of an Internet framework convention.

  88. 88.

    See: Council of Europe (2010).

  89. 89.

    Weber 2010 at 14.

  90. 90.

    Weber 2010 at 16.

  91. 91.

    Perrez 2000 at 264 ff.

  92. 92.

    Human Rights Council 2012. On international Internet law, its genesis and principles see generally: Kulesza (2012), 130 ff.

  93. 93.

    Human Rights Council 2012 at 2.

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Kulesza, J. (2014). Social Media Censorship vs. State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations. In: Pătruţ, B., Pătruţ, M. (eds) Social Media in Politics. Public Administration and Information Technology, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04666-2_15

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