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Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64

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Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2023 (SAC 2023)

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Abstract

GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers based on SPN structure and composed of two versions named GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of GIFT-64 against the rectangle attack under the related-key setting. Investigating the previous rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64, we obtain the core idea of improving the attack—trading off the time complexity of each attack phase. We flexibly guess part of the involved subkey bits to balance the time cost of each phase so that the overall time complexity of the attack is reduced. Moreover, the reused subkey bits are identified according to the linear key schedule of GIFT-64 and bring additional advantages for our attacks. Furthermore, we incorporate the above ideas and propose a dedicated MILP model for finding the best rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64. As a result, we get the improved rectangle attacks on 26-round GIFT-64, which are the best attacks on it in terms of time complexity so far.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/lightweight-cryptography.

  2. 2.

    https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1419.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program (No. 2018YFA0704704, No.2022YFB2701900, No.2022YFB2703003) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants 62022036, 62132008, 62202460, 62172410, 62372213).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Cyber Security, Jinan University, Guangzhou, 510632, China

    Yincen Chen, Xuanyu Liang, Ling Song & Zhuohui Feng

  2. Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100093, China

    Nana Zhang & Qianqian Yang

  3. School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Nana Zhang

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  1. Yincen Chen
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  3. Xuanyu Liang
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  4. Ling Song
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  6. Zhuohui Feng
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Correspondence to Ling Song .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University Paris 8, Paris, France

    Claude Carlet

  2. University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB, Canada

    Kalikinkar Mandal

  3. University of Leuven and University of Bergen, Heverlee, Belgium

    Vincent Rijmen

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Chen, Y., Zhang, N., Liang, X., Song, L., Yang, Q., Feng, Z. (2024). Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64. In: Carlet, C., Mandal, K., Rijmen, V. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2023. SAC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14201. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53368-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53368-6_3

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