Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Generalized Boomerang Connectivity Table and Improved Cryptanalysis of GIFT

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13837))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Boomerang connectivity table (BCT), an essential tool in boomerang attack, gives a unified description of the probability in the middle round of a boomerang distinguisher. However, it suffers the drawback that the asymmetric relationship between the upper and lower differentials in the middle round is ignored. To make up for this deficiency, we propose the generalized boomerang connectivity table (GBCT), which characterizes all combinations of upper and lower differentials to provide a more precise probability in the middle round. We first study the cryptographic properties of GBCT and introduce its variants applied in multiple rounds and Feistel structure. Then, we provide an automatic search algorithm to increase the probability of the boomerang distinguisher by adding thorough considerations that more trails can be included, which is applicable to all S-box based ciphers. Finally, we increase the probabilities of the 20-round GIFT-64 distinguisher from \(2^{-58.557}\) to \(2^{-57.43}\) and the 19-round GIFT-128 distinguisher from \(2^{-109.626}\) to \(2^{-108.349}\), both of which are the highest so far. Applying the key recovery attack proposed by Dong et al. at Eurocrypt 2022 on the new distinguisher, we achieve the lowest complexities of the attack on GIFT-64 and the best rectangle attack on GIFT-128.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Banik, S., et al.: GIFT-COFB. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/738 (2020)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Banik, S., Pandey, S.K., Peyrin, T., Sasaki, Yu., Sim, S.M., Todo, Y.: GIFT: a small present - towards reaching the limit of lightweight encryption. In: Fischer, W., Homma, N. (eds.) CHES 2017. LNCS, vol. 10529, pp. 321–345. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_16

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., Keller, N.: The rectangle attack—rectangling the serpent. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 340–357. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44987-6_21

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. J. Cryptol. 4(1), 3–72 (1991)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Biryukov, A., Khovratovich, D.: Related-key cryptanalysis of the full AES-192 and AES-256. In: Matsui, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5912, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Boukerrou, H., Huynh, P., Lallemand, V., Mandal, B., Minier, M.: On the feistel counterpart of the boomerang connectivity table: introduction and analysis of the FBCT. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2020(1), 331–362 (2020)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Lopez, C.M., CINVESTAV, Sasaki, Y.: LOTUS-AEAD and LOCUS-AEAD. Submission to the NIST Lightweight Cryptography project (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Nandi, M.: HYENA. Submission to the NIST Lightweight Cryptography project (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Cid, C., Huang, T., Peyrin, T., Sasaki, Y., Song, L.: A Security Analysis of Deoxys and its Internal Tweakable Block Ciphers. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 3, 73–107 (2017)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Cid, C., Huang, T., Peyrin, T., Sasaki, Yu., Song, L.: Boomerang connectivity table: a new cryptanalysis tool. In: Nielsen, J.B., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2018. LNCS, vol. 10821, pp. 683–714. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78375-8_22

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Delaune, S., Derbez, P., Vavrille, M.: Catching the fastest boomerangs application to SKINNY. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2020(4), 104–129 (2020)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Dong, X., Qin, L., Sun, S., Wang, X.: Key guessing strategies for linear key-schedule algorithms in rectangle attacks. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., p. 856 (2021)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Dunkelman, O., Keller, N., Shamir, A.: A practical-time related-key attack on the Kasumi cryptosystem used in GSM and 3G telephony. In: Rabin, T. (ed.) CRYPTO 2010. LNCS, vol. 6223, pp. 393–410. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_21

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Hadipour, H., Bagheri, N., Song, L.: Improved rectangle attacks on SKINNY and CRAFT. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2021(2), 140–198 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Hadipour, H., Nageler, M., Eichlseder, M.: Throwing boomerangs into feistel structures: application to CLEFIA, WARP, LBlock, LBlock-s and TWINE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/745 (2022)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Ji, F., Zhang, W., Zhou, C., Ding, T.: Improved (related-key) differential cryptanalysis on GIFT. In: Dunkelman, O., Jacobson, Jr., M.J., O’Flynn, C. (eds.) SAC 2020. LNCS, vol. 12804, pp. 198–228. Springer, Cham (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81652-0_8

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Liu, Y., Sasaki, Yu.: Related-key boomerang attacks on GIFT with automated trail search including BCT Effect. In: Jang-Jaccard, J., Guo, F. (eds.) ACISP 2019. LNCS, vol. 11547, pp. 555–572. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_30

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Murphy, S.: The return of the cryptographic boomerang. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 57(4), 2517–2521 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Song, L., Qin, X., Hu, L.: Boomerang connectivity table revisited. Application to SKINNY and AES. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2019(1), 118–141 (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Su, L., Wang, W., Wang, M.: Accelerating the search of differential and linear characteristics with the SAT method. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2021(1), 269–315 (2021)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Wagner, D.: The boomerang attack. In: Knudsen, L. (ed.) FSE 1999. LNCS, vol. 1636, pp. 156–170. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48519-8_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Wang, H., Peyrin, T.: Boomerang switch in multiple rounds. Application to AES variants and deoxys. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2019(1), 142–169 (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Zhu, B., Dong, X., Yu, H.: MILP-based differential attack on round-reduced GIFT. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2018, 390 (2018)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61872359, No. 61936008 and No. 61972393) and the Climbing Program from Institute of Information Engineering CAS (Grant No. E1Z0041112).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100093, China

    Chenmeng Li, Baofeng Wu & Dongdai Lin

  2. School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China

    Chenmeng Li, Baofeng Wu & Dongdai Lin

Authors
  1. Chenmeng Li
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Baofeng Wu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Dongdai Lin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Baofeng Wu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China

    Yi Deng

  2. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

A 10-Round Optimal (Related-Key) Differentials for GIFT-64

A 10-Round Optimal (Related-Key) Differentials for GIFT-64

Table 6. Input and Output differences of 10-round related-key differential trails with weight 19.8 of GIFT-64
Full size table

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Li, C., Wu, B., Lin, D. (2023). Generalized Boomerang Connectivity Table and Improved Cryptanalysis of GIFT. In: Deng, Y., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13837. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26553-2_11

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26553-2_11

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-26552-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-26553-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation