This penultimate chapter discusses wild animals’ vulnerability. To be sure, this topic may come as a surprise. After all, the last two chapters drew connections between vulnerability and two types of harmful uses of animals by humans: using and killing animals as a source of food, and using animals as research subjects. In these cases, humans caused the animals’ plight. However, the situation presents itself differently in the case of wild animals: they seemingly live independently from human influence. I define here as “wild animals” those animals who are neither domesticated nor in direct interaction with humans on a regular basis.Footnote 1

Earlier, I distinguished among three different manifestations of vulnerability: non-preventable harm, justified harm that cannot be considered morally problematic since it does not constitute a wrong, and wrongs (with or without harm) that could and should have been prevented. At first sight, we might think that any harm wild animals incur (such as diseases or accidents) falls into the first two categories, that is, non-preventable or morally justified harms. After all, are not all the harms wild animals incur in their daily lives either non-preventable or justified, given that they are not caused by moral agents? That is, one could argue that the harm wild animals incur is beyond the realm of human morality. Why, then, devote a whole chapter to the topic of wild animal vulnerability?

Nonetheless, this chapter aims to investigate whether the harm wild animals incur in their daily lives is justified from an ethical perspective. I will argue that, in many cases, it is not, as wild animals can also hold basic claims—ones which are frequently overlooked by humans. What is more, moral agents often fail to compensate wild animals for the harm we cause them. For example, humans destroy wild animals’ habitats (e.g., to extract natural resources) which, in turn, endangers wild animals’ subsistence. I will argue that in such cases, humans have a compensatory duty, although we often neglect it. Many groups of wild animals thus face an increased likelihood of having their claims unjustly considered—or not at all—by moral agents, and are thus at risk of incurring unjustified forms of harm. Accordingly, wild animals can often be described as a particularly vulnerable group in need of more attention and special protection to reduce their risk of being wronged and to increase their chances of eventually receiving what they are due. In other words, the function vulnerability discourse performs in the case of humans can also be performed in the case of wild animals: it highlights those beings who are more likely to have their basic claims disregarded and neglected and who are thus more likely to incur wrongful harm.

I proceed as follows. First, I present a short overview of the different forms of suffering and distress animals incur in the wild. I show that in many cases, humans have the means to alleviate the harms endured by wild animals. I also contend that wild animals can hold valid claims against moral agents, who have a duty to give these claims their due weight. However, as I will show, humans frequently fall short: moral agents frequently do not leave wild animals alone when we should, nor do we properly assist and support them when required. This is a first way in which wild animals are particularly vulnerable: their claims frequently receive less weight than they should receive. As a consequence, these animals should be given more attention in public discourse. In practice, this also means that moral agents should reconsider several activities related to wild animals: research priorities, the distribution of land amongst humans and animals, and the use of natural resources on which wild animals’ subsistence depends.

In a second step, I argue that if moral agents fail to give wild animals’ claims due weight and end up harming them unjustifiably (e.g., due to oil spills or the effects of anthropogenic climate change), they owe them some sort of compensation, reparation, or restitution (I use these terms here interchangeably). I also show that this duty of compensation is often disregarded in practice; as a result, many wild animals are frequently denied what they are legitimately due. This is thus a second way in which humans render wild animals particularly vulnerable: not only do moral agents frequently fail to respect wild animals’ basic claims (be it intentionally or unintentionally), but they often fail to compensate these animals for the harms incurred. Wild animals should, therefore, be considered a particularly vulnerable group deserving of more protection and attention—and I will outline what this means in practice.

7.1 The Plight of Wild Animals

One might be tempted to describe the state wild animals find themselves in as idyllic—a life unperturbed by negative human influences. The reality, however, is less blissful. In their daily lives, wild animals encounter many dire situations charged with stress and fear. Furthermore, wild animals’ lives are not as independent of human actions as we might think.

Animals in the wild face stress and anxiety in many situations. For example, they are often on the look-out for food and shelter, and they suffer from diseases. In addition, they frequently fear for their own lives as well as the lives of their offspring, because they are constantly threatened by predators. Richard Dawkins vividly summarizes this state of affairs: “The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are being slowly devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst and disease” (Dawkins 2004: 131–132).

The field of welfare biology is concerned with questions such as which animal species are capable of experiencing welfare, whether animals’ welfare is positive, negative, or neutral, and how the welfare of these animals can be improved (Groff and Ng 2019). Welfare biologists are concerned not only with the welfare of animals used by humans, but also with the welfare of wild animals. Yew-Kwang Ng (1995), for example, argued in an influential early article that, in the wild, suffering outweighs enjoyment: wild animals often experience more suffering than pleasurable moments during their lifetime.Footnote 2 Others have argued in a similar vein (see, e.g., Horta 2017; Johannsen 2021; Soryl et al. 2021; O’Brien 2022; Faria 2023).

And indeed, many wild animals encounter considerable suffering and distress during their lifetime: they experience accidents and diseases, they fall victim to predators, they experience the loss of family members and corresponding grief, they endure harsh winters without enough food, and the like. When it comes to wild animals’ lifespan, the distinction between animals traditionally known as K-strategists and r-strategists is illuminating. Examples of K-strategists are giraffes, lions, eagles, and elephants. They have fewer offspring, each of which has a relatively high probability of surviving until the age of maturity and beyond. However, many species are r-strategists. R-strategists are animals who have a high reproduction rate: they produce many offspring, each of which has a relatively low likelihood of surviving to adulthood. Common examples are rodents and fish. Many wild animals die at a young age and are thus deprived of potentially valuable lifespan, and this is especially the case for r-strategist animal species. Many of them are killed by predators shortly after birth or at a very young age, or they inevitably die because of limited natural resources (such as food). For example, 88% of meadow voles die during the first month of their lives (Johannsen 2021: 13). Among fish, size is inversely correlated with mortality: smaller fish (e.g., shortly after hatching) face a higher risk of dying prematurely due to predation (at rates over 60% per day), as “small animals can quite literally fit in more mouths, and as such, may suffer a greater risk of predation” (Goatley and Bellwood 2016: 1).

Why, then, do we often picture the lives of wild animals as blissful and idyllic? This can likely be explained by a “survivorship bias” (Horta 2010: 76–77; Johannsen 2021: 22). The animals we see are those who have survived so far, and we forget about those who died at a young age. In addition, we tend to overlook smaller animals (often r-strategists) because we see them less frequently. That is, if we think about enjoyment, pleasure, and happiness in the wild, we usually picture bigger, K-strategist animals, thereby forgetting or overlooking the innumerable plights of r-strategists who frequently die at a young age.

So far, I have established that the lives of wild animals is not as pleasurable as we often picture it. Many wild animals experience stressful moments, suffer from diseases, and die at a young age. But there is a second issue: wild animals often do not live as independently from human influence as we may think. In fact, humans interfere with their lives in many ways. For instance, humans exploit their habitats (e.g., to extract natural resources such as oil and trees), which disturbs the resident wild animals and causes them considerable distress. Agricultural expansion encroaches onto wild animals’ habitats, leading to deforestation and the replacement of natural vegetation. In turn, this results in species loss, because animals are deprived of the natural habitat which forms the basis of their subsistence. More generally, humans also contribute to climate change, which negatively affects the lives of many wild animals. For example, rising sea levels will make the habitats of many wild animals disappear altogether. A systematic review found evidence that over 700 species are already negatively impacted by climate change (Pacifici et al. 2017).

Some think that moral agents minimally owe sentient animals something if we directly caused these animals’ negative welfare state. That is, humans only owe wild animals something when we are responsible for the harm these animals have incurred. According to this view, if humans destroy the habitats of wild animals, for example, then we owe them some sort of compensation. Conversely, many people think that if humans did not cause the problematic situation wild animals find themselves in, it is better to leave them alone. This is called the “laissez-faire intuition,” which results in a “hands-off” approach toward wild animals in most contexts (Palmer 2010: 2).

In the following, I discuss whether this is correct, and analyze how the debate about what we owe to wild animals can be linked to vulnerability discourse. I argue that many groups of wild animals should be regarded as particularly vulnerable groups for two reasons: first, because humans often fail to fairly consider wild animals’ basic claims; second, because humans often neglect to compensate wild animals for the harm we cause them. In other words, moral agents frequently overlook, ignore, and forget wild animals’ basic claims. Therefore, these particularly vulnerable beings should be afforded additional attention to eventually receive what they are legitimately due.

In order to develop my argument, I need to show that wild animals can be claim-holders, and that humans have the abilities to respect and, if necessary, to fulfill these claims. After all, if moral agents lack the capacities to improve wild animals’ welfare, for example, then wild animals cannot have a claim related to this point. In a second step, I need to determine whether wild animals’ claims are likely to be disregarded by moral agents.

Let us turn to the first point. I argued in Chap. 3 that moral agents have a duty to justly consider those claims over which they have power. To have power, in this context, means to have the ability to positively or negatively influence a situation. I further argued, based on an argument proposed by Peter Singer (Singer 1972), that moral agents sometimes have power over the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the interests of individuals living far away. That is, I accept Singer’s view that distance per se does not matter from a moral point of view. This reasoning leads to a pro tanto duty to alleviate and reduce avoidable suffering. As Singer (1972: 231) states: “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” This view implies that moral agents may be morally blameworthy for actions and omissions for which they were not directly and personally assigned responsibility. This is the case if they fail to prevent suffering (such as diseases) which is happening far away from them but which they could have prevented by investing a reasonable amount of money or time.

Let us now apply these insights to wild animals. In actual fact, humans often have the technical abilities and means to alleviate wild animals’ suffering and to improve their life. As Beril İdemen Sözmen (2013: 1077–1078) notes, interventions within nature are frequent and generally go unnoticed by the public. For example, wild animals are saved from drowning, protected in reserves for species conservation, have their injuries treated or are given pills against parasites. Further examples of interventions in nature are vaccinations for wild animals, habitat transformations, or the treatment and rehabilitation of injured animals (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). According to Sözmen, then, “the question is not, whether humans should or in fact do intervene in nature to alleviate non-human harm or how absurd such intervention is. The question is rather, if intervention is morally obligatory, and if yes, what such an obligation entails” (Sözmen 2013: 1078).

One might concede that moral agents have duties in the case of suffering human beings who live far away from them, yet contend that these duties do not extend to the case of wild animals in need, insofar as wild animals cannot hold claims against humans. However, such an exclusion of wild animals from the scope of morality is problematic. As I have shown in Chap. 4, sentient animals can generally hold claims against humans. It is therefore unclear why sentient wild animals should be incapable of being claim-holders. Even if one assumes that wild animals live totally unaffected from human influence, it is still true in many situations that humans wield the power to positively influence the course of wild animals’ lives (e.g., by providing medical treatment or food during harsh winters). If one accepts that moral agents have moral obligations toward distant strangers in need, it is then hard to justify why such obligations should not be extended to distant wild animals in dire need—assuming we seek to avoid speciesist discrimination.

Note that in this chapter I am mostly concerned with specifying what humans owe wild animals, along with explaining how not giving wild animals what they are due renders them particularly vulnerable. I focus less on who precisely bears the burden of such duties. By framing the duty in terms of the relevant moral agents who have the power to positively influence wild animals’ lives, I am leaving room for a variety of views about a number of related questions, such who exactly bears this duty, how to assign this duty, and whether collectives or individuals are duty bearers. Admittedly, moral agents vary greatly in the power, opportunities, and resources available to them to improve wild animals’ lives. Nevertheless, most individual moral agents frequently have the possibility to positively influence the course of wild animals’ lives. For example, individuals can assist wild animals individually (i.e., by respecting their basic claims, by providing them with food or assisting them after accidents); at a minimum, they can talk publicly about the plight of wild animals while supporting organizations and individuals who are providing assistance to wild animals or who are advocating for more research in this domain.

In sum, I have established so far that there is abundant distress, suffering, and premature death among sentient wild animals. I further argued that moral agents often have the capacity to positively influence the course of wild animals’ lives, or at least to avoid causing them unnecessary harm. Therefore, moral agents have a duty to justly consider not only the interests of humans but also those of sentient animals—both domesticated and wild. Therefore, the basic interests of animals outlined in Chap. 4 also have the status of legitimate claims in the case of wild animals, if humans have the capacity to fairly consider and potentially satisfy them. These claims are:

  1. 1)

    a claim to the absence of hunger and thirst;

  2. 2)

    a claim to the absence of suffering (absence of pain, injury, and disease);

  3. 3)

    a claim to express and pursue normal behavior;

  4. 4)

    a claim to the absence of discomfort, fear, and distress;

  5. 5)

    a claim to lead a self-determined life; and

  6. 6)

    a claim to continued existence.

But what follows from this in practice with regard to humans’ duties toward wild animals?

7.2 Wild Animals’ Claims and Humans’ Duties

Parts of this section are based on Martin (2021).

In the last section, I established that sentient wild animals can also hold valid claims. That is, not only are humans and domesticated animals claim-holders, but wild animals are as well. What does this position imply for human interactions with these animals and their treatment of the latter? In many cases, respect for wild animals’ claims means that humans owe animals negative duties of non-interference. Some of these duties are straightforward: if wild animals have a claim to continued existence, then moral agents have, minimally, a pro tanto duty not to kill them. Admittedly, there may be some exceptions to this rule. An example is self-defense against an attack by a wild animal. However, whenever possible, humans should respect wild animals’ claim to continued existence, by not ending their lives prematurely.

Furthermore, if we accept that wild animals have a claim to the absence of suffering, discomfort, fear, and distress, then humans have a corresponding duty not to cause any unnecessary and avoidable harm, such as distress and suffering, to wild animals. This means that humans should avoid interventions in wild animals’ lives which lead to considerable distress and which risk causing harm to these animals. Examples are noisy, disturbing visits to animals’ natural habitats (e.g., disrupting hibernation periods, or taking off-track paths).

With regard to wild animals’ claim to the absence of hunger and thirst, humans have a duty, when in the wild, to abstain from interventions that threaten wild animals’ subsistence and survival. In practice, this means that humans should not, for example, pollute rivers and lakes in ways that threaten the survival or welfare of the animals who depend on these water sources. Furthermore, humans should not undertake any actions that threaten the availability of food for wild animals in their natural environment. This means that humans ought to protect and respect natural habitats (i.e., natural vegetation like trees and bushes), so as not to jeopardize wild animals’ subsistence.

Wild animals’ claim to express and pursue normal behavior entails that humans ought to refrain from any actions which would interfere with wild animals’ abilities to lead a species-typical life. In practice, this means that humans should, whenever possible, forgo actions which harm the social bonds of wild animals, for instance by hunting or capturing individual animals. Furthermore, humans should preserve nature in a way that allows wild animals to pursue their natural (and also individual) behaviors, such as building nests or tunnel systems to raise their offspring. Moreover, humans have a pro tanto duty to respect and protect the migratory routes of animals who tend to migrate over large territories (such as wolves, elephants, and some birds), so that these animals can continue to express their natural behavior. In practice, this may imply that humans must reconsider where they build high towers or roads, for example, to reduce interference with natural migratory routes.

So far, I have fleshed out humans’ negative duties with regard to wild animals’ claims. That is, I outlined what humans should not be doing to and with wild animals, as well as their habitats, territories, and sustenance. However, do not some of wild animals’ claims also imply that humans have positive duties of assistance? After all, if wild animals have a legitimate claim to the absence of thirst and hunger, does this not mean that humans should not only avoid polluting animals’ food and water sources, but also provide them with food and clean water (e.g., during hot summers, harsh winters, or times of drought)? Even more controversially, if wild animals have a claim to continued existence, does this not imply that humans actually have a duty to intervene in nature to assist wild animals by protecting their health and lives? After all, as outlined earlier, many wild animals die prematurely, and they encounter various sources of distress during their lives, such as when they become sick or fall prey to predators who devour their bodies alive. Or do humans only owe duties of non-interference, rather than assistance, to wild animals, in cases where humans did not cause the dire situations in which wild animals find themselves?

The duty to intervene in nature for the sake of wild animals used to be an argumentative reductio ad absurdum in the field of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of intervening in the wild has received considerable attention and support in the literature (Hadley 2006; Nussbaum 2007; Horta 2010, 2013; Cochrane 2013; Horta 2017; Johannsen 2021; Horta 2022). As I will contend in what follows, humans do not have merely negative duties when it comes to wild animals (such as a duty to not pollute their territories, or to not kill game). In some circumstances, moral agents also have a duty to assist wild animals. In the next sections, I show under which circumstances this is the case.

The view that humans sometimes have a duty to assist wild animals is not new. John Hadley, for example, argues that we have “a duty to provide aid at minimal cost to ourselves—‘minimal aid and assistance’—to free-roaming non-human animals […] in dire need” (Hadley 2006: 446). In support of this point, he presents different ecological catastrophe scenarios. In the first one (e.g., in the event of a drought, or in the aftermath of a tsunami or an earthquake), the lives of many human beings are in jeopardy. They have many basic unmet welfare interests, such as for food, clean water, or basic medical treatment. In this case, our intuitive belief is that moral agents have a duty to aid and assist under three conditions: first, if it is possible from a logistical point of view (i.e., they can actually do something about the situation); second, if the intervention is not too financially burdensome; and third, if human beings, such as aid workers, are not put at risk.

The second scenario involves the same setting, but instead of humans, wild animals face the harmful event in question: animals are confronted with a situation of dire need, such as a drought. Here, one might be tempted to discard the view that we humans owe duties of assistance to these animals. However, if we want to avoid the charge of speciesism, then we should also assist wild animals in situations which would warrant help and assistance if humans were concerned. To the extent that we are committed to avoiding speciesist forms of discrimination, we have compelling reasons to assist wild animals who find themselves in situations similar to those warranting assistance to humans.

One might still object to the argument proposed here. One might argue that the analogy in these thought experiments does not hold, as the initial baselines of well-being between humans and animals differ substantially: the humans in this thought experiment were living healthy and flourishing lives before the catastrophe happened and are thus made worse off by this unfortunate event. Wild animals, however, were always badly off if they lived in places with restricted food options or areas at high risk of forest fires and droughts. That is, one could claim that wild animals frequently live in what could be called failed states—contexts which often entail more suffering, violence, and death than pleasure and enjoyment (Horta 2013; Mannino 2015; Milburn 2016). Why, then, should we have a duty to improve these animals’ living situation, if they were not necessarily made worse off?

This objection does not hold up to scrutiny, however: we do not think that a human population A, which was always living under bad circumstances (such as areas with a high risk of droughts), deserves less attention and assistance than another human population B which was flourishing before suddenly undergoing a natural catastrophe. That is, it should not make any difference whether the interests of individuals living remotely from us were previously satisfied and then suddenly frustrated by unavoidable external circumstances, or whether these interests were constantly unsatisfied (Martin 2021: 209–210). As pointed out earlier, frustrations of interests do not only occur if previously fulfilled interests are suddenly thwarted: they also occur if someone is impeded from achieving some potential welfare state that they previously did not have, but legitimately can and should have.

A further objection against human interventions could be that wild animals have a claim to non-interference. After all, I argued earlier that sentient animals, including wild animals, have a claim to lead a self-determined life. Is not this claim at odds with interventions in nature? Do we not violate animals’ agency and self-determination if we interfere—even positively—in their lives? It is hard to accept this argument for two reasons. First, to lead a self-determined life as a wild animal is not at odds with human interventions. If humans intervene to improve wild animals’ welfare, this also improves the likelihood that these animals can lead an active, autonomous, and self-determined life. That is, interventions in the wild sometimes actually enable animals to lead a self-determined life. If humans provide animals with food or water during harsh winters, for example, we thereby provide animals with the basics that allow them to lead a flourishing, self-determined life. Second, as outlined earlier, animals fulfilling the conditions of vulnerability ascriptions have welfare interests. This means that some things (e.g., access to fresh water and food) are in their interest. It is hard to see why non-interference should be in wild animals’ interests in all cases, if some forms of assistance fundamentally improve their basic welfare.

How far does the human duty to assist wild animals extend? So far, I have mostly focused on assistance provided to animals after catastrophes and in situations of distress or suffering in which humans can often provide help easily. However, much suffering in nature is actually caused by animals themselves—in particular, predators preying on other animals. Does the duty to assist wild animals lead to the presumably absurd consequence that humans also have a duty to intervene in nature to halt predation?

A strategy for avoiding this conclusion is the Moral Agency Argument (Sözmen 2013: 1078). It claims that humans are not obliged to intervene against natural predation because animals are not moral agents; as such, predators cannot commit any moral wrongs since they are not responsible for their actions. That is, predators cannot hold any duties and thus do not violate the claims of the prey animals they attack. And if nobody is morally responsible, so the argument goes, then humans have no duty to intervene (for a presentation of different versions of this argument, see Sözmen 2013 and Milburn 2015).

The Moral Agency Argument fails for a simple reason, though. Imagine a human being who is not responsible for her actions (e.g., due to substance abuse or a severe cognitive deficit). If she is violently attacking another person, we would usually consider it obligatory to intervene and help the person who is under attack. However, this duty of assistance is restricted: we only owe a duty of assistance if our intervention does not come at too high a risk to ourselves. That is, we cannot be asked to sacrifice our bodily integrity and safety in such a case. The same should apply when assisting wild animals: we have a duty to assist and intervene, yet not at the expense of our own safety. In the case of predation, most interventions are likely too risky to humans. Nevertheless, this does not preclude positing a duty to intervene and assist if wild animals are in dire need and if we could assist them with little or no risk to ourselves.

A second argument against intervening in nature is the Implementation Argument. This argument accepts that avoidable animal suffering should be prevented or alleviated. However, according to this view, it is impossible to intervene in nature from a practical point of view: “Demanding equal moral consideration for non-human animals is pointless, the argument goes, when it’s impossible practically or too costly to be contemplated” (Sözmen 2013: 1081). Admittedly, in some cases it may indeed be impossible from a practical point of view to intervene and improve the fate of wild animals. Nonetheless, in some situations it is practically feasible to substantially improve the plight of wild animals—and in these cases, we should do so.Footnote 3

Admittedly, we humans have a rather bad track-record when it comes to our relationship with nature: we are a threat to biodiversity, we drive thousands of animals to extinction, we cause climate change, and we frequently pollute nature and destroy habitats (Hunter 2007). In addition, we may not always be aware of all the consequences of our interventions in nature. Such interventions may be problematic for the ecosystem or for other animals: we may, for example, destroy ecological stability in nature through our interventions, with devastating consequences. Therefore, we may currently prefer a laissez-faire approach when it comes to interventions in the wild: to keep our hands off nature. And indeed, if the consequences of a potential intervention are unpredictable, or even undesirable in the long-term, this provides us with a strong reason against undertaking it. Currently, humans often lack the knowledge about the impact and potential negative consequences of some interventions in the wild. For this reason, it is reasonable to accept a prudential principle which claims that one should only intervene if one is likely to produce more good than harm—that is, if the anticipated benefits clearly outweigh the anticipated harm.

At the same time, such potential ecological risks do not diminish the duty to fairly consider wild animals’ basic claims in various contexts and situations. All too often, humans do not think about the plight of animals when making decisions affecting them and the nature they inhabit. Furthermore, ecological risks related to interventions do not exempt humans from a duty to conduct research on how to improve the lives of wild animals in the long run.

To sum up what has been said so far, sentient wild animals can be bearers of claims. Amongst others, wild animals have claims to continued existence, to leading a self-determined life, and to be free from suffering, disease, and the like. In turn, humans have pro tanto duties when it comes to these claims. When I talk about pro tanto (instead of pro toto) duties, I mean that these duties are not absolute: they can be overridden if they conflict with more important duties and claims. That said, in usual circumstances, when there is no conflict between crucial interests of humans and animals, these basic duties with regard to wild animals should be respected.

According to my argument, respect for wild animals’ claims means that humans owe wild animals not only duties of non-interference, but also sometimes positive duties of assistance. For example, humans can provide wild animals with vaccinations to improve their health and potentially extend their lifespan, assist them during droughts, save them from forest fires, feed them during unusually harsh winters, rescue them after accidents and natural catastrophes, and so on. It also follows that not all naturally occurring harm is ethically justified. Rather, if humans have the means and ability to prevent and alleviate natural harm, then we have a duty to do so, in many cases. Allowing harm toward wild animals thus is only justified if humans have fairly considered the claims of wild animals, yet supplied justifiable reasons for instead giving priority to the weightier claims of other individuals (humans or animals).

When distributing resources such as time and money, if the claims of wild animals are likely to be given comparatively less weight than they are due, then wild animals qualify as a particularly vulnerable group. This is likely often the case: humans frequently overlook wild animals’ claims and fail to devote sufficient resources and time to improving their welfare. The same holds for many research priorities: the fundamental interests of wild animals are likely not given enough weight when research priorities are set. And all too often, wild animals are merely considered parts of the ecosystem—not as individuals with self-determined lives who can experience pleasure and pain. If humans intervene in nature to help wild animals, frequently only a few species benefit from such assistance, such as animals threatened by extinction, or animals of certain species which the public finds cute or interesting. For example, when people are asked to donate money to help different animal species, priority is given to rare or endangered species, animals deemed “charismatic,” and those animals who fulfill a crucial role in the ecosystem (Martín-López et al. 2008; Angulo and Courchamp 2009; Richardson and Loomis 2009; Wainger et al. 2018). Furthermore, larger animals elicit more donations than smaller ones (Veríssimo et al. 2018). This shows that there may be biases toward some species of wild animals, to the detriment of others. Compared to other groups of animals (such as companion animals) and humans, many species of wild animals are more likely to have their legitimate claims overlooked or simply ignored. As a consequence, they can be considered a particularly vulnerable group in need of special protection and attention.

What should this special protection and additional attention look like? As a first step, we have to collectively recognize the moral importance of individual sentient wild animals. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that we owe duties to wild animals. Once these goals have been achieved, we will have to reconsider how we treat wild animals. In practice, this means that during political deliberations about the use of natural resources and land, priority-setting, and research funding allocation, the claims of wild animals should be given more attention. In addition, when taking decisions affecting wild animals (such as building roads in the countryside, or during landscape and city planning), we should consider how wild animals may be affected; correspondingly, steps should be taken so that these decisions are compatible with respect for wild animals’ basic claims.

Publicly identifying wild animals as a vulnerable group may have a further positive effect: it may effectively change the way we think about these animals. It orients our attention toward the fact that these animals belong to a group whose interests are currently overlooked. This recognition will help us remember to take their plight into consideration when making certain decisions (e.g., how to allocate public resources or whom to aid in the aftermath of natural catastrophes).

So far, I have argued that respect for wild animals’ claims sometimes involves a duty to intervene in nature for the sake of wild animals when the risk is low and the expected outcome is net-positive. Thus, the question is not whether humans should intervene in nature for wild animals’ sakes, but rather how strong this duty is compared to other duties (e.g., with respect to humans and animals closer to us, to animals we previously wronged, or to other instances of suffering in the world). It is possible that our duty toward wild animals with whom we have no interactions may sometimes be outweighed by more important duties toward animals closer to us who may be in greater need. Be that as it may, this amounts to an issue of priority-setting and is not an argument against duties toward wild animals in general. Furthermore, I have argued that many groups of wild animals can be identified as particularly vulnerable because we are likely to overlook their basic claims. In addition, there is a second way in which wild animals are particularly vulnerable: often, humans intentionally or unintentionally disrespect wild animals’ claims, but then fail to properly make up for these violations. I address this topic in the following section.

7.3 Violations of Wild Animals’ Claims and the Duty to Compensate

Humans negatively affect the lives of wild animals in many ways: we destroy their habitats (e.g., in the search for natural resources), we pollute their habitats (e.g., oil spills), and we cause climate change, which may have a negative impact on wild animals’ lives.Footnote 4 If wild animals do indeed have the six basic claims outlined before, what do humans owe animals if we disrespect these claims and cause harm? And what is the precise link between such harm and animal vulnerability?

In this section, I suggest that if humans fail to respect wild animals’ basic claims without a solid justification, then we owe the affected animals compensation, reparation, and restitution (while there are slight differences among these terms, I use them here interchangeably). Moreover, if humans fail to compensate wild animals for the intentional and even unintentional harms we have caused, then these animals are wronged by not receiving the reparation they are due. This leads to a second group of wild animals we can deem particularly vulnerable: those animals whose claims for reparation, restitution, and compensation are not fulfilled.

Most people accept that if we wrong someone, we owe them compensation, restitution, or reparation. For example, if I injure another person intentionally or even unintentionally, I owe her some sort of compensation: I (or my insurance company) have to pay her medical bill and maybe even damages. Various philosophers have argued, in the same vein, that the same principle holds for animals who are victims of humans’ actions: if we wrong them, we owe them some sort of compensation or reparation (Palmer 2010; Mosquera 2016; Fischer et al. 2021). Fischer et al., for example, note: “If you are responsible for large-scale harms to wild animals in wild ecosystems, then you have some duty of repair to those wild animals” (Fischer et al. 2021: 17).

As outlined earlier, we may sometimes have good reasons to override the claims of wild animals. There are cases in which more important human claims should be given priority over animals’ claims. For example, when attacked by a wild animal, I am justified in defending myself, even if this violates the animal’s claim to avoid suffering and to continued existence. However, in some cases, we disrespect animals’ basic claims willingly and intentionally. In these types of cases, we owe the affected animals some sort of compensation. For example, if we harmfully interfere in some wild animals’ habitat by polluting it and thereby endanger their survival without any acceptable justification, then we have a duty to repair: we should clean the affected area and assist the animals until they can resume a self-determined life. And if we fail to do so, we cause these animals an additional wrong.

In practice, humans do provide assistance to wild animals they negatively affect, in some cases. For example, after the “Prestige oil spill” on the Galician coast of Spain in 2002, there was public outcry about its impact on wildlife, such as birds like guillemots, razorbills, and puffins. Consequently, a rescue and rehabilitation center was established where birds were gathered, cleaned, and treated before being released (Balseiro et al. 2005). However, such help is not yet systematically provided to animals who fall victim to human faults: many companies and governments fail to consider the plight of the wild animals they negatively impact.

However, humans also sometimes negatively affect wild animals in ways that are less obvious and thus less well recognized: humans often cause direct but unintended harm to wild animals (Fraser 2012: 736). For example, agricultural practices, such as plowing fields, have a detrimental effect on many wild animals who live in the fields. A further example is road traffic: many animals are hit by cars, or their habitats are destroyed by the construction of new roads. Furthermore, considerable harm is caused to birds by communication towers and buildings with windows. Pollution (such as the routine discharge of machinery waste oil from ships) and the use of chemicals also negatively affect many wild animals. Yet despite their highly negative impacts on wildlife, these types of disturbances often go unnoticed (Fraser 2012: 736–737).

Wild animals who are more likely to be victims of both intended and unintended harms can be considered particularly vulnerable groups. The fact that some of these harms are unintended does not play a role in the assessment of whether these harms are morally problematic or not. Commensurate to their increased vulnerability, these animals should receive more attention. For example, when government agencies are constructing new buildings or roads, they should give additional care to the ways these endeavors may affect wild animals. As for agricultural practices, incentives could be given to subsidize farming practices which are less harmful to wild animals, or more research money could be devoted to studies on such topics.

A further important example of unintended harm caused to animals is anthropogenic climate change. Numerous publications have highlighted the disastrous impact of climate change on humans (one of the most recent being the Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC 2021). However, the impact of climate change on animals has received less attention in the literature. This is problematic, as rising sea levels and weather extremes will negatively affect the lives of countless wild animals in the future. While some animal species may benefit from climate change, it has problematic effects on others. Yet—with a few notable exceptions (Palmer 2010; Pepper 2019; Rowlands 2021; Sebo 2021)—this topic is rather underdeveloped in the animal ethics literature.

I cannot develop here what compensation for climate-related harm to animals should look like in detail, as this would be a separate endeavor. A few words are nonetheless necessary. Moral agents have a duty not only to mitigate climate change (i.e., to take measures to address its causes), but also to assist animals who are victims of the effects of climate change. That is, to the extent that climate change jeopardizes animals’ basic claims, we owe the affected animals assistance and aid. The specific assistance depends on the kind of wrongs the animals are likely to incur along with the type of claims that are at stake. For example, animals’ claims to live a self-determined life and to express normal behaviors are violated if their territory is flooded as a consequence of climate change. In this case, if it is a viable possibility, relocation of the animals concerned could be discussed. Of course, special attention will have to be paid to potential negative consequences of such resettlement on the animals affected and on other animals. Other strategic tools to facilitate adaptation of wild animals to climate change include land and water conservation, animal rehabilitation, habitat restoration, natural resource management, along with better legislation and regulation (Mawdsley et al. 2009; Palmer 2021).

There are two ways to move forward from here regarding the harm that climate change causes wild animals. First, we are under the moral obligation to do more research on how to both mitigate climate change and assist wild animals adapt to a changing climate. Second, “we can make practical progress by advocating for moral and political standing for wild animals, so that we will have the social and political capital necessary for taking the interests of wild animals into account as we recreate human societies in the face of climate change” (Sebo 2021: 61). To extend vulnerability language to wild animals and by describing them publicly as a particularly vulnerable group whose basic claims are likely to be overlooked may contribute to bringing about these changes.

Again, note that if I say that “we” are under a moral obligation, I have in mind those moral agents who have the power to positively influence the course of wild animals’ lives and who are best placed to fulfill such duties. In the case of climate change, many humans benefit from past or current emissions, and thus owe wild animals a duty to mitigate the effects of climate change as well as adaptive measures if it becomes clear that animals will be negatively impacted. This means that moral agents are minimally under the duty to publicly talk about the effects of climate change on wild animals, and to support organizations conducting research on how to mitigate its effects and assist animals in their adaptation process.

7.4 Wild Animals as a Particularly Vulnerable Group

In this chapter, I have argued that wild animals hold basic claims—no less so than animals destined for the food industry and for research. I showed that wild animals’ claims are often not given the weight they are due, and that wild animals therefore often qualify as a vulnerable group. There are two reasons for the heightened vulnerability of wild animals. First, many wild animals are particularly vulnerable because they are at increased risk of having their claims disrespected by humans—be it intentionally or unintentionally. Second, when humans disrespect animals’ basic claims, we frequently neglect to provide the compensation and reparations these animals are due. In sum, wild animals are frequently at increased risk of being denied what they are entitled to. This problem is particularly acute for those species who tend to be overlooked, such as small animals, animals who prematurely die in high numbers (r-strategists), and animals who are deemed unattractive by the public or who fulfill no key function in the ecosystem. All these animals’ claims are often not given due weight when it comes to decisions about land use, the effects of climate change, and after disasters.

A further problem is that wild animals are often not seen as individuals with their own lives but rather as members of a specific species, particularly those animals who are deemed “invasive species” and thus regarded as a nuisance. Often, lethal conservation practices are used to limit their numbers, overlooking the fact that these animals are sentient individuals (Abbate and Fischer 2019; Wallach et al. 2020). Publicly describing wild animals as particularly vulnerable groups may change the way we perceive these creatures. It draws our attention toward the fact that they are often at increased risk of not being given what they are due, and that more protection and attention is needed when we are dealing with them.

From what has been said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7, it follows that many groups of animals are particularly vulnerable. We may then be tempted to wonder: if so many groups of animals (and humans, for this matter) are particularly vulnerable, does the concept of vulnerability lose its meaning? And if so many groups are vulnerable, where should we start to reduce increased vulnerability? Should those particularly vulnerable receive priority? I turn to these questions in the next chapter.