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Part of the book series: Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ((WHPS,volume 18))

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Abstract

In this chapter, Thelma Zeno Lavine argues that the sociology of knowledge should subject the norms of knowledge to socio-historical analysis.

Thelma Zeno Lavine: First published in 1942 in The Journal of Philosophy, 39(19), 342–356.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    (1) Alexander von Schelting, review of Ideologie and Utopie by Karl Mannheim (Bonn, 1930), American Sociological Review, Vol. I (1936), pp. 664–674; (2) Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge: An Answer to Relativism (New York, 1938); (3) Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Reflections on the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. I (1940), pp. 3–23; (4) C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order (New York, 1929); (5) Gerard De Gre, “The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Truth,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. II (1941), pp. 110–115; (6) Hans Speier, “The Social Determination of Ideas,” Social Research, Vol. V (1938), pp. 182–205; (7) Max Weber; cf. Talcott Parsons, review of von Schelting’s Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre, American Sociological Review, Vol. I (1936), pp. 675–681; (8) Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York 1937); (9) George H. Sabine, “Logic and Social Studies,” Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVIII (1939), pp. 155–176; (10) Robert K. Merton, “The Sociology of Knowledge,” Isis, Vol. XXVII (1937), pp. 493–503.

  2. 2.

    Mannheim’s term. Cf. Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1936), pp. 261, 273, 275.

  3. 3.

    Conversely, the distinctions which are formulated by methodologists within the special sciences rarely receive recognition in philosophical discussions, although the special methodologies frequently address similar, if not the same, problems, and with a cogency of treatment which comes of empirical orientation. Cf. e.g., Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, chs. 1–3, and passim.

  4. 4.

    The pursuance or non-pursuance of the act of validation with regard to a specific claim is, of course, of the greatest sociological significance.

  5. 5.

    P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York, 1928), pp. 73–74.

  6. 6.

    Sociological analysis of the formalizations, which may be termed procedural norms, is, of course, possible.

  7. 7.

    Although the norms of these procedures are themselves susceptible of sociological analysis.

  8. 8.

    A similar point constitutes the basis for Mannheim’s distinction between “particular” and “total” ideology: “The particular conception of ‘ideology’ makes its analysis of ideas on a purely psychological level. If it is claimed for instance that an adversary is lying, or that he is concealing or distorting a given factual situation, it is still nevertheless assumed that both parties share common criteria of validity…” Ideology and Utopia, p. 50.

  9. 9.

    The determining of the cognitive value of such validity-norms is a distinct question. It is not, however, susceptible of a priori resolution.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Merton, op. cit., p. 493.

  11. 11.

    Cf. von Schelting, op. cit., p. 674.

  12. 12.

    Notably, by von Schelting and Mandelbaum.

  13. 13.

    Professor Louis Wirth presents some suggestions concerning the role of the social sciences in these modifications. Cf. his Preface, Ideology and Utopia, pp. xx–xxi.

  14. 14.

    The psychological possibility of objective experience, which may be assumed, in conjunction with other capacities, to be necessary to the survival of the species, must not be confused with the relatively recent abstracting of a scientific objective validity norm. It may be noted that the philosophical concern, most notably that of Kant, with the requirements for objective experience, did not antedate the acuteness of the problem within the special sciences. The objectivity-norm is considered below in connection with a further development of the discussion. Cf. pp. 354–355.

  15. 15.

    von Schelting, op. cit., p. 668. Cf. also Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 81–82: “… he [Mannheim] assumes the objectivity of our knowledge of the stylistic structure of thought. But this also implies an objective knowledge of the conditions which produced it if it is to be considered as a resultant of historico-social processes.” Mandelbaum’s stand concerning the correspondence theory of truth may be cited again: “It is clear when we examine actual historical works that they all presuppose a correspondence theory of truth, no matter how relativistic the theories of the historians themselves may be” (p. 185).

  16. 16.

    The circularity charge in itself really constitutes a general attack upon the critics of the correspondence theory, and has no special significance for the sociology of knowledge.

  17. 17.

    Cf. von Schelting, op. cit., p. 674.

  18. 18.

    Relations are included in the category.

  19. 19.

    The abstraction “concept” will be most frequently employed in the present discussion, partly because the issues underlying the formulation of the other abstractions are not directly relevant to the problem, and partly because the literature under discussion most commonly uses “concept” as an analytical element.

  20. 20.

    Cf. the interpretationism of C. I. Lewis: “Thus all concepts, and not simply those we should call ‘categories’ function as criteria of reality. Every criterion of classification is criterion of some particular sort. There is no such thing as reality in general; to be real, a thing must be a particular sort of real … What is fixed datum and must be conformed to, is only that welter of the given in which not even the distinction of real and unreal is yet made. The rest is completely and exclusively our problem of interpretation” op. cit., pp. 262–265.

  21. 21.

    Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (New York, 1936), p. 8.

  22. 22.

    On the contrary, once the normative significance of all cognitive elements is seen, the distinction becomes the significant differentiation of two of the several types of cognitive norms: validity-norms and presentational norms.

  23. 23.

    It has not been neglected by C. I. Lewis. One of the principal contributions of Mind and the World-Order is its cogent presentation of this argument. Cf. also Muzafer Sherif, op. cit.

  24. 24.

    “Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLVI (1940), pp. 316–330.

  25. 25.

    “Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge,” op. cit., p. 323.

  26. 26.

    I am indebted to Professor Margaret Dey of Vassar College for the suggestion of this term and for her sympathetic criticism of the entire paper. Cf. C. I. Lewis’s Mind and the World-Order, ch. VIII, “The Nature of the a Priori and the Pragmatic Element in Knowledge,” for a similar point of view. Cf. also the following statements by Mannheim, who does not, regrettably, pursue their implications: “Relating individual ideas to the total structure of a given historico-social subject should not be confused with a philosophical relativism which denies the validity of any standards and of the existence of order in the world” (Ideology and Utopia, pp. 254 f.).

  27. 27.

    Throughout this discussion the term “social” is taken in a very broad sense which includes “economic” and “political,” unless some one of these is specifically discriminated. Also, the interest of the present discussion is in the significance, for a concept of cognitive value, of the plurality of demand types and the nature of a few of them. It does not extend to the further problem of the relations which may be discovered among them, as is expressed, e.g., in the distinction between “super-structure” and “basis” among the “categories” which contribute analyses of social phenomena, and which constitutes the inquiry into social causation.

  28. 28.

    It will be noted that the analysis of adequacy is undertaken only in respect of the “responsiveness” aspect of the norm, and not its normative function. “Adequacy” is not predicable of the normative function as such because this function is logical and absolute, insusceptible, while it is sustained, of degrees, emendations, or demands.

  29. 29.

    For its solution this question requires not only the analysis of the sociology of knowledge, but also the findings of the inquiry into social causality.

  30. 30.

    Obviously, a question-begging term.

  31. 31.

    Narrowness in conceiving the possibilities, either in types of social responsiveness or in areas where they may be fruitfully pursued has no logical grounds. On the latter score, cf. such related scientific interests as: (a) the abundant research into the social responsiveness of language-types; (b) the concept of speech itself as the response to a set of concrete evolutionary social demands; this reference is especially to Grace Andrus de Laguna, Speech, Its Function and Development (New Haven, 1927), which is one of the genuine contributions of the twentieth century to the inquiry into cognitive phenomena by means of the categories of positive science; (c) the Gestalt principle concerning perception fructified by the concept of the social responsiveness of specific types of gestalts as the “norms,” or “frames of reference,” of perceptual knowledge; cf. Muzafer Sherif, op. cit.

  32. 32.

    This term is offered by Muzafer Sherif: “Indeed, psychologists are no exception to the rule about the impress of cultural forces; their norms and their mentalities are to a large extent products of the cultural group of which they are members. Whenever they study human nature, or make comparisons between different groups of people, without first subjecting their own norms to a critical revision in order to gain the necessary perspective, they force the absolutism of their subjectivity or their community-centrism upon all the facts, even those laboriously achieved through experiment” (op. cit., p. 9).

  33. 33.

    Cf. C. Wright Mills, “Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge,” loc. cit., esp. pp. 328–330.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Carroll C. Pratt, The Logic of Modern Psychology (New York, 1939), ch. V. This is perhaps the most complete available development of the operationist position. Cf. also its predecessor, P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York, 1928). For further accounts of operationism in psychology, cf. J. R. Kantor, “The Operational Principle in the Physical and Psychological Sciences,” Psychological Record, Vol. II (1938), pp. 3–32; S. S. Stevens, “The Operational Definition of Concepts,” Psychological Review, Vol. XLII (1935), pp. 517–527.

  35. 35.

    Together, of course, with the several other types of demands upon the cognitive norm.

  36. 36.

    Cf., e.g., Pratt’s criticism of Stevens’ operational definition of the concept of tonal density. The operations which Stevens uses to define tonal density are finger-reactions; tonal density, then, is defined by certain types of finger-reaction. Pratt vigorously rejects this definition as not “proper” (op. cit., p. 107). The point of interest for this discussion is the ground of an operationist’s certainty of a “proper” definition.

  37. 37.

    Operationism presents many facets for interesting sociological analysis, e.g., as a “theory” of meaning, and as a protest movement against certain forms of traditionalism. This latter aspect is very pronounced in the literature of operationism in psychology. These comments are concerned only with a specially selected aspect of the theory; they do not pretend to be an account of the total position.

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Lavine, T.Z., Edited by., Katzav, J., Vaesen, K. (2023). Sociological Analysis of Cognitive Norms. In: Katzav, J., Vaesen, K., Rogers, D. (eds) Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_14

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