Abstract
This chapter is a critical examination of the growing literature dealing with the normative structure of scientific practice. More specifically, my intention is to analyze the presuppositions of Robert Merton’s original formulation of the ethos of science and—the critiques of his position, thereby arriving at a provisional assessment of the current status of the theory of the normative structure of science. The critiques may be divided into four major issues; (1) the extent to which the norms of science are peculiar to science; (2) the actual conduct of scientists in various organizational and historical contexts and the extent to which their conduct is governed by the norms of science; (3) the ‘morality’ of the moral imperatives of science; and (4) the relation between the scientific ethos and the development of scientific knowledge .
This text was first published as Stehr, Nico. 1978. “The Ethos of Science Ethos of Science Revisited”, Sociological Inquiry, 48: 172–196. The permission was granted on 17 July 2017 on behalf of Wiley by Ms. Kelly Hoff, Permissions Coordinator, Copyright and Permissions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I would like to acknowledge a critical reading of the first draft of the essay by Michael Kozlowslu and the helpful editorial assistance of Laura Hargrave.
- 2.
I intend to retain the formulation communism since the Zeitgeist has undergone change once again and does not at the present time, so it seems, require a substitute term such as communality (see Barber 1952: 91).
- 3.
A rather similar observation is made by Ravetz (1971: 299): “One essential feature of the scientist’s intellectual property, as distinguished from the ‘real’ property of commerce, is that it exists only by being available for use by others.” The anomalous and distinctive character of intellectual property in science, as an essential context and expression of the norm of communism, also is emphasized in several of Merton’s subsequent writings; more recently, for example, Merton (1977: 48–49) notes that the “distinctively anomalous character of intellectual property, becoming fully established in the domain of science only by being openly given away (published), is linked with the normative requirement for scientists making use of that property to acknowledge (publish) the source, past or contemporaneous” (see also Merton [1957] 1973c: 294–295). Moreover, in direct contrast to commercial relations, the greater the ‘use’ of the property by others, the greater the value of the property (see also Price 1978: 80–81). The availability of knowledge claims is the condition for the possibility of a “continued appraisal of work and recognition for work judged well done by the standards of the time [which] constitute a mechanism for maintaining the processes of falsification and confirmation of ideas that are required for the cognitive development of science” (Merton 1976: 45; emphasis added).
- 4.
These distinctions suggest that the ethos of science (norms) pertains directly to what could be called both methodological (cognitive) and social means, which are simultaneously subsidiary to the goal of science (values). Such categorical distinctions indeed are made at times (for instance, Storer 1966: 76), but I shall not attempt to maintain such a distinction here. That would presuppose a much more explicit and developed theory of the social relations of science than actually is available at this time.
- 5.
The decision to concentrate attention on the normative basis of the social relations of science presumably also rests on a number of more nearly immanent meta-theoretical considerations. For example, as emphasized at various times (Merton 1948, 1975), a general theory of social action is not a realistic prospect in sociology at the present stage of its cognitive development; thus, more delimited theoretical structures have to be developed, and research strategies have to be adjusted accordingly. The scope of theories is therefore limited by the cognitive state of the discipline. At the same time, one of the central features of Mertonian discourse, as described by Coser (1975: 5), might well be relevant: “Merton’s world is composed of multiple ambiguities, of conflicting and contradictory demands and requirements that need to be articulated and made accessible by the sociologist.”
- 6.
However, I will exclude a more detailed discussion of the possible interrelation between societal (including cognitive) norms and the ethos of science (see also Merton [19738] 1973d: 259; Barber 1952; Blume 1974: 45–50), including the views advanced by Downey (1967: 253) that ‘scientism’ assures the obsolescence of a number of norms which are part of the ethos of science , or that the autonomy of scientific institutions is in effect the outcome of cognitive progress in science.
- 7.
- 8.
I refer, of course, to Rickert and Weber’s theory of concept formation in the empirical sciences, particularly Weber’s notion of ideal types as conceptual tools in the social sciences. Such ideal types were not conceived simply as descriptions of observable conduct (Rickert 1902; Weber 1922; Burger 1976).
- 9.
The position that Mulkay advances is not, it seems, peculiar for a social scientist to adopt (Gaston 1978: 163–166) but rather is the result of underlying Kuhnian presuppositions. Gaston, in his critique of Mulkay’s view, discusses the norms of science primarily as they manifest themselves in the social relations of science (the research formulation), whereas Mulkay discusses the ethos of science primarily in terms of cognitive processes and consequences in science. Kuhn’s program for paradigm closure (Simmons/Stehr 1978) and logical empiricism as well as critical rationalism (Hempel 1965: 3–5; Popper [1935] 1968: 41, [1962] 1969: 156) also is based on a differentiation of science from nonscience; namely, the idea that demarcation must be based on cognitive attributes of systems of discourse. As far as social relations in general are concerned, positivism emphasizes cognitive factors of social action, while functionalism stresses norms, values, motives, and the consequences of social conduct (King 1971: 8; see also Parsons [1937] 1949: 387, 439–440) . The emphasis of cognitive norms to the exclusion of other processes in science, of course, results in an image of a rather ‘rational’ scientific practice. It may therefore fail to do justice to the immense complexity of the social organization of science. That is, the reduction (and retention) of complexity in science, to use Luhmann’s terminology, requires social mechanisms other than cognitive norms—for example, reputation operating both as a medium of communication (selection) and as motivation (Luhmann [1968] 1970).
- 10.
In an essay written some thirty years after the original formulation of the ethos of science , Merton [1968] 1973a: 327–328) appears to acknowledge the historicity of the social norms and with it, of course, the possibility that the norms of science are neither entirely autonomous nor unresponsive to basic sociostructural changes in science and society. However, the emphasis, in this essay at least, is on the continuity of certain institutional relations of science, such as the intensity and the degree of competition among scientists.
- 11.
In his essay “The Ambivalence of Scientists” Merton (1976: 41–42) refers to the doubling of ambivalence—scientists’ ambivalence toward feeling ambivalent—as a possible explanation of the lack of attention paid to conflicts and modes of conflict in science as conflicts over claims to priority. One of the interesting issues raised by the conception of conflicting norms as a ‘normal’, structurally generated attribute of social organization concerns the problem of deviant conduct under such circumstances. For deviant conduct traditionally is defined as behavior at variance with specific dominant norms typifying social positions. Given the particular formulation of norms and counternorms (their scope and range, for instance), deviant conduct might well be denied a priori. In the case of science, however, deviant conduct also requires a set of rules signifying both social and cognitive distinctiveness of scientific practice (demarcation criteria). (For a discussion of deviant behavior from both cognitive and social norms in science, see Zuckerman 1977.)
- 12.
The empirical evidence Mitroff reports refers to research about the moon, which at the time was not intellectually homogeneous (in the sense of a dominant paradigm, for instance). As Mitroff (1974b: 594) therefore suggests, “whereas the conventional norms of science are dominant for well-structured problems, the counternorms proposed here appear to be dominant for ill-structured problems.”
- 13.
Mulkay’s underlying theory of institutions largely rests on a notion of social control (and norms) based on externally imposed sanctions (or sanctioned norms) but not on what may be called ‘primary’ social control . The internalization of norms does not require an ‘exchange’ or reward (Berger/Luckmann 1966). A critique of such a restrictive conceptualization of social norms also may be found in Luhmann (1969), while Dahrendorf (1964) and Popitz (1961) advocate the restriction of the concept of norm to sanctioned conduct. The somewhat retrogressive perspective argued by Mulkay, at least in the context of his discussion of the status of the norms of science, can also be illustrated with respect to the theoretical status of “intellectual commitments.” Mulkay largely abstains from linking commitments to social mechanisms. Social mechanisms may explain the homogeneity (within specific social boundaries), heterogeneity, distribution, and reproduction (or origin and alteration) of intellectual commitments. Such an explanation requires a theoretical analysis that transcends either a cognitive approach or a sociology of scientific ideas and procedures.
- 14.
Using information gathered for a small and heterogeneous sample of university scientists, West (1960: 61) reports that neither their rate of publication nor the strength of their motivation as reported by peers appears to be associated with an endorsement of the ethos of science .
- 15.
Following Feyerabend (1975) and Churchman (1971), Mitroff (for example, 1974b: 590) subscribes to a historiography of scientific knowledge based on the theory of paradigm proliferation. Subsequently, Merton (1976: 59) has criticized Mitroff for exaggerating the inevitably ‘subjective’ attributes of the production of scientific knowledge to the detriment of its objective aspects and for ignoring the interaction of subjective and objective attributes, which results in a “storybook version of scientific inquiry”.
References
Baldamus, Wilhelm. 1977. “Ludwig Fleck and the Development of the Sociology of Science”, in: Human Figurations: Essays for Norbert Elias. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Sociologist Tijdschrift.
Barber, Benjamin. 1952. Science and the Social Order. New York: Free Press.
Barber, Benjamin. 1961. “The Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery”, Science, 134: 596–602.
Barnes, Barry and Dolby, Robert G.A. 1970. “The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint”, European Journal of Sociology, 11: 3–25.
Barnes, Barry. 1973. “The Comparison of Belief-Systems Anomaly Versus Falsehood”, in: Robin Horton and R. Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought. Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies. London: Faber: 182–198.
Ben-David, Joseph. 1977. “Organization, Social Control and Cognitive Change in Science”, in: Joseph Ben-David and T. Clark (eds.), Culture and Its Creators. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Doubleday.
Blume, Stuart S. 1974. Toward a Political Sociology of Science. New York: Free Press.
Boehme, Gernot. 1974. “Die Bedeutung von Experimentalregeln für die Wissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 3: 5–17.
Boehme, Gernot, Wolfgang van den Daele and Wolfgang Krohn. 1972. “Alternativen in der Wissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 1: 302–316.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1975. “The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason”, Social Science Information, 14: 19–47.
Box, Steven, and Stephen Cotgrove. 1966. “Scientific Identity, Occupational Selection and Role Strain”, British Journal of Sociology, 17: 20–28.
Buehl, Walter L. 1974. Einführung in die Wissenschaftssoziologie. München: Beck.
Burger, Thomas. 1976. Max Weber’s Theory of Concept Formation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Churchman, C. West. 1971. The Design of Inquiring System. New York: Basic Books.
Cole, Jonathan R. and Stephen Cole. 1973. Social Stratification in Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cole, Jonathan R. and Harriet Zuckerman. 1975. “The Emergence of a Scientific Specialty: The Self-exemplifying Case of the Sociology of Science”, in: Lewis A. Coser (ed.), The Idea of Social Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Coser, Lewis A. (ed.). 1975. The Idea if Social Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Coser, Lewis A. and Robert Nisbet. 1975. “Merton and the Contemporary Mind: An Affectionate Dialogue”, in: Lewis A. Coser (ed.), The Idea of Social Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Cournand, Andre F. 1977. “The Code of the Scientist and Its Relationship to Ethics”, Science, 198: 699–705.
Cournand, Andre F. and Harriet A. Zuckerman. 1970. “The Code of Science”, Studium Generale, 23: 941–962.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1964. Homo Sociologicus. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Deutscher, Irwin. 1972. “Public and Private Opinions: Social Situations and Multiple Realities”, in: Saad Z. Nagi and Ronald G. Corwin (eds.), The Social Contexts if Research. New York: Wiley.
Downey, Kenneth J. 1967. “Sociology and the Modern Scientific Revolution”, Sociological Quarterly, 8: 239–254.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method. London: New Left Books.
Fleck, Ludwik. 1935. Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv [Origin and Evolution of a Scientific Fact: Introduction to the Theory of Styles and Collective Carriers of Thought]. Basel, Switzerland: Schwab.
Gaston, Jerry. 1975. “Soziale Organisation, Kodifizierung des Wissens, und das Belohnungssystem der Wissenschaft” [“Social Organization, Codification of Knowledge, and the Reward System of Science”], in: Nico Stehr and René König (eds.), Wissenschafissoziologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Gaston, Jerry. 1978. The Reward System in British and American Science. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1976. The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology. New York: Seabury Press.
Gutting, Gary. 1973. “Conceptual Structures and Scientific Change”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 4: 209–230.
Hagstrom, Warren O. 1965. The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books.
Hempel, Carl G. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press.
King, M. D. 1971. “Reason, Tradition, and the Progressiveness of Science”, History and Theory, 10: 3–32.
Knorr, Karin. 1977. “Producing and Reproducing Knowledge: Descriptive or Constructive? Toward a Model of Research Production”, Social Science Information, 16: 669–696.
Kornhauser, William. 1963. (with the assistance of W. O. Hagstrom). Scientists in Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kowalewski, Stephen A. 1974. “Bureaucratic Trends in the Organization and Institutionalisation of Scientific Activity”, in: R. Whitley (ed.), Social Processes of Scientific Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Krohn, Roger G. 1961. “The Institutional Location of the Scientist and His Scientific Values”, IRE Transactions on Engineering Management, EM-8: 133–138.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lammers, Cornelius. 1974. “Mono- and Poly-paradigmatic Developments in Natural and Social Sciences”, in: Richard Whitley (ed.), Social Processes of Scientific Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Lautmann, Rüdiger. 1971. Wert und Norm: Begriffsanalysen für die Soziologie [Value and Norm: Concepts of Analysis for Sociology]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas. [1968] 1970. “Selbststeuerung der Wissenschaft”, in: Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme. [Sociological Enlightenment: Essays on the Theory of Social Systems]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1969. “Normen in soziologischer Perspektive” [Norms in the Sociological Perspective], Soziale Welt, 20: 28–48.
Marcson, Simon. 1960. The Scientist in American Industry. New York: Harper & Row.
Merton, Robert K. 1948. “On the Position of Sociological Theory”, American Sociological Review, 13: 164–168.
Merton, Robert K. [1968] 1973a. “Behavior Patterns of Scientists”, in: The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, Robert K. [1942] 1973b. “The Normative Structure of Science”, in: The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, Robert K. [1957] 1973c. “Priorities in Scientific Discovery”, in: The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, Robert K. [1938] 1973d. “Science and the Social Order”, in: The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1973e. The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1975. “Structural Analysis in Sociology”, in: Peter M. Blau (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1976. Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays. New York: Free Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1977. “The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir”, in: Robert K. Merton and Jerry Gaston (eds.), The Sociology of Science in Europe. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Mitroff, Ian I. 1974a. The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Psychology of the Apollo Moon Scientists. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Mitroff, Ian I. 1974b. “Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of the Apollo Moon Scientists: A Case Study of the Ambivalence of Scientists”, American Sociological Review, 39: 579–595.
Mok, Albert, and Anne Westerdiep. 1974. “Societal Influences on the Choice of Research Topics of Biologists”, in: Richard Whitley (ed.), Social Processes of Scientific Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.
Mulkay, Michael. J. 1969. “Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences”, Social Research, 36: 22–52.
Mulkay, Michael J. 1972a. “Conformity and Innovation in Science”, in: Paul Halmos (ed.), The Sociology of Science. Sociological Review Monograph, No. 18. Keele, England: University of Keele.
Mulkay, Michael J. 1972b. The Social Process of Innovation: A Study in the Sociology of Science. London: Macmillan.
Mulkay, Michael J. 1975. “Drei Modelle der Wissenschaftsentwicklung” [“Three Models of the Evolution of Science”], in: Nico Stehr and René König (eds.), Wissenschaftssoziologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Mulkay, Michael J. 1976. “Norms and Ideology in Science”, Social Science Information, 15: 627–656.
Parsons, Talcott. 1939. “The Professions and Social Structure”, Social Forces, 17: 457–467.
Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1949. The Structure of Social Action. Vol. 1. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1970. “On building Social Systems Theory: A Personal History”, Daedalus, 99: 826–881.
Popitz, Heinrich. 1961. “Soziale Normen”, European Journal of Sociology, 2: 185–198.
Popper, Karl R. [1935] 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, (enlarged ed. 1959). London: Hutchinson.
Popper, Karl R. [1962] 1969. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Price, D. de Solla. 1978. “Toward a Model for Science Indicators”, in: Y. Elkana et al. (eds.), Toward a Metric of Science: The Advent of Science Indicators. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Ravetz, Jerome R. 1971. Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rickert, Heinrich. 1902. Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung [The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science]. Tübingen: Mohr.
Rothman, R.A. 1972. “A Dissenting View on the Scientific Ethos”, British Journal of Sociology, 23: 102–108.
Scherhorn, Gerhard. 1968. “Der Wettbewerb in der Erfahrungswissenschaft” [“Competition in Empirical Science”], Hamburger Jahrbuch fur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik [Hamburg Yearbook of Economic and Social Policy], 14: 63–86.
Shephard, Herbert. A. 1954. “The Value System of a University Research Group”, American Sociological Review, 19: 456–462.
Simmons, Anthony and Nico Stehr. 1978. “Language and the Growth of Knowledge in Sociology”, Unpublished Paper.
Sklair, Leslie. 1973. Organized Knowledge. A Sociological View of Science and Technology. St. Albans, England: Paladin Books.
Spiegel-Rosing, Ina-Susanne. 1973. Wissenschaftsentwicklung und Wissenschaftssteuerung: Einführung und Material zur Wissenschaftsforschung [Evolution and the Control of Science: An Introduction and Materials on Science Research]. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.
Spinner, Helmut F. 1977. “Thesen zum Thema Reichweite und Relevanz der Wissenschaftstheorie für die Einzelwissenschaften – Analytische Philosophie Versus Marxismus”, in: Karl-Heinz Braun and Klaus Holzkamp (eds.), Kritische Psychologie [Critical Psychology]. Vol 2. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein.
Stehr, Nico. 1975. “Zur Soziologie der Wissenschaftssoziologie”, in: Nico Stehr and René König (eds.), Wissenschaftssoziologie [Sociology of Science]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Storer, Norman W. 1966. The Social System of Science. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Storer, Norman W. 1973. “Introduction”, in: Robert K. Merton (ed.), The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Useem, Michael. 1968. “Scientific Normative Orientations and Research Methodologies: A Comparative Study of European Scientists and Engineers at Euratom”, Unpublished Report.
Weber, Max. 1922. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre [Collected Essays on the Theory of Knowledge]. Tübingen: Mohr.
Weingart, Peter. 1972. “Wissenschaftsforschung und Wissenschaftssoziologie”, in: Peter Weingart (ed.), Wissenschaftssoziologie. 1: Wissenschaftliche Entwicklung als sozialer Prozess [Sociology of Science: The Evolution of Science as a Social Process]. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.
Weingart, Peter. 1974. “On a Sociological Theory of Scientific Change”, in: Richard Whitley (ed.), Social Processes of Scientific Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Weingart, Peter. 1976. Wissensproduktion und Soziale Struktur [The Production of Knowledge and Social Structure]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
West, S. Stewart. 1960. “The Ideology of Academic Scientists”, IRE Transactions on Engineering Management, EM-1: 54–62.
Whitley, Richard D. 1972. “Black Boxism and the Sociology of Science”, in: Paul Halmos (ed.), The Sociology of Science. Sociological Review Monograph No. 18. Keele, England: University of Keele.
Wunderlich, Richard. 1974. “The Scientific Ethos: A Clarification”, British Journal of Sociology, 25: 373–377.
Young, Robert. 1973. “The Historiographic and Ideological Contexts of the Nineteenth-Century Debate on Man’s Place in Nature”, in: M. Teich and Robert Young (eds.), Changing Perspectives in the History of Science. London: Heinemann.
Ziman, John M. 1968. Public Knowledge. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Zuckerman, Harriet. 1977. “Deviant Behavior and Social Control in Science”, in: Edward Sagarin (ed.), Deviance and Social Change. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Zuckerman, H., and Merton, R.K. 1971. “Patterns of Evaluation in Science: Institutionalization, Structure and Functions of the Referee System”, Minerva, 9: 66–100.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stehr, N. (2018). The Ethos of Science Revisited: Social and Cognitive Norms. In: Adolf, M. (eds) Nico Stehr: Pioneer in the Theory of Society and Knowledge. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76995-0_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76995-0_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-76994-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-76995-0
eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)