Abstract
This chapter explores the last of Arrow’s assumptions that could be sacrificed in order to create legislative stability: nondictatorship. Previous research has argued that because most constitutions in Latin America were written during dictatorships, then executives in Latin America tend to have extensive powers which render legislatures “reactive” rather than “proactive” branches of government (Cox and Morgenstern (2001) Comp Polit 33(2):171–189). It follows from this argument that if the executive has extensive powers then this may provide a stabilizing force for the legislature. In this chapter, I analyze the powers of Paraguay’s president, and I find that constitutionally it is one of the weakest presidents in the world. Furthermore, I extensively analyze whether the president’s weak veto powers may stabilize the legislature. As a whole, I find that presidential powers in Paraguay are extremely weak, and therefore they are unlikely to produce any legislative stability.
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Notes
- 1.
In this period there were two presidents—Fernando Lugo and Federico Franco—because Lugo was impeached in 2012.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Remember that rising ideal points mean more pro-government legislators according to my coding.
- 6.
Recall that Lugo was impeached and removed from office in 2012.
- 7.
Or at least it suggests that Lugo was less equipped to anticipate legislative preferences. After all, an impeachment can also result from failure to anticipate legislative preferences.
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Carrizosa, A. (2023). Nondictatorship: Paraguay’s Weak Executive Promotes Chaos. In: Skewing Chaos. Springer Series in Electoral Politics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18625-7_6
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