Introduction

From 1992 to 2012, Mozambique’s peacebuilding process was hailed as a successful case of liberal peacebuilding. Various actors implemented numerous peacebuilding programs focused on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), economic and social development issues, decentralization, state-building, and justice. However, more recent events have challenged more than twenty years of peacebuilding outcomes. In 2012, the country saw a small-scale resurgence of conflict between RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) and the FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front)-led Mozambican government. In addition, since 2017, a Mashababos insurgency in Northern Mozambique aims to establish a Caliphate in the Cabo Delgado province. As a result, there is now a renewed sense of purpose in debating peacebuilding effectiveness in an increasingly fragile Mozambican context that has been aggravated by additional human security threats, such as natural disasters and climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, malaria, and, more recently, the SARS-CoV-2.

The dominant peacebuilding approach implemented after the 1992 peace agreement—based on a determined-designed process and technocratic model—did not address issues related to political inclusion, gender, and youth and was not able to foster long-term sustainable peace. Thus, current threats to peace in Mozambique call for alternative peacebuilding approaches and its effective coordination with humanitarian actions, peacemaking initiatives, and development assistance programs, in line with a whole-of-society approach to sustaining peace. An increasingly complex and uncertain environment resulted from ineffective determined-designed peacebuilding approaches incapable of preventing conflict recurrence in the central and northern provinces and the rise of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. It revealed that sustaining peace had not been realized in Mozambique and that addressing remaining grievances to achieve national stability will require further, and increasingly adaptive, approaches. After the signature of the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (MAPR), several challenges remain to be addressed by peacebuilders in Mozambique, for example, recurrent post-electoral violence, RENAMO’s Military Junta, the escalation of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado province, and widespread unemployment and poverty.

Amid this complex and uncertain environment, this chapter explores the current international peacebuilding paradigm shift as demonstrated by increasingly adaptive and context-specific approaches implemented by the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Mozambique (UN-PESGM) and the European Union (EU) in Mozambique. Furthermore, this chapter highlights adaptive peacebuilding examples presented by ‘localized’ international non-governmental organizations (L-INGOs), such as the Community of Sant’Egidio (CSE) and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). By examining the abovementioned cases, this chapter attempts to answer two main research questions: (1) Are adaptive peacebuilding approaches more effective than determined-designed approaches in Mozambique’s increasingly complex and uncertain context? (2) How have peacebuilders adapted to Mozambique’s uncertainty and complexity? By answering these questions, this chapter offers some insights for peace and development practitioners facing increasing challenges to their activities in Mozambique.

This study draws from primary data collected during fieldwork conducted between January and February 2020 in Mozambique, Botswana, South Africa, Italy, and Portugal. The field research includes in-depth interviews, archival research, and site-intensive methods. The interviews were conducted with academic experts and practitioners from government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and faith-based organizations. In addition, archive and library research and site-intensive methods, such as ethnographic analysis and participant observation, allowed for the consolidation of an insider’s perspective on Mozambican peace and conflict issues. These methods were combined with content analysis of online news coverage between 2012 and 2021 (mainly in Portuguese) and discourse analysis covering the main stakeholders involved in the peacebuilding process.

Mozambique’s Complexity and Uncertainty: Protracted Violence and Intractability?

Since the independence war (1964–1974) against Portuguese rule, Mozambique has experienced multiple cycles of violent conflict, including a long civil war (1977–1992) between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and its recent resurgence (2012–2019) combined with the rise of a Mashababos insurgency (2017–present) in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. FRELIMO came to power in 1975, following a long-armed conflict and struggle for independence that started in 1964 against the Portuguese dictatorship, Estado Novo. The ‘carnation revolution’ that occurred in Lisbon in 1974 marked the end of the Portuguese colonial enterprise and the beginning of a new democratic regime in Portugal and the Mozambican independence. The civil war between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO began two years after independence in 1977 and lasted 16 years. One million people were killed in the conflict, which also resulted in 1.5 million cross-border refugees and 4.5 million domestic refugees (Funada-Classen 2013).

Mozambique’s civil war was characterized as a conventional insurgency that opposed rival ideologies in the context of the Cold War dynamics. In the 1990s, the withdrawal of external actors from Mozambique following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa allowed for a peaceful solution. As with most post-Cold War insurgencies, the answer was found through political compromise instead of the battleground. A peace agreement was signed in Rome in 1992, which attempted to establish lasting peace by promoting democratic participation and the “development of a multi-party democracy based on respect for and guarantees of basic rights and freedoms (…) under which political power belongs exclusively to the people and is exercised in accordance with principles of a representative and pluralistic democracy” (United Nations Security Council 1992, 9).

Conflict Recurrence (2012–2019)

Due to escalating tensions between the Mozambican government and RENAMO during peacetime, Mozambique saw a small-scale resurgence of the civil war in 2012. These developments had a significant impact on the country’s peace prospects after more than two decades of peace. RENAMO sought more decentralization, provincial autonomy, equal state resources allocation, and more opportunities to hold sufficient political power. The objective of the Mozambican government has been the total disarmament of RENAMO’s residual forces and the complete cessation of hostilities. RENAMO demanded the Mozambican government to address the issue of corruption and the incorporation of former combatants in the police and in the intelligence services. Many of RENAMO’s ex-combatants remained ineligible for pensions that should have been delivered as part of the previous DDR process. Young RENAMO recruits, many of whom were relatives of former combatants, concluded that resorting to arms as a bargaining tool was the only way to achieve their objectives. In addition, RENAMO underlined the need for a fair redistribution of natural resource revenues in the context of the discovery of one of the world’s largest gas reserves in Mozambique in 2012 (Academia Source 2020a).

The 2012 political crisis in Mozambique began with the decision of Afonso Dhlakama to retreat to RENAMO’s guerrilla base in Satungira, Gorongosa, demanding changes in the electoral law and compliance with the provisions of the 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA). The Mozambican government initially took this event as another strong call for negotiations, but it ultimately resulted in armed hostilities that started in 2012. Between 2013 and 2016, RENAMO would attempt to seize control of six provinces, including Manica, Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete (where important coal mining industries and the Cahora-Bassa dam are located), and Zambezia (Academia Source 2020a). Despite the limited scope of the RENAMO insurgency, the logistics and number of victims were comparable to other intrastate conflicts. RENAMO has resorted to its traditional guerilla and destabilization strategy, targeting specific areas and industries critical to the country’s economy. The disruption of transportation routes has been central to the insurgent strategy, indirectly affecting FRELIMO’s sources of income (Regalia 2017). In addition, targeted killings would occur in the capital Maputo, in particular the murder by FRELIMO hardliners of the constitutional lawyer Gilles Cistac, who defended the constitutionality of provincial autonomy in Mozambique (Granjo 2016).

Over time, the impact of the small-scale civil war increased in severity. By March 2016, the UNHCR reported that more than 10,000 Mozambican refugees had fled to Malawi and that this was a considerable increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Shimo 2016). However, while the crisis was escalating, a new peace process was also unfolding based on the direct dialogue between the Mozambican government, led by Filipe Nyusi, and RENAMO, led by Afonso Dhlakama. After the signature of a new peace agreement in August 2019, the hostilities between the Mozambican government and RENAMO may have ceased; however, several challenges to peace remain, including recurrent electoral irregularities and electoral violence.

Electoral Irregularities and Electoral Violence

Despite continuous constitutional and legal reforms, RENAMO has contested all six presidential and parliamentary elections, remaining as the most voted party in the opposition amid recurrent electoral irregularities. RENAMO’s perception is that one of the main objectives of the 1992 GPA—establishing an effective democracy—has not been achieved. The consolidation of a democratic system presupposes uncertain electoral outcomes and alternation of the parties in power. According to Samuel Huntington (1993), a democratic regime has to achieve two turnovers in power to be considered a stable democracy, and the Mozambican political system was not able to achieve even one turnover in 27 years of multiparty elections (see Fig. 5.1).

Fig. 5.1
A grouped bar graph plots the number of seats versus years. The political parties are Frelimo, Renamo, M D M, and Udemo. Frelimo secured the highest number of seats in 2009 while the lowest is in 1994. Udemo won seats only in the year 1994. M D M did not win any seats in 1999 and 2004.

Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique’s seats by political party (1994–2019). Source: (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2021)

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Despite several constitutional and electoral law reforms, FRELIMO has been consolidating its position as a “Party-State” and recognized early on that RENAMO posed an electoral threat in several provinces (Academia Source 2020a). It actively countered their democratic political participation by intimidating voters and party members during election cycles. Irregularities have occurred in every election since 1999, and in 2014—despite the signature of a Cessation of Military Hostilities Agreement (CMHA) ensuring that RENAMO would stop armed attacks and participate in the elections as a political party—Dhlakama contested the results, alleging that the election was rigged. The third major party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), and its leader Daviz Simango also challenged the electoral results for the same reasons, but unlike Dhlakama, Simango accepted the Constitutional Council’s decision that confirmed the National Electoral Commission’s results and FRELIMO’s electoral victory (Nuvunga 2017, 86).

The 2018 constitutional reform and the 2019 MAPR would ensure again that RENAMO steps out from its guerrilla activities and participates in Mozambique’s parliamentary, provincial, and presidential elections. The October 2019 elections led to a resounding victory by FRELIMO. However, the elections were once more marked by irregularities, cementing a lack of trust in political institutions and promoting further societal division. This is also a sign that FRELIMO may not have been genuinely interested in advancing with decentralization reforms, causing difficulties for voter registration in RENAMO majority provinces, in particular in Nampula and Zambeze (NGO Source 2020).

According to a 2018 poll, a third of Mozambicans fear election-related intimidations and violence, which increased by 11% between 2012 and 2018. High abstention rates in Mozambique are directly related to this phenomenon (Jacobs and Isbell 2021). The fact is that the Mozambican electoral process often occurs in a context marked by political violence, with two new peace agreements being signed before the last two national elections in 2014 and 2019. This demonstrates that reconciliation in Mozambique has not been fully realized, and recurrent electoral violence strongly affects future peace prospects in the country: “The general population wants peace and wants the negotiations for peace to continue. However, after the 2019 elections, the situation is not yet normalized. We are not sure about the future” (Civil Society Source 2020a).

The Division of RENAMO and the Rise of the Military Junta

Afonso Dhlakama unexpectedly passed away on May 3, 2018, from diabetes complications. The untimely death of RENAMO’s leader was a major setback for the recent peace process, which was on the brink of reaching a definitive agreement. RENAMO quickly adjusted to the loss of its leadership and began the process of selecting a successor. Shortly after this, Ossufo Momade, a former RENAMO lieutenant-general (until 1992) and secretary-general (between 2005 and 2012), was appointed interim leader and eventually chosen as the effective head of RENAMO in a party congress on January 17, 2019 (Henriques 2019). Subsequently, the RENAMO Military Junta defied Momade’s authority and elected Lieutenant-General Mariano Nhongo as its leader. This splinter group did not agree with the terms of the 2019 MAPR and unleashed a new wave of violence, attacking vehicles and people in the provinces of Sofala, Manica, and Tete. Although the Military Junta consisted of a small group of 200 armed men, it had considerable support in central Mozambique, and it was able to cause significant disruption in 2019 (Vines 2021).

The Military Junta remained as a relevant peace threat during 2019 and 2020, focused on continuously raising their claims regarding the new DDR process. Momade’s response was to address this problem via political means, which entailed continuous cooperation with the FRELIMO government. However, Momade was also facing constant political opposition inside RENAMO, not only by the Military Junta leader but also by other key RENAMO members, including Elias Dhlakama, the brother of the historical RENAMO leader. Other high-profile RENAMO members—including João Machava, a senior figure, and André Matsangaíssa Junior, nephew of one of the founders—were also discontent with Momade’s leadership and temporarily joined the Military Junta (Academia Source 2020a). However, both have later opted to join the dialogue with the Mozambican government and accepted the terms of the new DDR process, further damaging the credibility of the Military Junta (Mozambique Information Agency 2020, 2021).

To make room for a possible dialogue with the Military Junta, President Filipe Nyusi announced a one-week military truce on October 25, 2020. However, the Junta’s military attacks in the central region continued, leading the Mozambican armed forces to harden their positions and capture several Military Junta’s combatants. Excessive national and international media coverage played a significant role in the emergence of the Military Junta, which had the opportunity to participate in various news conferences and radio interviews, allowing the splinter group to swiftly establish themselves as well-known insurrectionists (Institute for Multiparty Democracy 2021).

The Junta’s leader—Mariano Nhongo—was killed in combat in October 2021—and at the time of writing, the insurgent group is neutralized or dormant. President Nyusi has underlined that fighting two armed conflicts (one with the Junta and another with the Mashababos insurgency) was unacceptable and encouraged the defense and security forces to follow a hard security approach to address the Junta’s threat. Because there is no apparent successor to Nhongo, his death might mark the end of the Military Junta. Others, however, disagree and have sworn to fight under its new leader, Lieutenant-General Augusto Faindane Phyri, also known as Massiafumbi (Fabricius 2021). In the eyes of many RENAMO members then, Momade’s legitimacy continues to be questioned, as it derives mainly from his political career as he lacks guerrilla experience in the jungle (Academia Source 2020b). The fact is that the Junta attempted to destabilize the implementation of the 2019 MAPR, which indicates that in the worst-case scenario, this insurgency could result in further conflict recurrence in central Mozambique.

The Emergence of a Mashababos Insurgency (2017–Present) in Cabo Delgado

Violent extremism emerged for the first time in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in October 2017, when extremist insurgents attacked a police station and other state infrastructure in an apparent attack against the Mozambican government in the port town of Mocímboa da Praia. The attacks occurred after growing tensions between the insurgents and other segments of the local community, who had been fighting over social and economic grievances, religious intolerance, and dissatisfaction with the local Frelimo-led authority. The insurgency is centered in Cabo Delgado, the least developed region of Mozambique, located on the northeastern border with Tanzania. However, the province is also one of the richest in the world in terms of natural resources. The rise of violent extremism occurred in parallel with powerful economic interests settling in Cabo Delgado, focused on natural gas extraction, ruby, and graphite mining (Alberdi and Barroso 2021).

The insurgents’ affiliation has been ambiguous. The local population and local experts often identify the armed group as Al-Shabaab or Mashababos, and others English-language sources also referred to it as Al-Sunnah Wal-Jamâa, or ‘followers of the prophetic tradition.’ But, in June 2019, the insurgents’ connection with ISIS emerged, with the Islamic State claiming that “the soldiers of the Caliphate were able to repel an attack by the Crusader Mozambican army” (Postings 2019). In addition, external insurgents from Tanzania, Uganda, Congo (DRC), and Kenya provided organizational resources and armament (Matsinhe and Valoi 2019, 8). The tactics, weaponry, and geographical reach of the armed groups have evolved considerably since 2017. According to Faleg (2019, 4), in 2019, the insurgent armed group counted “between 350 and 1000 militants, organized in cell-based structures with each cell comprising 10–20 individuals using basic weaponry and tactics.” The Mashababos insurgency appears to function as a decentralized non-state armed group (NSAG)—an alliance of smaller groups where individual sub-commanders retain significant authority. Because of the dynamic nature of these alliances and the variety of subgroups, violence might appear chaotic and disorderly. However, the flexibility and local adaptability of such armed groups pose unique challenges for humanitarian, peacemaking, and peacebuilding actions (Mcquinn and Courchesne 2020). The Mashababos insurgency grew stronger over time, and the security situation in Cabo Delgado began to deteriorate rapidly. What began as sporadic attacks on smaller towns evolved into large sweeps across major provincial towns, causing a humanitarian crisis and the weakening of an already fragile government presence in the region.

The debate on the origins and nature of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado continues among scholars and policymakers (see Morier-Genoud 2020). Some see religious extremism or even ethnic issues as the root causes of the conflict. Others see poverty, inequality, marginalization, and youth unemployment as some of the most relevant factors. A local expert suggests that religious extremism is being used as a tool to take advantage of local people disenfranchised from the Mozambican state and society. In his opinion, addressing inequality, food security, and capacity-building to generate jobs is as important as the security operations to address the insurgency (Civil Society Source 2020b). The country’s fragile and centralized governance structure is also a crucial vulnerability as it failed to provide adequate education, health infrastructures, and other forms of social support in Northern Mozambique. A local expert also reinforced that ISIS and Al-Shabab are just opportunistic groups “that take advantage of its system of terrorism franchising” in regions with weak states affected by poverty, unemployment, and other socioeconomic challenges. Therefore, addressing these issues should be part of the priorities of peace and security actors intervening in Cabo Delgado (Academia Source 2020b).

Local sources also underlined that heroin narcotraffickers in the region prefer a situation of instability because they can better choose the space and time to transport drugs in collaboration with NSAGs. If the state army and security forces are occupied with violent extremism, drug trafficking loses attention and expands its scope. In addition, human trafficking stands out as an additional element of the crime-conflict nexus in Cabo Delgado, as several women have been abducted by the insurgents in the region. Other sources also pointed to the trafficking of ivory, rubies, and wood as funding sources for the insurgents (Civil Society Source 2020b). Cabo Delgado’s fragility and exposure to violent extremism, crime, environmental and health threats, together with its geopolitical and socioeconomic relevance, makes it a particularly sensitive context to destabilization and armed violence, possibly resulting in unforeseen consequences to the future of peace and security in Mozambique and the Southern African region.

As a result of the threats to peace presented by both the RENAMO and the Mashababos insurgencies, there is now a widespread perception of insecurity among Mozambican political elites and the population in general. Many have considered that Mozambique has been facing not only one but two armed conflicts occurring simultaneously in the country. The Mozambican people’s general perception is that the peace achieved in 1992 has been suddenly lost, and even after the 2019 MAPR, there is a general feeling that the conflict situation is not yet normalized. The fact is that most Mozambicans remain unsure about their future in an increasingly volatile and uncertain environment (Civil Society Source 2020a).

The Peacebuilding Paradigm Shift in Mozambique: From Liberal to Adaptive Peacebuilding?

The Mozambican case presents a context that had been hailed as a successful liberal peacebuilding model until the events described in the previous section challenged more than 20 years of peace. There is now a common perception among Mozambicans that the coexistence between the RENAMO insurgency and the Mashababos insurgency demonstrated that the previous peacebuilding approaches, programs, and methods were not entirely effective (Civil Society Source 2020a). After the 1992 GPA, numerous peacebuilding programs have been implemented by various actors, ranging from traditional international donors such as the G19 groupFootnote 1 to donors that have emerged in the last fifteen years such as China, Brazil, India, Vietnam, and the Gulf countries. Since the 1990s, peacebuilding interventions in Mozambique have been devised mainly under a liberal or determined-designed approach in five main areas: security, economic foundations, inclusive politics, justice, and revenues and services (de Carvalho et al. 2016). However, numerous factors contributed to peacebuilding ineffectiveness in preventing the relapse of violence in the country.

The Dominant Determined-Designed Peacebuilding Paradigm: What Has Failed?

The previous literature has underlined the role of the UN and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in explaining the outcomes of the 1992 peace process. It also highlighted the role of bilateral donors with country experience and solid knowledge about domestic political actors and domestic constraints (Manning and Malbrough 2010). Peacebuilding and development assistance programs were focused on building democracy in Mozambique, attempting to support the transition from a single-party rule to multiparty politics in the early 1990s. In the early 2000s, the focus transitioned to improving good governance at national and municipal levels (Manning and Malbrough 2012).

The promotion of democracy and economic liberalization as central elements of peacebuilding practices in Mozambique has effectively changed people’s perception of power and their ability to influence political spaces. Thus, the liberal peacebuilding focus on democratization may have contributed to people’s empowerment by creating formal spaces of political participation. However, economic liberalization was not effectively implemented and failed to tackle poverty, while simultaneously negatively affecting the spaces of political empowerment (Maschietto 2015; Hanlon 2010). Other key reforms focused on decentralization and local governance. However, the limited effectiveness of such reforms revealed the inherent contradiction in the top-down and determined-designed dynamics that shaped the peacebuilding process.

The decentralization agenda and its emphasis on deconcentration instead of devolution did not result in effective power-sharing, thus affecting both the reconciliation and democratization processes in Mozambique (Maschietto 2016). The involvement of donors in decentralization programs followed the reversal of democratic decentralization, leading some donor agencies to reformulate or decrease their support to local governance. Instead, international donors focused on sector-based programs, for example, education and agriculture, that deconcentrated the deployment of resources and bypassed the control mechanisms of statutory bodies at the local government level. While this process may have allowed donors to achieve a relative degree of effectiveness and achieve short-term results, it also undermined the building of long-term effective local governance structures (Bossuyt and Gould 2000).

Another sign of ineffective peacebuilding in Mozambique is evident in the partial failure of the previous DDR process. Despite the efforts of the UN, religious organizations, and local NGOs, international donors assumed too early that Mozambique had undergone a successful post-conflict transition. They halted support to NGOs working on DDR issues, while RENAMO maintained armed men and stockpiles for more than 20 years. Both the ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique) and international donors could not conclude their peacebuilding mandate effectively, not only on disarmament but also on demobilization and reintegration, as support to former combatants in central Mozambique was consistently lacking (Vines 2021).

In addition, women, youth, and the most vulnerable have been left with hardly any assistance in the previous DDR program. Children received educational support and were placed under a different program when compared to adults. However, some of them rebelled, demanding the same vocational reinsertion package that their adult counterparts were receiving. The previous DDR program also failed to recognize the specific needs of female fighters in Mozambique. Only men were issued with resettlement grants, and only male clothing was available, demonstrating the narrow focus of previous DDR programs in Mozambique (Casey-Maslen et al. 2020, 6).

The growth and decline of both FRELIMO’s and RENAMO’s roles in assuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs were also evident. FRELIMO consolidated its power within various state structures and did not allow for the democratization and decentralization process to be fully realized. On the other hand, RENAMO opted for continuing to hold some of its military bases and concealed weapons. Dhlakama was not able to accommodate the fact that alternance in power at the national and provincial levels did not really occur in the country. The long-term ineffectiveness of previous democratization, decentralization, and DDR efforts after the 1992 GPA resulted both from an erroneous assessment on the progress of previous peacebuilding programs and the inability of both national and international peacebuilding actors to adapt to the new challenges that have emerged since 2012. Thus, the dominant peacebuilding approach implemented after the 1992 GPA—based on a determined-design process and technocratic model that did not address issues related to political inclusion, gender, and youth—was not able to sustain peace in the country after 2012. In that context of conflict recurrence, mediation became again a key tool to create a new peacebuilding avenue and a sustaining peace pathway in Mozambique.

Direct Dialogue and Adaptive Mediation: The Emergence of an Alternative Approach?

Responding to a continuously changing context and to the escalation of violence became a key priority for mediation efforts between 2013 and 2019 in Mozambique. Peacemaking solutions often involved a sense of urgency due to the complex and uncertain environment described in previous sections. Moreover, amid ongoing volatility, the future of peacebuilding in Mozambique had to first rely on the effectiveness of peacemaking and conflict resolution initiatives. In this context, the new peace process involved multiple stakeholders and featured three main mediation stages: (1) domestic mediation without external process facilitation, (2) standard high-level international mediation, and (3) adaptive mediation as facilitation of direct dialogue between both parties.Footnote 2 The Mozambican government and RENAMO, and several domestic and external mediation actors, such as individuals, states, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), attempted to find new solutions to the conflict and participated directly or indirectly in the mediation process.

In the last stage of the mediation process, from 2016 to 2019, a small mediation team of four members was led by the Swiss ambassador to Mozambique, Mirko Manzoni. While addressing the failures and ineffectiveness of previous peace negotiations, the final round of the new mediation process was adaptive and pragmatic in style. It privileged the facilitation of direct dialogue between both parties in the context of a nationally owned peace process. This effective style of mediation was focused on three main pillars: (1) self-organization and national ownership, enabling the leaders of both parties and Mozambicans from both sides to be at the center of the architecture of negotiations, (2) an understanding of mediation as a synonym of process facilitation, with a small mediation team of four members working discretely and unassumingly amid challenging conditions, and (3) an adaptive and pragmatic approach that enabled the mediators to deal more effectively with complexity and uncertainty during the negotiations. This mediation approach allowed first for a permanent ceasefire in 2017, an MoU on military affairs in 2018, and the MAPR signed in August 2019.

The implementation of an alternative mediation approach—that is, adaptive mediation—indicates that in the case of recurrent armed conflicts like in Mozambique, the effectiveness of mediation initiatives depended, first, on the resilience and adaptiveness of both parties in the conflict, as well as all domestic stakeholders involved in the peace process. Second, it also depended largely on the mediators’ mindset and the ability of external mediators to listen to domestic actors while focusing on understanding the culture and context of the conflict-affected situation. A mindset of discretion and humility, and a smaller number of external mediators involved in the peace process, also largely contributed to building trust among all parties. Third, when this mindset was allied to a pragmatic and adaptive approach, this enabled the mediators to face complex and uncertain environments more effectively. Adaptive mediation and adaptive peacebuilding initiatives should be perceived as ongoing and interlinked iterative processes and as essential long-term endeavors for sustainable peace in Mozambique. Therefore, it is possible to assert that for the effective implementation of the 2019 MAPR, the related peacebuilding actions should remain adaptive in nature while being adequately supported by international and domestic peacebuilders. The question that remains is whether adaptive mediation has opened an avenue for adaptive peacebuilding in Mozambique.

Implementing the 2019 MAPR: The Rise of Adaptive Peacebuilding in Mozambique?

After the signature of the new peace agreement in 2019, the lead mediator of the recent peace process, Mirko Manzoni, was appointed as the UN-PESGM. The UN-PESGM’s primary function has been to deepen the dialogue between the Mozambican government and RENAMO and assist in implementing the 2019 MAPR. Manzoni’s approach in the implementation stage was focused on achieving significant progress on military issues by consolidating early gains in advancing DDR activities and expecting to progress on decentralization and reconciliation at a later stage. In addition, as in the mediation stage, the implementation of the peace agreement, which includes peacebuilding components, is focused on external process facilitation of a nationally owned peacebuilding process (Peace Process Secretariat 2021a).

Looking at the short-term impact of the MAPR implementation, the number of demobilized fighters increased from 6% to 20% in 2020, and two military bases have been thoroughly closed. Former combatants have returned home and began the reintegration process into their communities with the help of local religious, civil society, and community leaders. Unlike the previous program, the current DDR process also considers female combatants and their unique reintegration needs. On September 5, 2020, with the active support of the UN-PESGM, Filipe Nyusi and Ossufo Momade visited a DDR center in central Mozambique where 140 former female combatants (of an estimated total of 247) were disarmed and demobilized in a safe and inclusive manner (UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 2020). The current DDR activities seem to prioritize a context-specific approach, taking place in specially designated ‘Assembly Areas’ (AA), where former combatants go through a registration and sensitization process that supports their transition to civilian life, and weapons and other military equipment are also registered and handed over. Subsequently, the former combatants also participate in reintegration interviews in the AA, which then provide crucial information on their hopes and intentions for the following phase. They are given training and livelihood options based on their needs, capabilities, and local opportunities in the communities where they want to settle (Peace Process Secretariat 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an unexpected obstacle to the DDR process. Resource mobilization to address the health crisis, more restrictive measures, and the fear associated with the virus disrupted demilitarization initiatives. The impact of COVID-19 presented an increase in additional DDR logistics costs to both the government and international partners. Additional provision of food, accommodation, and access to health services, including hygiene and prevention kits for COVID-19, have been in increasing demand for those that remain in RENAMO military bases. On the other hand, DDR has also been impacted by the need to comply with the state of emergency measures, for example, social distancing and the prohibition on holding meetings of more than 20 people. These limitations also inhibit social practices and the community’s reception to former combatants (ACCORD 2020).

Despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the DDR process is expected to be concluded by the end of 2022. The new DDR program has been supported by a multi-donor fund (Canada, the European Union, Ireland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the Peace Process Secretariat (PPS), led by the UN-PESGM. The PPS includes members from the Mozambican government and RENAMO and works closely with the Military Affairs Commission (MAC), the Joint Technical Group for DDR (JTGDDR), the Joint Technical Group for Placement (JTGP), and the Joint Technical Group for Monitoring and Verification (JTGMV) (Peace Process Secretariat 2021).

At the level of international peacebuilding donors, the European Union (EU) has emerged as one of the main partners of the Mozambican government after the signature of the 2019 MAPR, allocating 62 million euros to address peacebuilding issues. Half of that amount is destined for the implementation of the DDR process. The other half is managed by the PPS to assist the reconciliation process, that is, supporting grassroots and civil society organizations, culture, sports, theater, and others. One-fourth of the funds will be allocated to decentralization programs and to support security sector reform. The assistance for decentralization in the short term will be focused on capacity-building and support for the 2024 district elections (EU Delegation in Mozambique 2020).

An analysis of the approach used by the EU to implement its peacebuilding activities in Mozambique reveals its focus on context-specificity, which tends to differ from the liberal peacebuilding paradigm endorsed by international donors in the 1990s and early 2000s. Most of the EU peacebuilding initiatives in Mozambique are initiated by the EU delegation in Mozambique with frequent consultations with national and local stakeholders. The EU officials in Mozambique and local partners engage thoroughly in problem analysis and recommend actions accordingly. Subsequently, the headquarters in Brussels will assess and approve the initiatives. At the implementation level, the initiative also remains in the hands of the field office, which will select the most appropriate implementation partner, for example, NGOs and CSOs, other international cooperation partners in Mozambique, private contractors, etc. The same context-specific focus is applied to the evaluation stage. An EU program officer in Mozambique is responsible for monthly evaluations based on local feedback. In the design, implementation, and evaluation stages, the EU perceives the process as a bottom-up approach within the EU peace and development bureaucratic structure. The decision-making process is initiated from the field office in Mozambique (with the input from local partners) up to the headquarters in Brussels, and not the other way around. Therefore, key inputs for peacebuilding programs result from the assessment of EU officials in Mozambique, who will in turn privilege feedback from local organizations and the national and local governments at all stages of their peacebuilding activities (EU Delegation in Mozambique 2020).

Considering that the approach of the UN-PESGM and the PPS derives from an effective adaptive mediation model in the peacemaking stage, the implementation of the 2019 MAPR also seems to integrate a similar approach focused on process facilitation, national ownership, self-organization, and an adaptive mindset in the peacebuilding stage, to the point that the DDR program was not fully interrupted by the COVID-19 and the Military Junta crises. In addition, looking at the example of the EU as one of the main peacebuilding donors in Mozambique and its context-specific methods, it is possible to observe a gradual paradigm shift from liberal and determined-design approaches toward adaptive and context-specific peacebuilding approaches in Mozambique.

As peacebuilding processes encompass a larger number of actors and a longer time horizon when compared with mediation processes, further peacebuilding research in the next 20 years should be able to confirm if the peacebuilding paradigm shift toward adaptive approaches was effectively realized or not. However, this section highlights that current peacebuilding trends in Mozambique demonstrate that the transition from liberal to adaptive peacebuilding seems to be occurring and resulting in an increasing effectiveness of related programs. International peacebuilders are now recognizing the value of approaches that promote the self-organization and resilience of Mozambicans through adaptive, pragmatic, and context-specific peacebuilding initiatives. However, other non-governmental peacebuilding actors have contributed consistently to sustaining peace in Mozambique and offer a valuable example of how twenty-first-century peacebuilders should address current peace threats and challenges.

Localized International Non-Governmental Organizations (L-INGOs): An example of Adaptive Peacebuilding in Mozambique

In the post-Cold War period, international NGOs have been contributing to humanitarian, development, and peace actions in conflict-affected situations. In the Mozambican context, the role of ‘localized’ international non-governmental organizations (L-INGOs), such as the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Aga Khan Development Network, has been fundamental to sustain effective peacebuilding actions focused on the most vulnerable while often operating on challenging grounds. The unique characteristic of the L-INGOs is that they have both an international dimension—benefitting from the lessons learned and experience in other conflict contexts—and are simultaneously fully localized—that is, the design, implementation, and evaluation of their activities happen mostly at the local level and rely on local feedback. The L-INGOs are not a temporary mission or delegation constrained by specific national or economic interests. Instead, moved by faith-based or humanitarian principles, they have settled in Mozambique on a permanent basis. By nature, the process of transition from a global to a localized organization implies contextualization, pragmatism, and adaptiveness. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that these two cases constitute a valuable example for peacebuilders attempting to implement adaptive approaches in Mozambique and beyond.

The Community of Sant’Egidio (CSE) in Mozambique

The CSE is a Catholic organization founded in Rome, in 1968, under three core principles: ‘prayer, the poor, and peace’ (in Italian, preghiera, poveri, pace). According to the Vatican (2021), the CSE comprises a network of small communities, with about 50,000 members in 72 countries over five continents. The CSE’s first activity in Mozambique took place before the end of the civil war, sending a boat on a humanitarian mission to provide food for the most vulnerable. One of the main stances of the CSE is that peace will only arise if the most vulnerable are taken into consideration. The CSE in Mozambique is also the result of a friendship developed in Rome between a Mozambican bishop and Italian priests. The Mozambican bishop invited the Italian priests to visit Mozambique in 1988 during the civil war. The Italians found a very fragile situation and extreme poverty. The Catholic priests stayed in challenging areas, eating no more than a portion of rice per day. Despite the challenging conditions, they have continued to visit Mozambique, and later the CSE would contribute to the mediation process that led to the signature of the 1992 GPA at the CSE headquarters in Rome. It is possible to say that the CSE in Mozambique developed from a personal friendship into an international project that was later localized (CSE Source 2020b). This fact also demonstrates that besides having the right means and the right intentions (and predetermined plans), sometimes, to give an effective contribution in peacebuilding, it may be more a matter of being in the right place at the right time (CSE Source 2020a).

After the 1992 GPA, the CSE has been strongly committed to sustaining peace and reducing poverty in Mozambique, focused on the reconstruction of a network of infrastructures and communications, and strengthening education and health systems. The ‘Youth for Peace’ movement implemented in Mozambican schools and universities attempted to develop a culture of solidarity, pluralism, and peace, ensuring that younger people are included in community-based discussions and project implementation (Sant’Egidio 2017). Currently, the CSE is involved in two major projects in Mozambique: the BRAVO (Birth Registration against Oblivion) program, which addresses child trafficking issues, and the DREAM (Disease Relief through Excellent and Advanced Means) initiative, which aims to tackle the spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. Through the BRAVO program, the CSE could assist in registering thousands of children that had no legal identity in Mozambique, enabling the protection of their civil rights. Birth registration is seen by the CSE not only as a human right but also as a gateway to a variety of other rights and services provided by the state. In the outskirts of Maputo, the first DREAM antiretroviral therapy center in Africa opened in February 2002. The DREAM program has helped over 200,000 people in Mozambique, making antiretroviral therapy increasingly available, as well as addressing other diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer, and malnutrition (Sant’Egidio 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the DREAM program also collaborated with the Mozambican government to conduct disease screening, population awareness, training of health workers, and vaccinations (DREAM Sant’Egidio 2021).

The CSE’s context-specific and adaptive approach is focused on engaging and working with local actors. Considering the history of the CSE in Mozambique and its contribution to peacemaking and peacebuilding, the L-INGO was able to build trust and a solid relationship with the Mozambican government and with the local population. Regarding the CSE’s approach to peacebuilding, it derives from its faith-based principles while keeping an ecumenic spirit and promoting interfaith meetings. Although the CSE extends its activities in 13 countries, at the local level, it relies mainly on those living on the ground. Local communities are seen as those able to foster and deepen dialogue and enable effective implementation of the CSE programs (CSE Source 2020a). The BRAVO program exemplifies the current peacebuilding and humanitarian vision of the CSE in Mozambique, that is, in conflict-affected societies, the most vulnerable need to be assisted first. Besides relying on the grassroots, the CSE also keeps close contact with the national government and international organizations when implementing its programs, for example, the EU, the Italian government, or other major development actors such as Germany and Japan (CSE Source 2020a).

In terms of evaluation, there is a monthly and annual review of CSE’s programs. In addition, external audits ensure the accountability of these programs. In the case of Mozambique, the feedback from national and local actors is fundamental for a positive evaluation. Besides the monthly and annual reviews, the evaluation on the ground also happens daily. Through its localized practices and its long history of peacebuilding in Mozambique, the CSE developed contextualized knowledge through institutional learning, surpassing any external donor. In fact, Italian policymakers rely on the CSE to develop new peace and development policies to address Mozambican issues (CSE Source 2020a).

Some of the CSE activities may, at first glance, seem to have no direct relation with standard peacebuilding programs, for example, DDR, reconciliation, and decentralization programs. However, the relation with peacebuilding and sustaining peace here, although indirect, it is crucial, as the BRAVO and Dream projects help in building and strengthening the Mozambican civil society from a bottom-up perspective. In this context, the mission of the CSE in Mozambique unites both humanitarian and peacebuilding activities, focusing on the most vulnerable. The effectiveness of the CSE programs derives from its context-specificity from the design to the implementation and evaluation stages. The DREAM and BRAVO projects were designed in Maputo in collaboration with the national government and the Justice and Health Ministries. The CSE is also fundamentally adaptive in its approach, as there is no concrete design or planning but a response to concrete needs over time. According to Fr. Giorgio Ferretti, head of the CSE in Mozambique, “the evaluation stage is considered a fundamental tool, as an institution like the CSE needs to remain humble.” The evaluation of the BRAVO and DREAM programs is mainly conducted in Mozambique with local and international coordination. Fr. Ferretti also underlined that “the presence of the CSE in Mozambique is not temporary, it is there forever. Therefore, there is no grand strategy but constant adaptation. If you would like to cure HIV/AIDS or other diseases, it will be the work of a lifetime. Sometimes this is more than a matter of planning, implementation, and evaluation. It is necessary to think with the heart” (CSE Source 2020b).

This section highlighted that the CSE’s peacebuilding and humanitarian activities are based on an adaptive and context-specific approach that benefits from a long history of institutional learning and focus on context-specificity through continuous trust-building with local communities and national actors. The CSE adaptive actions in Mozambique derive from the localization of its know-how and procedures, and its faith-based and humanitarian principles focusing on the most vulnerable, which also makes them focus on a long-term objectives and people-centered actions.

The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Mozambique

The AKDN is an international development organization founded by the 49th hereditary Imam of the Shia Ismaili Muslims. The activity of the AKDN is guided by Islamic ethical principles, such as consultation, solidarity with those who are less fortunate, self-reliance, and human dignity. Pluralism is also a cornerstone of the AKDN’s ethical framework. Its goal is to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or gender. The AKDN staff members come from a variety of faiths, backgrounds, and origins. The AKDN agencies operate in more than thirty countries across eight regions (Aga Khan Development Network 2021a). Its development approach is based on the idea of helping those in need to achieve self-reliance and improve their quality of life (Aga Khan Development Network 2021b).

In 1998, through a request made by the former President Joaquim Chissano, the AKDN and the Mozambican government signed a Diplomatic Agreement of Cooperation for Development. Since 2001, the scope of AKDN activities in Mozambique has been concentrated in the Cabo Delgado province, where the Mashababos insurgency has been active since 2017. In addition, the AKDN has been operating in other areas, for example, creating the Aga Khan Academy in Maputo since 2009 and engaging in various other projects such as the Moztex factory in Matola and the rehabilitation of the Polana Hotel in Maputo. At the time of writing, the AKDN was employing over 1000 people in Mozambique (96% of them Mozambicans) in seven areas of activity: (1) agriculture and food security, (2) strengthening the civil society, (3) early childhood and development, (4) economic development and financial inclusion, (5) education and literacy, (6) humanitarian assistance, and (7) health and nutrition, including, more recently, assistance to address the COVID-19 crisis (Aga Khan Development Network 2021c).

Working mainly with local employees—and listening to local health committees, local activists, and community agents—has been one of the priorities of the AKDN in Mozambique. However, since violent extremism emerged in Cabo Delgado, the AKDN’s ability to engage with the situation on the ground has been substantially reduced. The AKDN continued to try to assist local communities in the region amid a very challenging context in the northern province. As the Mashababos insurgency instrumentalizes religious fundamentalism, the AKDN strived to work with all religious traditions and leaderships and with the local government in Cabo Delgado. It is also important to note that the AKDN activities are focused on social assistance, and although its principles are related to Islam, there is no religious element in the implementation of AKDN projects (including the AKDN education services). The key intermediary of the AKDN in Cabo Delgado has been the “committees of village development,” also known as “village development organizations” (VDOs). In addition, the AKDN also supports the creation of “community groups of savings” (CGS) focused on capacity-building and financial literacy (AKDN Source 2020).

The composition of the VDOs counts with 10 to 20 members. They are representatives of local areas, and sometimes there is also a representative of the local government. The AKDN funds the creation of the VDOs, and the members are elected by locals in democratic fashion. Once elected, these members will work to create “the map of dreams,” that is, their optimal vision for the future of those communities. Each member will share their dream for their village, and the AKDN will ask what they would do to achieve those dreams if they have financial support. By creating the map of dreams and generating this discussion, the problem recognition and the modes of assistance are clarified. Also, it is important to note that the exchange of ideas for the map of dreams remains limited to that small group of local people. Therefore, there is no external influence, which enables the AKDN activities to fully adapt to that context (AKDN Source 2020).

The VDOs are not an institution meant to serve the AKDN but to ultimately serve the local villages and their citizens. They function as intermediaries of an adaptive approach that promotes the self-organization and resilience of local communities. This is a model that the AKDN has developed since 2001, applying it first in Pakistan and India with successful results. Although Cabo Delgado is the focus of AKDN activities in Mozambique, the foundation also works in interaction with other regions, for example, to support local producers of cashew nuts, as it is difficult to find people with skills in this type of produce. Often, the AKDN attempts to transfer capacities from one region to another, for example, from Nampula to Cabo Delgado, maximizing inter-province knowledge sharing. In addition, the AKDN often collaborates with local NGOs on capacity-building, supporting the management, supervision, and implementation of projects (AKDN Source 2020).

During the implementation stage, the AKDN also developed a tool known as ‘Linkage-Building Events’ (LBEs), which enables networking with government actors or other relevant stakeholders, for example, the leaders of small local businesses. The AKDN also organizes thematic conferences, focusing on addressing relevant issues in a deeper and broader way. In terms of evaluation of AKDN projects, the map of dreams and the VODs activities is the main method of evaluation of their success, that is, it is a method fully based on local feedback, which is often enhanced by ‘commissions of truth’—a small group mandated to evaluate any sensitive or controversial situation. Civic education programs are also based on the map of dreams instead of being based on external values to that community. Finally, the support offered by external donors, for example, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Portugal, the European Union, or private corporations like the Mitsui Group, enables more robust and effective programs (AKDN Source 2020).

In summary, the values related to the implementation of the AKDN projects are associated with the importance of the context, local accountability, networking for institutional learning, self-organization, and resilience of local communities. The AKDN adaptive actions in Mozambique derive from the contextualization process enabled by the VDOs and the ‘map of dreams,’ providing additional local legitimacy to its forms of assistance and enabling effective peace and development actions even in the most complex, challenging, and uncertain regions. The AKDN adaptive method, if provided with enough security conditions, will be able to contribute with a more holistic approach to peacebuilding in Cabo Delgado, addressing issues related to unemployment and development in the most fragile region of Mozambique.

Conclusions

In the face of conflict recurrence and the rise of violent extremism in Mozambique, domestic and external peacebuilding actors were obliged to reevaluate the effectiveness of peacebuilding approaches implemented since the 1992 GPA. As a result, the current trend indicates a paradigm shift from liberal peacebuilding toward an alternative adaptive peacebuilding approach based on context-specificity, national and local ownership, resilience, and self-organization. The peacebuilding paradigm shift in Mozambique was initiated by effective conflict resolution initiatives based on an adaptive mediation approach developed between 2016 and 2019 by both parties and a small mediation team led by the Swiss ambassador, Mirko Manzoni. The implementation of the 2019 MAPR derives from the same adaptive mediation model and attempts to similarly focus on external process facilitation, national ownership, self-organization, and an adaptive mindset now applied to the peacebuilding stage, namely on the implementation of DDR programs. Major peacebuilding donors, such as the EU, also have been making efforts to follow this trend and have developed more context-specific approaches to design, implement, and evaluate their peacebuilding activities in Mozambique.

In addition, L-INGOs such as the CSE and the AKDN have been presented in this chapter as key examples of how to contribute to sustaining peace through adaptive approaches amid increasing complexity and uncertainty. Both organizations have been active in many conflicts or fragile situations in the world and were able to develop adaptive approaches from their institutional learning experience in conflict-affected contexts. Simultaneously, they are fully localized, relying mainly on the contributions of local staff, including those living and working close to the people in remote areas. National and local staff are key to foster dialogue with local communities, and their presence on the ground is fundamental to the effectiveness of their programs. Due to their long-term commitment to Mozambique, they were able to build knowledge through institutional learning and build trust with the local population, the Mozambican government, and international donors. In addition, both the CSE and AKDN are moved by a faith-based approach beyond national interests or temporary mandates, which generates further trust in their long-term activities on the ground. Both L-INGOs are focused by nature on a context-specific and people-centered approach, adaptive to a constantly changing environment, as exemplified by the implementation method of the CSE’s DREAM and BRAVO programs and the AKDN’s focus on the VODs and the ‘map of dreams.’ The assumption is that peace and development need to emerge from within rather than from the actions from external actors or from external methods.

The lessons we can draw from the shortcomings of peacebuilding in the past, and from the effectiveness of the approaches and methods used by CSE and AKDN, are that process-facilitation and institutional-learning based on context-specific feedback enable more flexible, adaptive, and effective peacebuilding initiatives. In addition, these initiatives should holistically address cross-cutting issues, such as poverty, inequality, and education, and respond to the needs of all Mozambicans, particularly those that are most vulnerable. Long-term peacebuilding programs will need to continue to reflect adaptations to a complex and uncertain environment and should follow the examples provided by L-INGOs, or by international peacebuilders such as the UN-PESGM and international cooperation partners who are breaking new ground and finding adaptive peacebuilding pathways in Mozambique.

The main hypothesis presented in this chapter is that to sustain peace—that is, the absence of physical violence and laying the foundations for durable peace—in Mozambique, adaptive peacebuilding approaches hold the potential to be more effective than the prevalent determined-designed peacebuilding approaches implemented between 1992 and 2012. Domestic and international peacebuilders will be able to adapt to an uncertain and complex environment more effectively if they focus on facilitation rather than full-fledged interventions and if the design, implementation, and evaluation of peacebuilding programs can stimulate the self-organization and resilience needed in the Mozambican society to manage its tensions without relapsing into violent conflict.