China and the Suez Canal—Politics, Economy, and Logistics

Abstract

The relations between China and Egypt are good and open, based on common economic and political interests as well as a deep mutual cultural appreciation since both China and Egypt are part of the four great river civilizations of the ancient world (The four civilizations are China and the Yang Cha River, Egypt and the Nile River, the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent and the Ganges River, and Mesopotamia and the Euphrates and Tigres rivers.). Egypt, even during Mao Zedong’s rule in China (1949–1976), enjoyed Chinese support as part of China’s support for the bloc of non-identifying countries, including East African countries such as Sudan, and benefited from the development of China–Africa relations.

The relations between China and Egypt are good and open, based on common economic and political interests as well as a deep mutual cultural appreciation since both China and Egypt are part of the four great river civilizations of the ancient world.¹Egypt, even during Mao Zedong’s rule in China (1949–1976), enjoyed Chinese support as part of China’s support for the bloc of non-identifying countries, including East African countries such as Sudan, and benefited from the development of China–Africa relations. Egypt recognized mainland China in 1956 (as opposed to recognizing Taiwan) and was the first Arab country to do so. In 1971, Egypt supported a permanent seat for China on the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China supported Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal prior to the Kadesh War (The Suez War 1956) and assisted by supplying food and weapons after the Yom Kippur War (October War 1973). According to media reports, there were also a number of arms deals in naval fields,² airspace,³ and in the development of missile arrays.

Relations over the past decade between China and Egypt have been fed by political and economic developments in both countries. Egypt, after the rise of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2014, is seeking national economic growth and employment engines to cope with huge challenges in the economy and society. The Suez Canal and the extensive activity around it—including logistics, industrial and manufacturing services, large investments in infrastructure, and, of course, ships passing through—were marked by El-Sisi as such growth engines. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is developing those areas and fields as well, which leads to a natural synergy between the Egyptian and Chinese policies in general and in activities related to the Suez Canal in particular.

Developments in Egypt

The beginning of the decade was characterized in Egypt by the upheaval in the Arab world (The Arab Spring) of 2011 that led to the fall of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime and the elections that were followed by a military coup. In 2014, former Defense Minister Abdul Fatah El-Sisi was elected president in Egypt. These events of the years 2011–2014 left a deep mark on Egyptian domestic politics and diplomacy. Internationally, President Obama’s support for protesters calling for the dismantling of Mubarak’s regime was conceived by Egypt’s elites as President Obama’s “betrayal” of a legitimate regime,⁴ pushing President El-Sisi to diversify Egypt’s international relations and develop relations with Russia and China in addition to those with the United States.

Internally social unrest demonstrated the fragility of the Egyptian economy resulting from historical structural factors alongside a large and young population. From demographic and geographical perspectives, Egypt is a large country. Its population is about 100 million and its area covers more than a million square kilometers, but due to the desert climate, 95% of its population concentrates along a very narrow belt of the Nile Valley. Egypt’s population is very young—about 50% of the population is under the age of 30. This combination of a young and very dense population requires planning suitable physical and economic infrastructures both in the large population centers and in the development of new areas.

Therefore, Egyptian President El-Sisi has announced a number of economic initiatives aimed at developing Egypt’s economy with an emphasis on job creation.

Suez Canal Doubling Initiative

In 2014, Egyptian President El-Sisi announced an Egyptian national project to expand the canal. The initiative ended after a year. The project, carried out and funded entirely from Egyptian sources while expressing and emphasizing strong national feelings, doubled the northern section of the canal by about 70 km (out of about a total of 200 km). The project had two main objectives, the first is to increase royalties from the canal by increasing the volume of traffic in the canal and reducing the waiting times of ships at the entrances of the canal. The Suez Canal is a very significant component of the Egyptian economy. Egypt’s revenues from the canal are very significant, and in the 2020–21 financial year, it accumulates to about $5.84 billion, representing about 10% of the total Egyptian government’s revenues and about 2% of Egypt’s total GDP.⁵ These are steady and stable incomes in foreign currency (export of services) that are of the utmost importance to the Egyptian economy, which suffers from many structural difficulties. In all its 150 years of operation, the canal was closed only for about eight years between 1967 and 1975 due to wars between Israel and Egypt.⁶ The second time the canal was closed for navigating was for six days in March 2021 when the ship Ever Given became stuck on the edge of the canal and blocked traffic.

The second goal is to create economic activity around the Canal by combining the construction of industrial parks that take advantage of Egypt’s existing workforce on the one hand and logistical access to the world’s main commercial lines (the canal) on the other.⁷ Such industrial parks have created jobs in new areas outside the Nile Valley and their products will be marketed to global markets conveniently and immediately as the factories are on a global maritime traffic artery.

Egypt Vision 2030

In February 2016, Egypt’s Vision 2030 Strategy was announced, consisting of eight Egyptian national goals in the fields of economy, society, and the environment, respectively with similar UN goals and programs such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Under this vision encompassing many fields and development plans, two mega-projects are particularly relevant to this chapter.

The New Administrative Capital Initiative

Part of Egypt’s Vision 2030 is the construction of Egypt’s new administrative capital. The new capital will be located between Cairo and the Suez Canal. This is a mega-project of building a new administrative city from scratch including large infrastructure and construction projects for both the institutional and residential sectors.

The Golden Triangle Project in Southern Egypt

This is a mineral-rich area of about 155 square kilometers between the cities of al-Qusayr and Safaga on the Red Sea coast and the city of Qena west of those on the banks of the Nile River. The Egyptian government announced the opening of this area for mineral extraction investments.

China

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the BRI: Belt & Road Initiative. This initiative is a diplomatic, economic, and financial framework for Outward Direct Investments (ODI) that began to flow from China a decade earlier. The initiative appears to be another phase of China’s transition from a growth model based on exports to the world and incoming Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to a growth model based on domestic consumption and ODI. The flow of investments from China, including under the BRI, has increased over the years to a significant phenomenon in financial and geographical scope and has attracted vast academic research⁸ as well as broad media coverage. The initiative includes both the execution of work by Chinese companies (export of services) mainly in the areas of infrastructure, and ODI from China, and is particularly focused on the Eurasian and East African geographical areas. The initiative’s goals are to synchronize development efforts and promote joint activities between the participating countries of the initiative by building common logistical infrastructures such as ports, railways, gas and oil pipelines, and more. The initiative includes a land component—the Silk Road Economic Belt and a marine component—the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road.⁹

The continental route (the Road) is a logistics network that exits China and passes through central and western Asian countries toward Europe. This network revives the historical and romantic narrative of the Silk Road and includes six logistical corridors from China to the north (Russia), south (Southeast Asia), southwest (Bangladesh), and west (Pakistan and Central Asian countries).

The Maritime Route (the Belt) is a network of seaports and cargo terminals in dozens of ports in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. This network connects eastern Chinese ports in the Greater Bay Area, which includes the Pearl River Delta ports, through the China Sea, Southeast Asia countries, through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, these connect to the eastern shores of Africa north through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the ports of southern European countries.

As part of BRI, the Chinese government established new financial entities such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the China-Southeast Asia Investment Fund (CAF), the China-Africa Investment Fund (CADF), and other financial frameworks. At the same time, China works to create cooperation with existing international bodies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and more. Total Chinese investments and commitments under this initiative are cumulatively estimated at approximately $2–4 trillion since 2013.¹⁰

Chinese Foreign Policy

The BRI has since been announced as one of China’s foreign policy pillars, and has been actively promoted by the Chinese leadership. The reasons for the launch of the initiative are many and are driven by players at different levels of analysis: from the personal level of the policy line led by President Xi, to continue at the intrastate level in China in the division of power between the provinces and the central government and the physical and logistical connectivity of western provinces (and less economically developed) in China, both to the developed eastern provinces, and to their neighboring countries in central and west Asia, and all the way to the international level in geostrategic considerations of securing China’s energy and mineral import sources and sea lines of communication (SLOC’s) alongside maintaining open trade routes for exports and tying economies in Asia to the Chinese one.

It is common to argue that economy is part of politics, and economic power is an international political force. China’s economic rise from poverty and struggle to become the world’s largest growing economy lasted only one generation and was accompanied by trade and investment as well as extensive political and military activity. This includes “soft power” whose stated goals are, among other things, a “National Rejuvenation,” namely, restoring China’s status to the historical one as the primary central east Asian country and erasing “the century of humiliation.”¹¹ In order to maintain the status of a regional and possibly future world power, and in order to support and protect its investments around the world, especially those included in the BRI, China is working to acquire all the means and “status symbols” of world power. This includes nuclear weapons, a comprehensive space program, a blue water fleet building program, including at least four aircraft carrier battle groups, the construction of fighter jets and strategic bombers, and more.

In the context of this discussion, we should mention the Chinese naval force in the war against pirates in the western Indian Ocean. This force operates independently and parallels the international force CTF 151 (CTF—Combined Task Force). China’s maritime power base is in the Port of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and is China’s first (and so far, the only) official military/naval base outside its borders.¹² In this action, China protects the shipping routes entering the Red Sea and farther to the Suez Canal, thus becoming a supplier of global public goods: The Defender of Freedom of Navigation. Researchers dealing with the rise of nations and empires sometimes emphasize the maritime aspects of such a rise (Theory of Navalism). There are certainly significant maritime aspects of China’s rise to world power.¹³ Aspects that its expressions include securing the shipping lanes entering the Suez Canal. China’s activity creates changes in the world power center of gravity and as a result the importance of the Indian Ocean increases. These strategic changes have led to the formation of a new conceptual area in international political literature: the Indo Pacific Region,¹⁴ which also projects the rise of the Red Sea that is part of it. Following this trend, Egypt established its Southern Naval Command and strengthened its forces in the Red Sea.¹⁵

In the Chinese conception, there are no conclusive boundaries between private and public economic activity and between civilian and military activity. The roots of this concept lie further in the military conceptions of imperial China, to be continued with Mao Zedong’s doctrine that subordinates all means in favor of the goal, to its expression today in a policy of “Strategy of Military-Civilian Integration” as formulated in the Declaration of the President of China during the 13th Congress of the People’s Party on the need for integration.¹⁶

This means that all Chinese infrastructure is built in advance and under the guidance of the government in such a way that it will enable operation as infrastructure for military/naval use when necessary.¹⁷

Egypt and China

As we saw, the economic and geostrategic interests of Egypt and China overlap considerably and there is a great deal of economic synergy between Egypt’s internal development needs and the BRI vision. Moreover, in view of the great importance of the Suez Canal to the Egyptian economy and the enormous importance of the canal in international trade as well as the international navigation and trade routes developed by China under BRI, the Suez Canal, its security, and the surrounding projects constitute a clear meeting of interests between internal Egyptian interests and China’s international interests.

In December 2014, Egyptian President El-Sisi visited China, his first visit as head of state outside the Arab world. During this visit, a joint declaration of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” was signed. It should be noted that under Chinese diplomacy protocol such a partnership is a high level of diplomatic relations between China and another country.¹⁸ About a year later in January 2016, Chinese President Xi visited Egypt. Egypt is also one of the founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) founded in 2016.¹⁹

Therefore, a number of mutual interests can be mapped starting with Chinese interest in Egyptian logistics: In view of the economic and environmental efficiency of maritime trade (with the exception of objectives that are clearly inland),²⁰ maritime transport will continue to lead the majority of trade on the long routes between Europe and Asia even with the development of intra-Asian land trade routes initiated by China under the BRI. About 13% of world trade passes through the Suez Canal²¹ and it links trade between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The Suez Canal is a bottleneck in trade between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. As an exclusive, narrow path in an area with a history of conflicts (including the events of 1956 around the Canal itself) and of fear of terrorism (between 2012 and 2013, Egypt reported thwarting attempts to harm ships crossing the canal).²² The canal region poses some risk to the flow of trade, hence a risk to the effectiveness of the entire trade chain. Therefore, in the Chinese view, the continued flow of trade in the Suez Canal in a safe and uninterrupted manner (politically and logistically) is in the primary interest. This is also, of course, an Egyptian supreme interest as well in light of the economic importance of the Suez Canal to Egypt.

The importance of the Suez Canal to China is mainly the flow of goods westward from China to Europe. Fewer goods flow in the opposite direction (from the west to China). Of further but less importance is transporting energy eastward toward China. According to official Chinese data, there is probably some Chinese use of energy passing through the Suez Canal. While the lion’s share of crude oil imported to China is from Gulf states and not through the Canal, China imported about 15.3% of its crude oil in 2019 from Russia. Some Russian oil passes to China through land pipes such as the Siberia–Daqing pipe, but some passes through the canal on a north–south route.

Figure 1 shows crude oil imports to China by the top 15 source countries. All oil imports to China totaled $238.7 billion in 2019.

Fig. 1

Top 15 countries of origin in crude oil imports to China²³

Egyptian market: which is close to $400 billion. The Egyptian market is the second largest market in Africa (after Nigeria) and the fourth largest in the Middle East (after Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran). This is a market with great potential both as a market for Chinese products (manufactured in China or by manufacturers owned by Chinese companies elsewhere) and as a market for infrastructure projects (construction, water, energy, etc.).

Egypt’s regional position: This status has several aspects. The first is Egypt’s political status as an important country on the main axis in the Middle East, which is the traditional Sunni axis with other members to be Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is a relatively moderate axis. Another side of Egypt’s regional status is its economic status as a regional gateway to East Africa. Egypt is a member of three regional trade agreements: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of East African States (ECEAS) in Africa.

Access to Egypt labor force, is usually cheaper and more accessible than in China. Egypt’s GDP per capita is about $3500 compared with just over $10,000 per capita in China. Products produced in Egypt in industrial parks are on the main route of the BRI. The population in Egypt is relatively young and unemployment is high. This very socially problematic situation in Egypt makes the country a destination for investments in labor-intensive manufacturing plants.

On the other hand, Egypt has interests in joining China.

Diversifying Egypt’s Foreign Relations Beyond the United States to Ties with China and Russia

As mentioned above, President Obama’s support of protesters who called against Mubarak’s rule in 2011 was perceived by Egypt’s elites as a “betrayal” by the United States. This led President El-Sisi to diversify Egypt’s international patrons. Since the end of the 1970s, with the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, brokered by the United States, moreover, since the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States has been Egypt’s patron. But President El-Sisi’s first visit outside the Middle East was to China. In addition, an investment agreement for Russian participation in an industrial zone east of Port Said (at the northern entrance to the canal) was signed in 2018, amounting to $190 million.²⁴

Chinese Shipping as a Significant (Albeit Perhaps “Captive”) Customer of the Suez Canal

China is the second country in the world (after Greece) to own a fleet of ships. Chinese-owned shipping accounts for about 14.5% of the world’s shipping in tons.²⁵ Although this is a “captive customer” in many ways, since today as surveyed above there is no real alternative to cruising the canal, there is still an Egyptian interest in maintaining as much traffic as possible through the Canal in order to reduce the search for future alternative routes.

China as a Provider of Infrastructure Services

Building infrastructures such as residential construction, water and energy infrastructure and utilities, transportation and more are the cornerstones of BRI. Chinese suppliers in that field are mainly state-owned enterprises (SOE) and have excellent engineering capabilities alongside impressive performance and financing solutions. All of this makes Chinese infrastructure construction suppliers preferred suppliers.

Chinese Investments Entering Egypt as Source for Foreign Capital and New Technology

Liberal literature indicates many advantages for a country that receives FDI, including capital availability, development of an international client network for export, transfer of technologies, knowledge and management methods, and know-how.²⁶ Encouraging Chinese FDI into Egypt is a source of these advantages.

Chinese Projects in Egypt

Synergy in the economic and geopolitical interests between China and Egypt is physically realized on the ground in a series of Chinese projects, investments and activities in Egypt.

A number of large construction projects are being built in the new administrative capital including the Parliament building, a National Exhibition Center, and buildings for about 12 government ministries. In addition, an agreement was signed with China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), for the construction of a central business district (CBD). In the energy sector, a contract has been signed for the construction of refining facilities for oil and petrochemical industry (The Suez Refining and Petrochemical Plant).

The highlight is the relationship around projects related to the Suez Canal. The Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (SETC) park was established in 2008 and expanded in 2016 in a ceremony attended by President Xi. This industrial park was built by Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA). It is a prototype for industrial economic development zones in Egypt. The Park is on the Red Sea’s shores near the city of Ain-Sokhna about 40 km from the southern entrance to the canal. In the same area (north of the Suez Bay) construction of a port began in the city of Sohna, by a Chinese company.

In addition, Chinese companies operate three terminals at Egyptian ports: the Hutchinson Company operates the two terminals in the port of Alexandria—Alexandria Terminal and El Dekheilia Terminal—and will operate a third terminal east of the city in Abu Qir. COSCO operates a central terminal in Port Said Port, the largest transshipment port in the Suez Canal and one of the largest in the Mediterranean Sea. These ports can be used, according to the Strategy of Military-Civilian Integration, as PLAN (People Liberation Army Navy) supply and technical support ports.

There are also Chinese investments in an industrial area specializing in textiles that are not on the canal. China-Egypt Mankai Textile Industrial Park in The City of Sadat is one of Africa’s largest specialized industrial parks and is expected to operate over 255 textile companies, most of them Chinese owned.

Conclusion

Synergy in the economic and geostrategic interests between China and Egypt causes significant cooperation between the countries, mainly on the economic side. The partnership between the countries anchored in mutual agreements and visits from presidents and was realized in the construction of large infrastructure projects and Chinese investments in Egypt. Many investments are related to the Suez Canal, either directly such as port management or in industrial parks developed by Egypt along the canal.

However, Egypt retains its assets around the Canal. Egypt has funded the canal expansion project by self-measures and is concerned about the diversity of its relations with the superpowers.

Notes

• 1. The four civilizations are China and the Yang Cha River, Egypt and the Nile River, the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent and the Ganges River, and Mesopotamia and the Euphrates and Tigres rivers.

• 2. “PLA Navy 70th Anniversary: A Look at China-Egypt Cooperation,” CGTN, April 24, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/794d444f33494464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html; Eyal Pinko, “A Threat to Israel: The Egyptian Navy Upgrades Its Submarine Warfare Capabilities,” Israel Defense, October 30, 2019, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/40697.

• 3. Thomas W. Lippman, “China Will Sell Arms to Egypt, Sadat Announces,” The Washington Post, June 6, 1979, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/06/06/china-will-sell-arms-to-egypt-sadat-announces/3c70f99a-2fa6-4dea-a92e-b8fbd8d0a97c/; Gary Mortimer, “Egypt: Nation Produces UAV in Cooperation with China,” sUAS News, May 18, 2012, https://www.suasnews.com/2012/05/egypt-nation-produces-uav-in-cooperation-with-china/.

• 4. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt,” The White House, President Barack Obama, February 1, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01/remarks-president-situation-egypt; John Hudson, “Mubarak Leaves Cairo and Confuses the White House,” The Atlantic, February 11, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/02/mubarak-leaves-cairo-and-confuses-the-white-house/342275/.

• 5. AFP, “Egypt’s Suez Canal Reports Record Revenue despite Blockage Crisis,” AlJazeera, July 11, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/11/record-revenues-flow-from-suez-despite-megaship-blockage.

• 6. The Six-Days War (June 1967), The War of Attrition (June 1967 to August 1970), and the Yom Kippur War (October War) (October 1973).

• 7. Suez Canal Area Development Project, “Great Egyptian Dream,” https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/Presentations/Great%20Egyptioan%20Dream.pptx.

• 8. For an overview on the academic research, see Mingchun Cao and Ilan Alon, “Intellectual Structure of the Belt and Road Initiative Research: A Scientometric Analysis and Suggestions for a Future Research Agenda,” Sustainability 12, no. 17 (2020): 6901, https://doi.org/10.3390/SU12176901.

• 9. National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council Authorization, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, March 2015, http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html.

• 10. Jonathan E. Hillman, (2018). “How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 3, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.

• 11. The term used in China to describe the period of intervention and subjugation of the Qing dynasty and the Republic of China by Western powers and Japan from 1839 to 1949.

• 12. Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint” CMSI China Maritime Reports, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/6.

• 13. H. J. Dooley, “The Great Leap Outward: China’s Maritime Renaissance,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 26, no. 1 (2012): 53–76; J. L. Suárez de Vivero and J. C. Rodríguez Mateos, “Ocean Governance in a Competitive World: The BRIC Countries as Emerging Maritime Powers—Building New Geopolitical Scenarios,” Marine Policy 34, no. 5 (2010): 967–78.

• 14. Benni Ben Ari, “The Indo-Pacific Region,” in Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel 2019/20, ed. Shaul Chorev and Ehud Gonen (Haifa: Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center, 2020).

• 15. Shlomo Gueta, “The Egyptian Navy: Its Origins and Its Future,” in Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel 2019/20, ed. Shaul Chorev and Ehud Gonen (Haifa: Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center, 2020).

• 16. Original CSET translation of “The ‘13th Five-Year’ Special Plan for S&T Military-Civil Fusion Development” [十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规划], PRC Ministry of Science and Technology, August 24, 2017, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-13th-five-year-special-plan-for-st-military-civil-fusion-development.

• 17. Y. Evron, “China’s Military-Civil Fusion and Military Procurement,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021): 25–44.

• 18. Li Quan and Ye Min, “China’s Emerging Partnership Network: What, Who, Where, When And Why,” International Trade, Politics and Development 3, no. 2 (2019): 66–81.

• 19. “Members and Prospective Members of the Bank,” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html (accessed March 11, 2022).

• 20. Maritime transport is considerably cheaper than any other transport (air, trains, or trucks) in terms of cost per ton per km. Another key parameter in the logistics of the trade is the transshipment of cargo from one means of transportation to another and transshipment of cargo between means of transportation of the same type (for example, transshipment of a container from one ship to another ship). In general, it can be said that any transshipment of cargo adds a significant cost to transportation.

• 21. “SCZone Head: 13% of World Trade Passes through Suez Canal,” Hellenic Shipping News, June 24, 2019, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/sczone-head-13-of-world-trade-passes-through-suez-canal.

• 22. “Egypt Attack on Suez Canal Ship ‘Foiled,’” BBC, 1 September 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23918642.

• 23. Data Source: ITC (International Trade Centre) processed by author, https://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx.

• 24. “Egypt and Russia Sign 50-Year Industrial Zone Agreement,” Reuters, May 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-russia-industry-idUSL5N1SU5SI.

• 25. “China Has Become the World’s Second–Largest Ship–Owning Nation,” Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, September 17, 2018, https://www.isl.org/en/news/china-become-the-worlds-second-largest-ship-owning-nation#:~:text=ship%2Downing%20nation-,China%20has%20become%20the%20world’s%20second%2Dlargest%20ship%2Downing%20nation,capacity%20of%20270%20million%20dwt.

• 26. For a comprehensive review of this topic, see Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries, Policy, Research Working Paper; no. WPS 1745 Washington, DC: World Bank Group. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/992201468765633696/how-foreign-investment-affects-host-countries.