Keywords

5.1 Introduction

Is there an essence to religiosity? What about spirituality and secularity? Can this ‘essence’ be typologized as a universal set of dimensions? In this chapter, we will address these controversial questions by comparing the main findings of our study to some of the field’s most prevalent typologies. Wulff (2019) writes that typologies have long been rejected by “social scientists under the mistaken assumption that they were intended as categories for sorting individual cases” but are now undergoing a comeback. Wulff underscores the need to conceive of any typology as a work in progress, noting that “as early typologists – e.g., James, Spranger, Jung, and Kretchmer – emphasized, typologies are mainly intended, rather, as intuitively distilled “idealized” portraits, intellectual tools for discerning and analyzing patterns of variation.” (ibid, p. 661).

Typologies serve as theoretical devices, which help their user to reduce the complexity of actual existence. A typology identifies the abstract characteristics assumed to be exemplified within the complexity of empirical reality. The relation between characterizing and exemplifying runs two ways: the abstract characteristics are supposed to be exemplified in fact, and the exemplified facts are supposed to be characterized by the abstract dimensions. While identifying these key religious-spiritual types is a bold and important endeavor, we must retain a critical awareness of the limits and purpose of any typology , and this means insisting upon the two-way traffic between data and categories. Maintaining a critical stance is particularly important, given that much of the research conducted in this area has had an ethnocentric Western bias and has often presupposed a limited range of religious (and non-religious) cultures. Most typologies suffer from a limited underlying pool of data, and hence risk projecting a highly distorted picture of the ‘essence of religion’. Indeed, we must surely entertain the possibility that there may be no essence to religion and that the question may be poorly posed. In this chapter, we use our Q-methodological findings to hold to scrutiny several existing religious (and other) typologies in the literature.

The question of religious typologies is not limited to the Study of Religions. More recently, such mapping of religiosities has also emerged from an interest in worldviews, and has been conducted under a range of conceptual frameworks such as ideologies (Tomkins, 1964), values (Schwartz, 1992), social attitudes (Saucier, 2000), social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2004) and moral foundations (Haidt, 2007). Although these conceptual frameworks clearly differ from each other, they all identify general principles of human variation. Some of these conceptual frameworks construe religiosity as a subset or a single dimension within broader worldview classifications, while others explore religiosity as a variable that correlates or intersects with various worldviews. In this chapter we will investigate such typologies of relevance for the study of religions from a novel methodological perspective, based on Q-methodology and David Wulff’s Faith Q-Sort (2019). The chapter starts from a brief discussion of method, after which we look into different typologies and finally investigate our results from the international study we conducted. The approach and method behind this study is presented more in detail in Chap. 1 of this volume (see also Nynäs et al., 2021). We pay more attention to religiosity in this chapter, since secular worldviews are discussed in Chap. 8 of this volume.

5.2 A Methodological Account

Ultimately, typologies should be judged by their correspondence to empirical data. In this sense, survey findings are far less useful at validating typologies, since religious categories are predefined while semi-structured interviews can be far more helpful in this respect. But even interviews are not exempt from difficulty in validating typologies, since the process of analysis and theory-building often allows researchers to re-create the same typologies they were familiar with in the first place. This means that typologies, classifications and categorization systems can be self-perpetuating, particularly when the categories are built-in by way of the questions that are asked and embedded in the very instruments which discover them. Thus, different methods for data collection and data-analysis can have important effects on typology structuring.

David Wulff’s (2019) Faith Q-Sort (FQS) instrument is sensitive to participant-driven variations, and does not merely reproduce existing categories based on pre-existing classifications. It offers new ways of exploring the relevance of previous typologies also to culturally-diverse samples. For a comprehensive overview of Q-methodology we refer to literature in the field (see Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012), and for a presentation of FQS see Wulff (2019). Our use of the FQS with an international sample allowed us to identify a set of distinct ways of being religious, spiritual and secular and to examine how these varied across cultures (see Chaps. 3 and 4 in this volume). In the current chapter, we take the study a step further by considering the results in light of some key typologies in the study of worldviews and religions. How do our findings reflect such typologies? What general principles for comprehending human variation in religiosity, non-religiosity and spirituality can we extract from them?

Wulff (2019) designed the FQS in order to assess multiple forms of religiosity in individual lives. When selecting the 101 statements for the FQS , Wulff (2019) aimed to be both systematic and globally inclusive. He sought to include items potentially relevant to all major world religions; to the more subjective sides of ‘religion’ and/or ‘spirituality’; and also to humanistic, existential and even spirituality-rejecting perspectives (Wulff, 2019). We developed the FQS further through a process of cross-cultural validation, and defined a revised version, the FQS-b (Appendix 1). This involved double- and back translation into the target languages: Arabic, Bengali, Finnish, French, Mandarin Chinese, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish (see Chap. 1 in this volume; Nynäs et al., 2021).

In a study with FQS , participants rank all statements into a quasi-normal distribution, ranging from +4 (“most descriptive” of me) through 0 (neutral) to −4 (“least descriptive” of me). The statistical analysis of each ‘Q sort’ reveals the existence of a small set of shared ways of sorting, each distinct from the next. Hence, the basic mechanism is simple: if a group of participants share the same perspective, they sort the statements in a recognizably similar fashion and populate the same factor. Each factor that emerges should thus express a different perspective. These results are ultimately in the service of a ‘qualitative’ aim: reconstructing each perspective by interpreting the meaning expressed in the prototypical Q-sort pattern that has been identified as a factor. Each so-called prototype is thus a reconstruction of the meaningful perspective that has been statistically captured by each factor.

The capacity of the FQS to reveal different patterns within a certain sample can be called emergent self-categorization. This means that in comparison with many regular studies, distinct patterns identified through a Q-study – prototypes – are less dependent on the judgement of the researcher or on pre-defined classifications. The complete set of interpreted so-called prototypes is parallel to a typology of perspectives or, in the case of FQS , worldviews with regards to (non-)religion. Each prototype is an “idealized” (or generalized) portrait that is in fact composed of all of the individual Q sorts that exemplified the factor in question (technically, all these Q sorts are statistically merged into a weighted average). Q-methodology thus allows the identification of a bottom-up typology , which’ characteristics emerge as a function of the selective sorting activity of the various participants. Hence, the qualitative sense-making activity of participants yields a quantitative result that – after statistical analysis – can be qualitatively reconstructed by means of the researchers’ interpretations.

For our study, we collected data with the FQS from Canada, China, Ghana, Finland, India, Israel , Peru, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States (see Chap. 1). Q-methodology does not require this large number of respondents, but it is important to find enough respondents representing a variety of viewpoints, and since we aimed for a large variety of nationalities, we also needed a relatively large sample. For this purpose, our initial survey with a larger sample (total N ≈ 300) in each country enabled a broad selection of university students for the FQS-study (n ≈ 45 per country), balanced as far as possible with regard to gender, ethnicity , religious affiliation, language groups, class and field of university studies. These, in combination with other features (e.g. a diversity in value priorities as expressed in our survey) guaranteed a high degree of diversity among the participants. In this study, we collected a total of 562 responses based on the FQS-b.

In Chap. 3 of this volume, we presented the joint analysis of all 562 sorts which we collected that resulted in five distinct global prototypes alongside the three to eight prototypes (in total 57 prototypes) that we received from analyzing the data by country (Appendix 2). In this chapter, we investigate the characteristics of the five global prototypes in light of our review of typologies: we compare how statements that are characteristic to a specific prototype are ranked by other prototypes. This helps us identify how the prototypes are formed.

It is, of course, important not to overstate the case for the emergent self-categorization possible with Q-methodology. To the extent that a prototype is seen as an ideal type, it also conceals a degree of real variety, being composed of a number of individual Q sorts, each unique to some degree. Our approach means an effort to transcend the locale, and this is a significant limitation in this study.

5.3 Typologies of Worldviews and Religion

Scholars have made various attempts to classify and organize worldviews in general and religious types in particular, ranging from deductive “armchair typologies” to inductive empirically-based studies. We begin by reviewing several general worldview typologies, and then shift to the ones that pertain specifically to religiosity. We present only a brief review of the diverse classifications at hand. More complete lists of such typologies can be found in Wulff (1985, 1997, 2007) and in Hood et al. (2018, pp. 26–56). We start by looking at general worldview classification and thereafter we briefly turn to typologies of religiosity, spirituality and non-religion. 

Ideology has been one important concept for attempts to define valid typologies, referring mostly to sets of ideas about how life should be lived and what forces influence it. Some scholars distinguish between group and personal ideologies, while others argue that the two are closely related in such a way that a person’s traits direct them towards certain ideologies, and the ideology they embrace reinforces these traits by framing their experiences in scripted ways (de St. Aubin, 1996). Tomkins’ Polarity of Ideology theory (1964) and Script theory (1987) suggest that ideological thought on both group and personal levels reflects two central dimensions that closely relate to affective experiences. The dimension of humanism highlights the intrinsic value of the person, and reflects an affective tendency towards joy, distress, fear, and shame. Normativism by contrast emphasizes conformity to norms and rules and reflects an affective tendency towards excitement, surprise, contempt, disgust, and anger. These dimensions are found across cultures and periods, and result in a fourfold ideological typology :

figure a

This structure was empirically confirmed (de St. Aubin, 1996 and others), and was found to distinguish well between political left/liberal and right/conservative ideologies in a robust, cross-cultural study (Nilsson & Jost, 2017).

Ideologies are sometimes conceptualized as “social attitudes.” When classifying social attitudes, a traditional-secular dimension seems to be accepted by most scholars, but the existence and possible meaning of additional dimensions is contested. Saucier (2000) conducted an extensive review of previous classifications, including a lexical study of every “ism” in the English dictionary. Four distinct factors of social attitudes or “isms” were found: (1) reverence for traditional and religious sources of authority versus skepticism about absolute and traditional accounts. This factor combines elements of conservatism, religiousness, and authoritarianism and is the factor consistently identified in previous studies; (2) hawkishness and exploitation versus dovishness and cooperation. This factor combines ethnocentrism, social dominance and materialism, and reflects a self-serving tendency which may involve assigning a low importance to values in general; (3) a pro-group attitude versus a pro individual one; (4) high vs. low mystical spiritualism. According to the authors, factors 3 and 4 both reflect Western, democratic, social justice elements and constitute two separable strands in normative thinking in Western democracies. Factor 3 relates to political community issues and support for freedom through institutions, while factor 4 relates to a more personal reverence for intuition, enlightenment and spirituality.

The literature on values presents a second point of entry to worldview typologies. Values are desirable, trans-situational goals, which vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in peoples’ lives (Schwartz, 1992). Today’s most influential theory on values, Schwartz’s Theory of Universal Values (Schwartz, 1992, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2012), identifies two diametrically opposed motivational dimensions according to which human values are (empirically) organized. One dimension contrasts openness to change to conservation , reflecting a conflict between independent thought versus preservation of tradition and stability. The second dimension opposes self-transcendence to self-enhancement , reflecting a conflict between concerns for the welfare of others versus pursuit of personal goals (Schwartz, 2012). We present the relation between basic values and the five global prototypes already in Chap. 3 of this volume.

In a different attempt, Inglehart et al. (2014) devised the World Values Survey to map 60 countries according to their underlying values. The findings confirmed two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world: traditional vs. secular/rational values and survival vs. self-expression values. Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion, custom, family and other sources of authority and have been related to nationalism and to right-wing ideologies, while secular-rational values reflect a rejection of traditional authority sources in favor of autonomous choice. Survival values emphasize economic and physical security, and are related to higher levels of ethnocentricity and less tolerance, while self-expression values prioritize democracy, environmental protection, and pluralism (Inglehart et al., 2014). As countries become industrialized and then democratized, they tend to shift from traditional values to rational ones and from security values to self-expression ones. There is evident overlap here with Tomkins’ ideological polarity, with self-expression values mapping onto person-centered humanism and traditional authority resembling norm-centered conformity (in this sense Tomkins’ ideological orientations are expressions of different ‘values’).

Moral foundations of worldviews represent a separate entry to typologies. An ongoing debate on the underlying foundations of different worldviews touches upon what is considered ‘moral.’ Turiel et al. (1987) argue that from a very young age, individuals identify issues of justice and harm as ‘moral’, and distinguish them from other social issues, which they deem ‘conventional’. This implies that justice and harm are the sole and universal foundational principles of morality (as suggested by Kohlberg and by Kant before him). However, Schweder (1991), Haidt (2007) and others argue that many non-Western cultures (e.g. Asian, African and Arab) as well as many religious or conservative Westerner groups, hold multiple moral foundations, which include, in addition to care and fairness, also, loyalty, authority , and sanctity. These additional moral foundations involve an additional layer of what is “right,” pertaining not to the interaction between individuals, but to that among and between groups. Thus, another way to classify worldviews is by the number and content of their defining moral foundations.

In sum, our overview of general worldview classifications show typologies that tend to revolve around a primary axis which distinguishes between support for rules, norms and traditions and support for human autonomy and rationality. Suggestions for what secondary (and possibly tertiary and quaternary) dimensions consist of vary, but a fairly common proposal is an emphasis on the needs of the self, versus the needs of others.

The issue of distinguishing between spirituality and religiosity has been discussed at length (see e.g. Hodge & McGrew, 2006; Zinnbauer et al., 1997, 1999). Some consider religion and spirituality to be two facets of the same construct, each with a different emphasis on personal or group tendencies towards the transcendent (e.g. Miller & Thoresen, 2003; Hood et al., 2009, pp. 8–9). Other view religiosity and spirituality as independent constructs. Saucier and Skrzypinska (2006, p. 1288) claim that “individual differences in religious/spiritual beliefs cannot be captured by a single dimension” and present in contrast two highly divergent and independent constructs. Typically, spirituality is seen as involving an intrinsic, personal openness to experience, whereas religiosity involves a group- and worship-focused concern with the sacred (Fontaine et al., 2005). This distinction leads to the well-known 2X2 typology of “religious but not spiritual,” “religious and spiritual,” “spiritual but not religious,” and “neither spiritual nor religious (secular)” (Hood et al., 2009).

There are also sub-divisions of each concept, creating typologies of religion, of spirituality and of non-religion. The latter will be discussed separately, since non-religiosity was such a predominant worldview in our findings. Non-religiosity and its subtypes are therefore given due attention in Chap. 8 of this volume, where it is compared to recent typologies of ‘unbelief’ (see e.g. Lee, 2014, 2015; Kontala, 2016) . Here, we focus on ways of classifying religiosity and spirituality.

When focusing solely on religion, the question of whether religiosity is a uni- or multi-dimensional construct arises (Wulff, 2019, p. 645). Evidence suggests that it is both, depending on the mix of questions and the demographics of the sample (Wulff, 1997). As a unidimensional construct, religiosity-related worldviews can be construed either as dichotomous (religious or non-religious) or as a continuum on which individuals can be more or less religious. The major B’s of religion, i.e. Believing, Behaving, Belonging, and Bonding, are often considered to be central to the construction of religious typologies (Saroglou, 2011). These can be said to reflect the multidimensionality of religion, insofar as they are seen as different aspects of being religious which to varying degrees together constitute forms of religiosity.

As a multidimensional construct, various types of religiosity have been enumerated. One classic typology is James’ (1902) distinction between the once-born religious type, whose religious impetus stems from a “healthy-minded” joy of living, and breeds an optimistic social faith, and the twice born religious type whose motivation stems from a “sick-souled” pessimistic and sorrowful perspective on the world and lends itself to religious transformation and conversion. Another classic distinction follows the main ideological dimension outlined above: Fromm (1950) distinguishes between humanistic religiosity, which emphasizes human self-realization, and authoritarian religiosity which focuses on obedience. A third well-known classification describes four religious orientations: extrinsic religiosity involves viewing religiosity as a means to other, usually social, ends, intrinsic religiosity considers religion as an end in itself (Allport & Ross, 1967), quest-focused religiosity treats religion as an ongoing search for truth (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991) while fundamentalist religiosity connotes a literal certainty in a particular set of religious truths (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Since each of these orientations is considered to reflect a distinct dimension, various combinations are possible, such as high extrinsic/high intrinsic religiosity.

Contemporary empirically-grounded typologies of religion have been making a comeback, and we will consider two of them here, both reported at length in Wulff (2019) , and both reflecting nationally- and culturally-limited data sources. First, in a study of 1186 Swiss Christians (Stolz et al., 2014/2016), researchers identified four types: institutional, (core members of religious communities); alternative (spiritual and experiential rather than religiously faithful); distanced (religiously affiliated, but minimally so) and secular (who claim no religious beliefs or practices but are nevertheless engaged in existential concerns and social action). This typology seems to reflect the classic division into religious, spiritual and secular, with an added category of distanced, who are uninvolved and less principled in all of these directions.

Second, in a study based solely on a US sample conducted by Pew Research Center 2018, seven types emerged in a cluster analysis: (1) Sunday Stalwarts are active traditionalists in their faith and congregational involvement; (2) God-and-Country Believers tend to hold strongly Republican political opinions; (3) Diversely Devout, are traditionally religious but also embrace New-Age beliefs; (4) Relaxed Religious say religion is important to them but seldom engage in religious practices; (5) Spiritually Awake subscribe to New-Age beliefs and seldom engage in traditional religious practices; (6) Religion Resisters are convinced that religious organizations do more harm than good, and (7) Solidly Secular reject both traditional and New-Age beliefs. This typology seems to reflect a nuanced version of the 2X2 religious-spiritual mapping in that types 1, 2 and 4 are religious but not spiritual, with differences in levels of religious commitment and meaning, type 3 is religious and spiritual, type 5 is spiritual but not religious and types 6 and 7 are neither spiritual nor religious.

Spiritual orientations too have been sub-categorized and the term has been used in many ways (Huss, 2014). MacDonald (2000) views spirituality as an inherently experiential and intrinsically religious construct, which is multidimensional and includes complex experiential, cognitive, affective, physiological, behavioral, and social components. Another classification sets spirituality apart from mysticism (characterized by loss of self-boundaries and a sense of unity with the “beyond” [Hood, 1975]). One can distinguish between spiritual individuals who affirm a vertical transcendence, and those who affirm a horizontal transcendence, the latter being an immanent form of spirituality. Others parse spirituality into multiple dimensions. For example, Elkis et al. (1988) categorized the transcendental dimension, the sacredness of life, altruism and six other dimensions of spirituality.

5.4 The Distinctiveness of Contemporary Worldviews

In Chap. 3 of this volume, we presented five distinct global prototypes from our analysis of the sorts conducted by all participants in all countries (N = 562). These were named: (1) Secular Humanist (GP1); (2) Active Confident Believer (GP2); (3) Noncommitted Traditionalist (GP3); (4) Spiritually Attuned (GP4) and (5) Disengaged Liberal (GP5). We use abbreviations GP1-GP5 for these when needed. The global prototypes on the one hand reflected Wulff’s (2019) original prototypes, and on the other hand most of the 57 country specific prototypes could be matched to them and suggested a form of family resemblance across cultures. We can conclude that the five distinct global prototypes represent ideal-types and a typology of (non-)religious worldviews.

A closer look at the five prototypes reveals a general pattern rooted in the well-known distinction between the secular, the religious and the spiritual, with GP1 and GP5 appearing ‘secular’; GP2 and GP3 appearing ‘religious’, and GP4 appearing ‘spiritual’. In addition, our results overlap considerably with the four types of Stolz et al. (2014/2016), with GP2 mapping onto their ‘institutional’ category, GP4 their ‘alternative’ category, GP1 their ‘secular’ category, with GP3 being a possible variation on their ‘distanced’ category and GP 5 being ‘distanced’ in a different way (i.e. disengaged from full commitment to liberal values). However, there are two important differences when we compare our results with Stolz et al. (2014/2016): we identify two and not only one prototype as religious (see Chap. 3 of this volume).

In order to understand more fully differences between the five prototypes, we will explore how each prototype is distinct from the other prototypes, through an analysis of how each prototype orients towards specific statements. In a study with FQS , all 101 statements are ranked between +4 and −4. Naturally, some statements are ranked highly by all prototypes, and thus represent shared characteristics of the viewpoints. For example, statement 77 “Is profoundly touched by the suffering of others” is ranked +3 in all prototypes. Other statements might be ranked highly by just one prototype, playing either no role or a negative role for the other prototypes. Such statements can help us distinguish the prototypes from each other, and we will first explore our prototypes from this perspective.

The three statements that most clearly distinguish the Secular Humanist global prototype (GP1) from the others are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Distinct features of global prototype 1 Secular Humanist (GP1)
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This result indicates that persons of this secular prototype stand out from people of other prototypes through their identification with the statements in Table 5.1. GP1 represents a worldview that affirms an outspoken trust in scientific reasoning, a view of religion as an all-too-human creation, and – consistent with both – no trace of a ‘keen awareness’ of any divine presence. From Table 5.1 we can also see that this contrasts most clearly with the rankings of GB2’s Active Confident Believer. In this respect, GP1 and GP2 reflect diametrically opposed worldviews on the truth of divinity versus the power of rationality. They clearly differ on what can be considered valid and reliable sources of knowledge. Next, we consider those statements that most clearly distinguish GP2 Active Confident Believer from the other prototypes.

From the point of view of GP2 Active Confident Believer, matters of truth and knowledge are not necessarily given highest priority. Rather, Table 5.2 indicates GP2’s emphasis on religious practice and identity. GP2 is hence alone amongst the prototypes in claiming a consistent religious identity at the core of their being, maintained in religious/spiritual practices. This prototype also strongly affirms statement 53 “Believes in a divine being with whom one can have a personal relationship”, but because this feature also appears as important in other prototypes (e.g. GP5), it is not uniquely distinctive of GP2.

Table 5.2 Distinct features of global prototype 2 Active Confident Believer (GP2)
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Turning to global prototype 3 Noncommitted Traditionalist, we find that by contrast, that statement 53 ranks negatively. Even though GP3 can also be seen as a religious prototype, persons of this prototype are in many ways different from the Active Confident Believer. Table 5.3 shows three of the statements that most clearly distinguish GP3 “Noncommitted Traditionalist” from the other prototypes.

Table 5.3 Distinct features of global prototype 3 Noncommitted Traditionalist (GP3)
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For global prototype 3 the Noncommitted Traditionalist, we find that notions about religion, nation and tradition are at the center of this worldview and further coupled with a trust in a higher justice that will take effect as punishment or suffering for those “who do not live righteously”. This form of religiosity is clearly different from the one affirmed by GP2, yet it is also defined by thinking that “the meaning of religious texts and teachings” is “clear and true” (FQS15), and “that men and women are by nature intended for different roles” (FQS54). Several of these statements connote in-group and tradition-related perceptions of what is moral. According to Haidt (2007, p. 1001), such statements are often affirmed by members of traditional societies and by religious and cultural conservatives in Western societies.

In many respects, global prototype 4 the Spiritually Attuned stands in clear contrast to GP3. This is evident from Table 5.3, and by the opposed rankings of “Feels that one should remain loyal to the religion of one’s nation” (FQS46) and “Takes comfort in thinking that those who do not live righteously will face suffering or punishment” (FQS99). These statements divide people on worldviews. The chief distinguishing statements for global prototype 4 Spiritually Attuned are listed in Table 5.4. For example, the worldview associated with this prototype connotes the centrality of nature, and is characterized by openness, harmony and inclusivity. In other respects, GP4 contrasts with GP2 (and comes closer to GP3), affirming the idea of “the ultimate as a life force or creative energy” (FQS9) over the belief in “a divine being with whom one can have a personal relationship” (FQS53). Other aspects again can be considered in light of Haidt’s (2007) moral foundation of “sanctity” that might be endorsed by persons of this prototype. How should we comprehend these, since they align with on the one hand notions of sanctity representative of traditional societies in Haidt’s perspective, and on the other hand post-materialist ideals about modernist and liberal nature (Inglehart’s view et al., 2014)?

Table 5.4 Distinct features of global prototype 4 Spiritually Attuned
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Where does all this leave us with global prototype 5, the Disengaged Liberal? Earlier we indicated that this can be seen as a prototype reflecting a secular worldview, but it can equally be interpreted as religious in a way. This is somewhat contradictory, but evident from how persons of this prototype tend to affirm statement 28 “believes in some way, but does not view him- or herself as religious”. Yet, they tend to distance themselves from things that are important to GP2 Active Confident Believer, such as the notions of being an “an active, contributing member of a religious or a spiritual community ” (FQS97), willingly giving “up worldly or bodily pleasures for religious or spiritual reasons” (FQS98), and claiming that “his or her sexuality is strongly guided by a religious or spiritual outlook” (FQS59). In contrast, they tend to agree with statements that are more characteristic of a secular worldview, such as “Views religious content as metaphoric, rather than literally true” (FQS87), and “Considers all religious scriptures to be outdated or misguided” (FQS32).

A tension between the religious and the secular is also evident from the examples in Table 5.5 addressing distinct features of global prototype 5 The Disengaged Liberal. In spite of the fact that distancing views on religion define this prototype, we note a significant tendency to self-identify as religious or spiritual on certain occasions, but this does not affect the social life of persons of this prototype in any obvious ways. This brings to mind Stolz et al.’s (2014/2016) typology of four religious types, one of which was termed distanced and was described as religiously affiliated, but minimally so. It is possible that the distanced perspective comes in various cultural varieties. For example, in less traditional societies, detached liberals may be ‘distanced’ from the enthusiasm of devout secularists or religionists, and so ‘waver’ in their convictions. In more traditional societies, the ‘distanced’ prototype might reflect individuals who ‘pass’ as religious in their community but don’t actually believe. Maybe we can claim that the dichotomy between the religious and the secular is not relevant to persons of this prototype and does not contribute to how it is formed to any great degree.

Table 5.5 Distinct features of global prototype 5 The Disengaged Liberal
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Reviewing the statements that define the five prototypes, we can conclude that a simple typology of secular, religious and spiritual, whilst certainly apparent, is not sufficient to make sense of our findings. We can see that being religious clearly unfolds in at least two different ways in this analysis, and that there is a separate prototype global prototype 5, the Disengaged Liberal that seems to be both secular and religious or, put another way, neither secular nor religious. In Chap. 3 of this volume, we described this worldview as situational. This gives rise to the question of whether we need to bring into the discussion of worldview typologies notions of category-fuzziness. For instance, af Burén (2015) has addressed what she describes as “simultaneities of religious identities” referring to the “both/and” character of everyday religious and secular identifications, where elements from various worldviews are combined in personal outlooks on life in different ways (Kalsky & van der Braak, 2017). Our study may be supporting such an interpretation of religious subjectivities.

For GP4 Spiritually Attuned, the distinguishing items were less polarized (unlike other prototypes, we could not clearly show that it gravitated toward statements ranked as +4 that were simultaneously repellent to all other prototypes and hence ranked negatively). This indicates that the distinctiveness of this particular worldview is less marked than the other prototypes, and that there are more shared elements. We indicated above that some previous research suggests that religious and spiritual worldviews share features which contrast them with secular worldviews. Our findings suggest that this may be incorrect. Factor score correlations between the prototypes in Table 5.6 show the highest correlation between the global prototype 1 Secular Humanist and global prototype 4 the Spiritually Attuned (r = .59). The correlation between the latter and global prototype 2 Active Confident Believer, by contrast, is low (r = .17). Even though spirituality is not necessarily very distinct as a worldview, the distinctiveness of the spiritual worldview is still marked in relation to religious worldviews rather than to secular ones. Global prototype 1 Secular Humanist and global prototype 2 Active Confident Believer are negatively correlated (r = −.27), and this indicates as discussed in Chap. 3 of this volume that the dichotomy between religiosity versus secularity represents one clear dimension.

Table 5.6 Factor score correlations for global prototypes
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5.5 Towards a Differentiation of Religious Worldviews

As we have learnt from the above, it is not evident how to define the essence of religion, and some additional observations can help us gain a more differentiated comprehension. The four major B’s of religion (Saroglou, 2011) are represented by the FQS statements, and can help us reveal more about how the prototypes differ from each other. The four dimensions Believing (in a “truth”), Behaving (“virtuously”), Belonging (to “transhistorical” groups), and Bonding (with “transcending realities”) are understood to be universal and hence constitutive for religious typologies (Saraglou, 2011).

The dimension Believing, stands out as a strong organizing dimension among our five prototypes. From looking at a sub-set of statements pertaining to the notion of belief, we can identify a simple ordering of the prototypes (see Stenner et al., 2000, p. 449). The general pattern GP2 > GP3 > GP5 > GP4 > GP1 is presented in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Ranking of prototypes on aspects of ‘believing’
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The dimension at play here appears to express the degree of epistemic commitment to the enduring value of religious precepts, and one can ask if such a dimension is given enough importance in capturing worldview differences. In this respect, it is notable that exactly this order of relationships can be discovered in the correlations between GP1 and the other prototypes, as shown in Table 5.6 on factor score correlations for global prototypes. Hence, GP1 correlates highest with GP4 at 0.6, indicating that these two prototypes share the closest relationship, justifying the placing of GP4 next to GP1. The next highest correlation is with GP5 (at 0.5), then GP 3 (0.1). Finally, the placement of GP2 at the other pole of the dimension is justified by the fact that GP2 is negatively correlated with GP1 at −0.3. Hence, showing these correlations with GP1, we have: GP2 (−0.3), GP3 (0.1), GP5 (0.5), GP4 (0.6) and GP2 (1).

The dimension Belonging does not come out as an equally strong and dividing dimension between the five prototypes. Rather, this dimension exemplifies well how the combination of dimensions creates differences between different types of religiosity. The dimension of Belonging is also represented by several statements. Being “an active, contributing member of a religious or a spiritual community ” (FQS97) is negatively ranked in all prototypes, except in the case of Active Confident Believer (GP2). GP2 is the only prototype that expresses a clear and positive identification with this notion. The emphasis of a religious or spiritual identity (FQS16) replicates more or less this pattern. Yet, when we turn to other expressions of religious belonging in the FQS , GP3 stands out among the prototypes. This is the only prototype that identifies strongly and positively with the importance of remaining “loyal to the religion of one’s nation” (FQS46) and maintaining “continuity of the religious traditions of family and ancestors” (FQS58). Table 5.8 shows the ranking of global prototypes on aspects of belonging.

Table 5.8 Ranking of prototypes on aspects of ‘belonging’
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The dimension Belonging catches well central differences, and varying forms of identifications with real or imagined communities affect ways of being religious. Political and historical circumstances probably contribute to these differences, but we can also raise another question. Is this an example of how our global prototypes emerge from differences in how the dimensions are emphasized and combined? GP3 is rather unique in both its strong emphases of the need to value and safeguard one’s own purity (FQS48) and in taking “comfort in thinking that those who do not live righteously will face suffering or punishment“ (FQS99). These are both viewpoints that might be interpreted to catch something essential from the dimension Behaving, i.e. issues around correct behavior in terms of priorities “given to interpersonal versus impersonal morality” (Saraglou, 2011, p. 1333). People of these prototypes tend to take opposite positions on these issues, and GP3 seems to express the dimension Behaving more. In comparison, the bonding dimension is central to GP2. This is, according to Saraglou (2011, p. 1332), a matter of “the specific emotional quality” that is “experienced through the connection with the transcendence”. If we look at statements such as “feels personally protected and guided by a spiritual being” (FQS74) and “engages regularly in religious or spiritual practices in private” (FQS23), they are rather unique to GP2, where they are both ranked +4. Naturally, these statements are ranked negatively in global prototype Secular Humanist (GP1), but this is also the case for Noncommitted Traditionalist (GP3). Bonding is not defining this prototype.

From the above one can conclude that both global prototypes 2 and 3 (Active Confident Believer and Noncommitted Traditionalist) to some extent express essential aspects of what is usually understood as essential to being religious. They both reflect the dimension believing well, and are thus also positively correlated to each other. This means that they both also represent a clear contrast to the global prototype Secular Humanist (GP1), and in one case present a negative correlation (see Table 5.6). Still, where the global prototype Active Confident Believer expresses a personal engagement, the global prototype Noncommitted Traditionalist embraces religiosity more as part of their identification with nation and tradition.

5.6 Discussion

In this chapter, we explored the results from our FQS study across 12 countries globally, in light of some key typologies in the Study of Religions. This enabled us to consider the use of a number of general principles for comprehending the variations presented in our data. The emergent self-categorization of the FQS method enables new ways of identifying, describing and distinguishing diverse worldviews from the bottom-up. Still, we need to keep in mind that Q-methodology is not concerned with generalizations from sample to population (e.g. it does not inquire after the proportion of a larger population that is associated with each prototype). The results are not about making claims like ‘the large majority of birds are pigeons’, but rather should be thought of in terms of establishing that ‘ravens exist’ (and offering a description of what they look like).

In this chapter, we investigated more in detail the five global prototypes which we have identified in our project: the Secular Humanist; the Active Confident Believer; the Noncommitted Traditionalist; the Spiritually Attuned; and the Disengaged Liberal. These global prototypes represent ideal types, each containing diverse variations of characteristic family resemblances that are exemplified across the countries that we included in this study. These represented two ways of being religious which were clearly distinct from each other in many respects. The global prototype 2 Active Confident Believer was clearly anchored in the notion of personal theistic belief, whereas this was not the case for the other religious global prototype Noncommitted Traditionalist where the personal was diminished and the external authority of traditions and national religious identity lay at the core. With reference to Saroglou (2011), bonding was central to the first and some measure of belonging to the latter.

We further demonstrated that the global prototype 4 Spiritually Attuned was distinct in relation to the religious prototypes (GP2 and GP3), and presented a closer proximity to the global prototype 1 Secular Humanist. Spirituality stands out as an independent type that involves universalism, seeking, open-mindedness and uncertainty in addition to the previously identified sense of vertical or horizontal transcendence (Huss, 2014). It is in some ways closer to Batson’s “Quest” orientation than to a classic framing of spirituality, especially considering that Batson’s Quest scale measures primarily complexity, doubt, and tentativeness (Wulff, 1997). In contrast, the global prototype Disengaged Liberal can be described as a prototype based on simultaneity, i.e. a lived everyday life based tendency to combine elements from prototypes of both religious, spiritual and secular character.

In revisiting the classic typologies pertaining to religiosity, our findings indicate that a simplistic religiosity-non-religiosity continuum – whilst pertinent to a limited extent – does not capture the full richness of worldviews on this topic. The four dimensions behaving, believing, belonging and bonding proved to be central for classifying worldviews that pertain to the realm of spirit and religion. Our prototypes seemed to be dependent of a variety of emphases and combinations of these. Our results can be seen as a consequence of the fact that worldviews are complex by nature; they often display inconsistencies with regards to the distilled and idealized theoretical notions we use to comprehend the patterns of variation. Even though our prototypes clearly express different perspectives, we need to comprehend them as a continuum where, for example, being more or less religious intersects with and is dependent of other aspects of worldview typologies. This complexity is further affected by the fact that religiosity is multidimensional.

Our results are of course limited by our method, and in practice by the design of the Faith Q-Sort. Still, based on our results we would like to suggest that our findings also do reflect the relevance of general worldview typologies. The four dimensions of religion do not necessarily reflect something essential to religion only. When comparing this grounded bottom-up finding to previous worldview classifications, we see that the openness/certainty which we identified corresponds more or less to a number of these proposals. It corresponds to some extent to “attitude to authority sources” as a set of dimensions; Tomkins’ (1964) normativism-humanism axis (Nilsson & Jost, 2017), Inglehart et al.’s (2014) traditional vs. secular/rational dimension; and Sauciers (2000) traditionalism vs. skepticism.

We would also like to raise the question of to what extent we should account for an “attitude to others”. The belonging dimension in religiosity catches relevant differences on a general level with regards, i.e. to how different ways of being religious are affected by social priorities and attitudes. Yet, with reference to Fromm’s (1950) classification of religiosity into humanistic and authoritarian, we can address the relevance of viewing other people as “of us” or “not of us”, i.e. humanist view of people (= universalistic) versus a particularistic view. This applies to several meanings given to belonging and in-group versus out-group attitude, but potentially also to tendencies to embrace pluralism. Further, the division between the religious and the secular in our study as determined by the believing dimension can also be viewed as a more general epistemic question. What sources of authority are used or trusted when acquiring knowledge and meaning? Alongside this epistemic dimension, we can also address the exclusivity of these sources versus the degree of open-mindedness and reflexivity that might reflect how epistemic priorities intersect with social ones.

Our bottom-up approach based on the Faith Q-Sort has affirmed that worldview typologies are multidimensional and emerge as a variation of how several dimensions are combined and emphasized. Even though it seems to be possible to identify significant dimensions at play in different worldviews, our findings seem to disappoint our hopes to answer what the essence of religion is. Already from our global bird’s eye’s view we find two different religious prototypes that differ from each other. The dynamic and taxonomy associated with family resemblance (see Chap. 4 in this volume) might help us comprehend why the typology at play seems to be not only multidimensional but also a complex, liquid and open-ended feature. The FQS also makes evident that at what distance and where we look affect what we see. Any worldview is in reality much more diverse and nuanced than any typology can do justice to.