Abstract
Recently, Aranha et al. (Eurocrypt 2020) as well as Fischlin and Günther (CT-RSA 2020) investigated the possibility to model memory fault attacks like Rowhammer in security games, and to deduce statements about the (in)security of schemes against such attacks. They looked into the fault-resistance of signature and AEAD schemes. Here, we extend the approach to the TLS 1.3 key exchange protocol.
Our results give a mixed picture about the fault resistance of TLS 1.3. Full fault attacks on the handshake protocol, where the adversary can modify the content of variables arbitrarily, render the protocol completely insecure. On the positive side we argue that differential faults, where the adversary can flip selected memory cells, do not seem to be harmful to key derivation in the pre-shared-key mode for the handshake. The weaker random fault attacks, where some bits in memory are flipped randomly, still enable successful attacks against the record layer. We therefore present a slight modification for the nonce generation in TLS 1.3 which withstands such attacks.
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Notes
- 1.
The terms \(\mathsf {IV}\) and nonce are often used interchangeably in the literature. In the context of TLS 1.3 we usually adopt the approach to let the nonce be derived from the \(\mathsf {IV}\) value \({write\_iv} \) together with the sequence number.
- 2.
While the \({PSK} \) can in principle be derived out-of-band, TLS 1.3 emphasizes that low-entropy and non-uniformly distributed secrets like passwords are susceptible to offline attacks.
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Acknowledgments
We thank the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments. Marc Fischlin has been [co-]funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) – SFB 1119 – 236615297.
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Brandstetter, L., Fischlin, M., Schröder, R.L., Yonli, M. (2020). On the Memory Fault Resilience of TLS 1.3. In: van der Merwe, T., Mitchell, C., Mehrnezhad, M. (eds) Security Standardisation Research. SSR 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12529. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64357-7_1
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