Abstract
Memory fault attacks, inducing errors in computations, have been an ever-evolving threat to cryptographic schemes since their discovery for cryptography by Boneh et al. (Eurocrypt 1997). Initially requiring physical tampering with hardware, the software-based rowhammer attack put forward by Kim et al. (ISCA 2014) enabled fault attacks also through malicious software running on the same host machine. This led to concerning novel attack vectors, for example on deterministic signature schemes, whose approach to avoid dependency on (good) randomness renders them vulnerable to fault attacks. This has been demonstrated in realistic adversarial settings in a series of recent works. However, a unified formalism of different memory fault attacks, enabling also to argue the security of countermeasures, is missing yet.
In this work, we suggest a generic extension for existing security models that enables a game-based treatment of cryptographic fault resilience. Our modeling specifies exemplary memory fault attack types of different strength, ranging from random bit-flip faults to differential (rowhammer-style) faults to full adversarial control on indicated memory variables. We apply our model first to deterministic signatures to revisit known fault attacks as well as to establish provable guarantees of fault resilience for proposed fault-attack countermeasures. In a second application to nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption, we provide the first fault-attack treatment of the SIV mode of operation and give a provably secure fault-resilient variant.
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Notes
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The adversary can opt to not modify the variable by returning a special symbol \(\bot \).
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One can also argue that the notions form a strict hierarchy (i.e., that the reverse implications do not hold), if used to attack cryptographic schemes. E.g., bending an \(\mathcal {A}\)-known \(\lambda \)-bit string x to some random string r (say, to trigger randomness reuse in a scheme) is easily achieved via full faults, but only with probability \(2^{-\lambda /2}\) for differential faults with \(w=\lambda /2\). Similarly, flipping \(w=\lambda /2\) bits in x to 0 is easy with w-differential faults, but hard with random faults.
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For completeness, observe that the fault attack described in the following applies also when introducing faults into r instead of m. Due to the usually larger size of m, facilitating bit flips in m through row-hammer attacks, we focus on faulting m, but note that similar results apply for faulting r.
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Note that we treat the underlying (randomized) signature scheme \(\mathcal {S}\) as well as the hash function \(\mathsf {H}\) in a black-box manner both for the positive fault resilience results here, as well as for the generic fault attacks on \(\mathcal {S}_\mathsf {dr}\) before. Of course, studying the fault resilience of specific such constructions is a valuable target on its own, which we leave for future work.
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Alternatively, one may include r as additional component in the ciphertext. This however degrades security to real-or-random indistinguishability in case of weak randomness values r.
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Analogous to the signature case in Theorem 2, the first part of the statement again only serves as a baseline result. It shows that \(\mathsf {SIV\$}\) provides at least the security of SIV even if the added randomness \(r'\) is completely flawed.
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Acknowledgments
Felix Günther is supported in part by Research Fellowship grant GU 1859/1-1 of the German Research Foundation (DFG) and National Science Foundation (NSF) grants CNS-1526801 and CNS-1717640. This work has been co-funded by the DFG as part of project P2 within the CRC 1119 CROSSING. Most of the work on this paper was done while Felix Günther was at UC San Diego.
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Fischlin, M., Günther, F. (2020). Modeling Memory Faults in Signature and Authenticated Encryption Schemes. In: Jarecki, S. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020. CT-RSA 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12006. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40186-3_4
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