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A Brief History of Social Choice and Welfare Theory

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Conversations on Social Choice and Welfare Theory - Vol. 1

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

A brief history of social choice and welfare theory.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Condorcet never mentions Borda, he mentions instead ‘a famous Geometer’ (un ‘Géomètre célèbre’).

  2. 2.

    See Peleg (1984), Taylor and Zwicker (1999), Peleg and Peters (2010).

  3. 3.

    Some recent textbooks on logic devote a chapter to social choice, for instance Hansson and Hendricks (2018) and de Swart (2018).

  4. 4.

    Many important recent studies in inequality and poverty such as those of, for instance, Thomas Piketty and Esther Duflo pertain to positive rather than normative economics even if, for such topics, this dichotomous partition can be problematic because the frontier between the positive and the normative is rather fuzzy.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Marc Fleurbaey

  2. CREM (UMR-CNRS 6211), University of Caen-Normandy, 14032, Caen cedex, France

    Maurice Salles

  3. CPNSS, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AB, UK

    Maurice Salles

  4. Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Maurice Salles

Authors
  1. Marc Fleurbaey
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  2. Maurice Salles
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Correspondence to Marc Fleurbaey or Maurice Salles .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Marc Fleurbaey

  2. University of Caen-Normandy, Caen, France

    Maurice Salles

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Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M. (2021). A Brief History of Social Choice and Welfare Theory. In: Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M. (eds) Conversations on Social Choice and Welfare Theory - Vol. 1. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_1

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