Abstract
Philosophers have long debated the relative priority of thought and language, both at the deepest level, in asking what makes us distinctively human, and more superficially, in explaining why we find it so natural to communicate with words. The “linguistic turn” in analytic philosophy accorded pride of place to language in the order of investigation, but only because it treated language as a window onto thought, which it took to be fundamental in the order of explanation. The Chomskian linguistic program tips the balance further toward language, by construing the language faculty as an independent, distinctively human biological mechanism. In Ignorance of Language, Devitt attempts to swing the pendulum back toward the other extreme, by proposing that thought itself is fundamentally sentential, and that there is little or nothing for language to do beyond reflecting the structure and content of thought. I argue that both thought and language involve a greater diversity of function and form than either the Chomskian model or Devitt’s antithesis acknowledge. Both thought and language are better seen as complex, mutually supporting suites of interacting abilities.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Allwein, G., and J. Barwise, eds. 1996. Logical reasoning with diagrams. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Asher, N., and A. Lascarides. 2003. Logics of conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bach, K. 1999. The myth of conventional implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy 22: 367–421.
Bach, K., and R. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bermudez, J.L. 2003. Thinking without words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brandom, R. 1983. Asserting. Noûs 17 (4): 637–650.
Brock, J. 2007. Language abilities in Williams syndrome: A critical review. Development and Psychopathology 19: 97–127.
Camp, E. 2007. Thinking with maps. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 145–182.
———. 2009a. A language of baboon thought? In The philosophy of animal minds, ed. R. Lurz, 108–127. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2009b. Putting thoughts to work: Concepts, systematicity, and stimulus-independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2): 275–311.
———. 2013. Slurring perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3): 330–349.
———. 2015. Logical concepts and associative characterizations. In The conceptual mind: New directions in the study of concepts, ed. E. Margolis and S. Laurence, 591–621. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2016. Conventions’ revenge: Davidson, derangement, and dormativity. Inquiry 59 (1): 113–138.
———. 2018a. Why cartography is not propositional. In Non-propositional intentionality, ed. A. Grzankowski and M. Montague, 19–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2018b. Slurs as dual-act expressions. In Bad words, ed. D. Sosa, 29–59. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Camp, E., and E. Shupe. 2017. Instrumental reasoning in non-human animals. In The Routledge handbook of philosophy and animal minds, ed. J. Beck and K. Andrews, 100–108. London: Routledge.
Carruthers, P. 1998. Thinking in language? Evolution and a modularist possibility. In Language and thought, ed. P. Carruthers and J. Boucher, 94–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2003. On Fodor’s problem. Mind and Language 18 (5): 502–523.
Casati, R., and A. Varzi. 1999. Parts and places: The structures of spatial representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Charlow, N. 2015. Prospects for an expressivist theory of meaning. Philosophers’ Imprint 15: 1–43.
Cheney, D.L., and R.M. Seyfarth. 2007. Baboon metaphysics: The evolution of a social mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clark, H.H., and J.E. Fox Tree. 2002. Using ‘uh’ and ‘um’ in spontaneous speaking. Cognition 84: 73–111.
Davidson, D. 1986. A nice derangement of epitaphs. In Truth and interpretation: Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. E. Lepore, 433–446. New York: Blackwell.
De Toffoli, S. 2017. ‘Chasing’ the diagram: The use of visualizations in algebraic reasoning. The Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1): 158–186.
Devitt, M. 2006. Ignorance of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dummett, M. 1989. Language and communication. In Reflections on Chomsky, ed. A. George, 192–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1994. Origins of analytical philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Elwert, F. 2013. Graphical causal models. In Handbook of causal analysis for social research, ed. S.L. Morgan, 245–273. New York: Springer.
Embick, D., A. Marantz, Y. Miyashita, W. O’Neil, and K.L. Sakai. 2000. A syntactic specialization for Broca’s area. PNAS 97 (11): 6150–6154.
Evans, J.St.B.T., and D.E. Over. 1996. Rationality and reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press.
Fiddick, L., L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby. 2000. No interpretation without representation: The role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task. Cognition 77: 1–79.
Fodor, J. 1987. Why there still has to be a language of thought. In J. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind, 135–154. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2007. The revenge of the given. In Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, ed. B.P. McLaughlin and J.D. Cohen, 105–116. Oxford: Blackwell.
Fodor, J., and Z. Pylyshyn. 1988. Connectionism and the cognitive architecture of mind. Cognition 28: 3–71.
Franconeri, S.L., J.M. Scimeca, J.C. Roth, S.A. Helseth, and L.E. Kahn. 2012. Flexible visual processing of spatial relationships. Cognition 122: 210–227.
Giardino, V., and G. Greenberg. 2014. Introduction: Varieties of iconicity. Review of Philosophical Psychology 6 (1): 1–25.
Gopnik, A., C. Glymour, D.M. Sobel, L.E. Schulz, T. Kushnir, and D. Danks. 2004. A theory of causal learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review 111 (1): 3–32.
Green, M.S. 2007. Self-expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Syntax and semantics volume 3: Speech acts, ed. P. Cole and J.L. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
Groenendijk, J., and M. Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1): 39–100.
Hauser, M.D., N. Chomsky, and W.T. Fitch. 2002. The language faculty: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298: 1569–1579.
Heim, I. 1983. File change semantics and the familiarity theory of definiteness. In Meaning, use and interpretation of language, ed. R. Bäuerle, C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, 164–189. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Horn, L. 2014. Information structure and the landscape of (non-)at-issue meaning. In The Oxford handbook of information structure, ed. C. Féry and S. Ishihara, 108–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Israel, M. 2011. The Grammar of polarity: Pragmatics, sensitivity, and the logic of scales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, K. 2004. On the systematicity of language and thought. The Journal of Philosophy 101 (3): 111–139.
Johnson-Laird, P. 2005. Mental models and thought. In The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning, ed. K.J. Holyoak and R.G. Morrison, 185–208. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kehler, A. 2004. Discourse coherence. In Handbook of pragmatics, ed. L.R. Horn and G. Ward, 241–265. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Koechlin, E., and T. Jubault. 2006. Broca’s area and the hierarchical organization of human behavior. Neuron 50: 963–974.
Krifka, M. 1995. The semantics and pragmatics of polarity items. Linguistic Analysis 25: 209–257.
Lackey, J. 2007. Norms of assertion. Noûs 41 (4): 594–626.
Ladusaw, W.A. 1979. Polarity sensitivity as inherent scope relations. PhD dissertation, University of Texas, Austin.
Lemon, O., and I. Pratt. 1997. Spatial logic and the complexity of diagrammatic reasoning. Machine Graphics and Vision 6 (1): 89–108.
Locke, J. 1689. An essay concerning human understanding. London: Thomas Bassett.
Ludlow, P. 2009. Review of Devitt’s Ignorance of language. Philosophical Review 118 (3): 393–402.
MacEachren, A. 2004. How maps work: Representation, visualization, and design. New York: Guilford Press.
MacFarlane, J. 2011. What is assertion? In Assertion, ed. J. Brown and H. Cappelen, 79–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marchette, S., J. Ryan, and R. Epstein. 2017. Schematic representations of local environmental space guide goal-directed navigation. Cognition 158: 68–80.
McCready, E. 2008. What man does. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6): 671–724.
———. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicature. Semantics and Pragmatics 3 (8): 1–57.
McGeer, V., and P. Pettit. 2002. The self-regulating mind. Language and Communication 22: 281–299.
Morgan, L., S. MacEvoy, G. Aguirre, and R. Epstein. 2011. Distances between real-world locations are represented in the human hippocampus. The Journal of Neuroscience 31 (4): 1238–1245.
Moro, A., M. Tettamanti, D. Perani, C. Donati, S. Cappa, and F. Fazio. 2001. Syntax and the brain: Disentangling grammar by selective anomalies. NeuroImage 13: 110–118.
Murray, S. 2014. Varieties of update. Semantics and Pragmatics 7 (2): 1–53.
Murray, S., and W. Starr. 2020. The structure of communicative acts. Linguistics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09289-0.
Musolino, J., and B. Landau. 2012. Genes, language, and the nature of scientific explanations: The case of Williams syndrome. Cognitive Neuropsychology 29 (1–2): 123–148.
Musso, M., A. Moro, V. Glauche, M. Rijintjes, J. Reichenbach, C. Büchel, and C. Weiller. 2003. Broca’s area and the language instinct. Nature Neuroscience 6 (7): 774–781.
Neale, S. 1999. Coloring and composition. In Philosophy and linguistics, ed. K. Murasugi and R. Stainton, 35–82. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Nowak, M.A., J.B. Plotkin, and V.A. Jansen. 2000. The evolution of syntactic communication. Nature 404: 495–498.
Patel, A.D. 2003. Language, music, syntax and the brain. Nature Neuroscience 6: 674–681.
Pearl, J. 2000. Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2009. Causal inference in statistics: An overview. Statistics Surveys 3: 96–146.
Pietroski, P., and S. Crain. 2012. The language faculty. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of cognitive science, ed. E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S.P. Stich, 361–381. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinker, S. 1999. Words and rules: The ingredients of language. New York: Basic Books.
Potts, C. 2005. The logic of conventional implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2007. The expressive dimension. Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2): 165–198.
Pratt, I. 1993. Map semantics. In Spatial information theory: A theoretical basis for GIS lecture notes in computer science, ed. A.U. Frank and I. Campari, 77–91. Berlin: Springer.
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rescorla, M. 2009. Predication and cartographic representation. Synthese 169: 175–200.
Rey, G. 1995. A not ‘merely empirical’ argument for the language of thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9: 201–222.
Rice, C. 2011. Massive modularity, content integration, and language. Philosophy of Science 78 (5): 800–812.
Roberts, C. 1996/2012. Information structure in discourse: Toward an integrated formal theory of pragmatics. Semantics and Pragmatics 5: 1–69.
———. 2018. Speech acts in discourse context. In New work on speech acts, ed. D. Fogal, D. Harris, and M. Moss, 317–359. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rossen, M.L., E.S. Klima, U. Bellugi, A. Bihrle, and W. Jones. 1996. Interaction between language and cognition: Evidence from Williams syndrome. In Language, learning, and behavior disorders: Developmental, biological, and clinical perspectives, ed. J.H. Beitchman, N. Cohen, M. Konstantareas, and R. Tannock, 367–392. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schmidhuber, J. 2015. Deep learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural Networks 61: 85–117.
Searle, J., and D. Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shin, S. 1994. The logical status of diagrams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siegel, M. 2002. Like: The discourse particle and semantics. Journal of Semantics 19: 35–71.
———. 2006. Biscuit conditionals: Quantification over potential literal acts. Linguistics and Philosophy 29: 167–203.
Simons, M., D. Beaver, J. Tonhauser, and C. Roberts. 2010. What projects and why. Proceedings of SALT 20: 309–327.
Sloman, A. 1978. The computer revolution in philosophy: Philosophy, science and models of mind. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Smith, N., I.-A. Tsimpli, and J. Ouhalla. 1993. Learning the impossible: The acquisition of possible and impossible languages by a polyglot savant. Lingua 91: 279–347.
Sorensen, R. 2007. Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2): 251–264.
Stalnaker, R. 1978. Assertion. In Syntax and semantics volume 9: Pragmatics, ed. P. Cole, 315–332. New York: Academic Press.
Szabo, Z. 2012. The case for compositionality. In The Oxford handbook of compositionality, ed. W. Hinzen, E. Machery, and M. Werning, 64–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tenenbaum, J., C. Kemp, T. Griffiths, and N. Goodman. 2011. How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction. Science 331: 1279–1285.
Tettamanti, M., I. Rotondi, D. Perani, G. Scotti, F. Fazio, S.F. Cappa, and A. Moro. 2009. Syntax without language: Neurobiological evidence for cross-domain syntactic computations. Cortex 45 (7): 825–838.
Thomas, M.S.C., and A. Karmiloff-Smith. 2005. Can developmental disorders reveal the component parts of the language faculty? Language Learning and Development 1: 65–92.
Tufte, E. 1983. The visual display of quantitative information. Connecticut: Graphics Press.
Veltman, F. 1996. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 221–261.
von Fintel, K. 1999. NPI-licensing, Strawson-entailment, and context-dependency. Journal of Semantics 16: 97–148.
Wittgenstein, L. 1921/2001. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Translated by D. Pears and B. McGuinness. New York: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Additional information
This article grew out of an Author Meets Critics session at the 2007 Pacific APA; thanks to audiences there, and especially to Michael Devitt. I also presented some of this material at the 2007 Workshop in Philosophy of Linguistics in Dubrovnik, addressing work by Peter Ludlow; thanks to audiences there, and especially to Peter Ludlow, Brian Epstein, and Gurpreet Rattan. Additional thanks to Josh Armstrong and Paul Pietroski, and to Carolina Flores for editorial work and advice.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Camp, E. (2020). Priorities and Diversities in Language and Thought. In: Bianchi, A. (eds) Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 142. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47641-0_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-47640-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-47641-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)