Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Conclusion: Implications of Judicial Power

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Two Faces of Judicial Power

  • 243 Accesses

Abstract

What are wider implications of the two faces of judicial power? In the concluding chapter I tentatively link both faces and summarize key findings of the study. The findings suggest the need to give greater weight to content-specific measures of judicial decision-making in order to understand judicial influence. Established explanations of judicial power are largely concerned with the strategic promotion of case characteristics that increase public awareness which enhances political compliance with decisions. An extended view, accounting for content-specific judicial choices, improves our assessment of the substantive political and societal influence of courts. Judicial power defined as a court’s ability to (threaten to) make decisions has implications for the judicialization of politics. Courts are able to vary the degree of the substantive judicialization showing all facets of the first face of judicial power. At the same time, a silent form of judicialization emerges fueled by courts showing the second face of judicial power.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Baum, L. (1976). Implementation of Judicial Decisions. An Organizational Analysis. American Politics Quarterly, 4(1), 86–114.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brouard, S. (2009). The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition. West European Politics, 32(2), 384–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christiansen, M.R., Eskridge Jr., W.N. (2014). Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011. Texas Law Review, 92, 1317–1515.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, T.S., Lauderdale, B. (2010). Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space. American Journal of Political Science, 54(4), 871–890.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, T.S., Lauderdale, B.E. (2012). The Genealogy of Law. Political Analysis, 20(3), 329–350.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corley, P.C., Wedeking, J. (2014). The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language. Law and Society Review, 48(1), 35–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easton, D. (1967). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engst, B.G. (2017). Die vierte Gesetzeslesung. Verfassungsgerichte des deutsch-österreichischen Modells als Vetospieler. In V. Frick, O. W. Lembcke, and R. Lhotta (Eds.) Politik und Recht. Umrisse eines politkwissenschaftlichen Forschungsfeldes (pp. 281–301). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engst, B.G., Gschwend, T., Schaks, N., Sternberg, S., Wittig, C. (2017). Zum Einfluss der Parteinähe auf das Abstimmungsverhalten der Bundesverfassungsrichter eine quantitative Untersuchung. Juristen Zeitung, 72(17), 816–826.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, L. (2016). Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior. William and Mary Law Review, 57(6), 2017–2073.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, L., Knight, J. (1998). The Choices Justices Make. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, L., Knight, J. (2000). Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead. Political Research Quarterly, 53(3), 625–661.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge Jr., W.N. (1991). Reneging on History. Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game. California Law Review, 79(3), 613–684.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fortunato, D., König, T., Proksch, S.O. (2013). Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution. Political Research Quarterly, 66(4), 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fowler, J.H., Jeon, S. (2008). The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent. Social Networks, 30(1), 16–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fowler, J.H., Johnson, T.R., Spriggs, J.F., Jeon, S., Wahlbeck, P.J. (2007). Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court. Political Analysis, 15(3), 324–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gawron, T. (2013). Das ferne Gericht. Wirkungsanalysen zum Verhältnis zwischen Bundersverfassungsgericht und Verwaltungsbehörden. In C. Boulanger, and M. Wrase (Eds.) Die Politik des Verfassungsrechts. Interdisziplinäre und vergleichende Perspektiven auf die Rolle und Funktion von Verfassungsgerichten (pp. 217–240). Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gawron, T., Rogowski, R. (2002). The Implementation of German Federal Constitutional Court Decisions. Judicial Orders and the Federal Legislature. In R. Rogowski, and T. Gawron (Eds.) Constitutional Courts in Comparison. The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court (pp. 239–256). New York: Berghahn Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanretty, C. (2013). The Decisions and Ideal Points of British Law Lords. British Journal of Political Science, 43(3), 703–716.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanretty, C. (2014). The Bulgarian Constitutional Court as an Additional Legislative Chamber. East European Politics and Societies, 28(3), 540–558.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirschl, R. (2008). The Judicialization of Politics. In G. A. Caldeira., D. R. Kelemen, and K. E. Whittington (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (pp. 119–141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hönnige, C. (2007). Verfassungsgericht, Regierung und Opposition. Die vergleichende Analyse eines Spannungsdreiecks. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hönnige, C. (2009). The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Judge Affects Oppositional Success at European Constitutional Courts. West European Politics, 32(5), 963–984.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hönnige, C. (2011). Beyond Judicialization: Why We Need More Comparative Research About Constitutional Courts. European Political Science, 10(3), 346–358.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hönnige, C., Gschwend, T. (2010). Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System der BRD ein unbekanntes Wesen? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 51(3), 507–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, K. (2013). Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts. German Law Journal, 14(8), 1345–1371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen, H. (2008). [1931] Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein? Abhandlungen zur Theorie der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der pluralistischen, parlamentarischen Demokratie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kranenpohl, U. (2010). Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses. Der Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozess des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, J.N. (2016). The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 990–1005.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landfried, C. (1985). The Impact of the German Federal Constitutional Court on Politics and Policy Output. Government and Opposition, 20(4), 522–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Landfried, C. (1992). Judicial Policy-Making in Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court. West European Politics, 15(3), 50–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2nd ed.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, A.D., Quinn, K.M. (2002). Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court , 1953–1999. Political Analysis, 10(2), 134–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G., Weingast, B.R. (1987). Adminsitrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3(2), 243–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raffaelli, R. (2012). Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States. European Parliament: Directorate General for Internal Policies (PE 462.470).

    Google Scholar 

  • Santoni, M., Zucchini, F. (2004). Does Policy Stability Increases the Constitutional Court’s Independence? The Case of Italy During the First Republic (1956–1992). Public Choice, 120, 439–461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spriggs, J.F.I. (1996). The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact. American Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 1122–1151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Staton, J.K. (2010). Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Staton, J.K., Vanberg, G. (2008). The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions. American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 504–519.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sternberg, S. (2019). No Public, No Power? Analyzing the Importance of Public Support for Constitutional Review with Novel Data and Machine Learning Methods. Mannheim: Dissertation—University of Mannheim.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sternberg, S., Gschwend, T., Wittig, C.E., Engst, B.G. (2015). Zum Einfluss der öffentlichen Meinung auf Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Eine Analyse von abstrakten Normenkontrollen sowie Bund-Länder-Streitigkeiten 1974–2010. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 56(4), 570–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone, A. (1992). The Birth of Judicial Politics in France. The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stone Sweet, A. (1998). A Comment on Vanberg: Rules, Dispute Resolution, and Strategic Behavior. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10(3), 327–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone Sweet, A. (2000). Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, G. (1998a). Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10(3), 299–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, G. (1998b). Reply to Stone Sweet. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10(3), 339–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, G. (2001). Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review. American Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 346–361.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, G. (2005). The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, G. (2015). Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment. Annual Review of Political Science, 18(1), 167–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wittig, C.E. (2016). The Occurrence of Separate Opinions at the Federal Constitutional Court: An Analysis with a Novel Database. Berlin: Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    Benjamin G. Engst

Authors
  1. Benjamin G. Engst
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Benjamin G. Engst .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Engst, B.G. (2021). Conclusion: Implications of Judicial Power. In: The Two Faces of Judicial Power. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46016-7_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation