Abstract
There are crucial differences between a political community and an organization, and between Aristotle’s polis and a modern liberal state. Rawls sees a just state as one that accommodates a variety of ideologies. Aristotle, who takes good citizenship to be crucial to virtue, advocates greater homogeneity in a polis. A good organization involves at least enough homogeneity to preserve it as a commons. The right kind of corporate culture facilitates the process. It calls for a style of management closer to Burns’s transformational, as opposed to transactional, leadership, though in recent years there have developed more sophisticated conceptions of leadership that go beyond transaction and are more like Aristotle’s views. The organization’s culture should affect its members’ second- or higher-order motivations, so that in the best cases they all want to be moved by the success of the good organization and by the interests of their fellow employees. It will also affect the local vocabulary, and how people frame. I have come to see the importance for this process of what Aristotle offers as a form of friendship that is more than transactional. That form of friendship is a good thing in itself, one of the benefits of a good life.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Pastin (1986) uses this metaphor to advantage, but on the issue of how to preserve the commons he and I have quite different views.
- 2.
This is not to suggest that managers can unilaterally create corporate cultures just as they wish.
- 3.
Cox (1985) shows that Hardin’s account does not describe what actually happened to common grazing land in medieval England. She says nothing damaging to my view of the commons problem.
- 4.
In actual communities people’s values may not be narrowly selfish, and may change over time. Solomon (1992, chapter 5, 48–64) claims that game theory’s standard problems make unsound assumptions, particularly about how a certain stark selfishness is natural. It will become clear that I agree with him about the unsound assumptions, but they do not make game theory useless to us.
- 5.
One can hold that this aggregate is no common good strictly speaking, yet still agree that the organization is analogously a commons. The collective action problems are no different, and my proffered solutions no less applicable. In a similar frame of mind, one might read Gauthier’s influential work (1986) as arguing that all of life is a commons and that the truly rational person is also moral—that is, contributes rather than take a free ride.
A good labor climate preserves the commons by minimizing free riding among both labor and management. A strike damages the commons in the short run; but that a company never has a strike suggests an imbalance of power between the parties, to the ultimate detriment of the commons. Rapoport and Chammah (1965) argue that the best strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is tit-for-tat: when your opponent profits at your expense, respond in kind in the next round only. This will likely lead to one worst-case outcome for both sides. Hence a strike or the equivalent will generate good outcomes if the selfish agent comes to see the consequences of continued selfish action. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) reply that if you tit every time you believe you have been tatted, you may be helping create a vendetta, and that therefore it is better to cut your adversary a bit of slack than to react vindictively.
- 6.
This is the sort of thing that some contemporary moral realists say of Bernard Williams (1985).
- 7.
The literature is vast. Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) give their own views and a summary of many others’. See Sathe (1985) and Schein (1985) for extensive treatments. Ray (1986) and Pastin (1986) consider how a strong culture may create moral problems.
In analyzing a culture we frame hypotheses that link the underlying beliefs and values with what is observable; but that link is not just a causal one, for some artifacts express the culture somewhat in the way words express thoughts. In that sense one interprets observable entities in understanding the culture.
- 8.
One standardly speaks of a corporate culture as being strong if it has a significant and pervasive homogenizing influence on employees’ behavior. There is reason to believe it does where employees behave very differently from the way they do outside the organization—as, for example, when behavior condemned elsewhere in our society is tolerated in a particular organization. Anthropologists do not normally speak of influential or strong cultures, because the notion of a social norm from which a certain culture deviates much or little makes no sense. Hence there are no applicable criteria for how strong that sort of culture is.
- 9.
- 10.
G. Dworkin (1988) allows autonomy where the first-order desire loses out to the second-order one; Frankfurt appears not to do so.
- 11.
On desires and character see Taylor (1977) and Williams (1981). I do not mean to suggest that all character traits can fairly be called higher-order desires; among other things, the strength of one’s will is part of one’s character. But traits like self-esteem and spitefulness will at the very least affect one’s second-order preferences as well as certain first-order desires. Sen (1987) attacks the implication of standard economic theory that desires of every order are exclusively selfish, that every choice one makes is motivated by a view of welfare that is entirely self-centered. That all one’s desires are self-centered suggests that there can be no dissonance between higher- and lower-order desires. Economists have not explicated this view, much less argued for it. See Etzioni (1988), Bowie (1991), and Solomon (1992) against the usual egoism of economics.
- 12.
Affecting second-order desires is not always an easy task. Fucini and Fucini (1990, 104) describe how Mazda management wanted the American employees in its new Flat Rock manufacturing facility to wear Mazda caps, but made the caps voluntary. The employees did not wear them, and the Japanese managers were unhappy with what they considered a sign of disrespect for the company. The employees responded by pointing out that the caps were voluntary, but what the managers wanted was precisely that the employees wear the caps voluntarily, and they tried to persuade the employees to do so. The employees, who would have worn the caps with minimal grumbling if so instructed, were offended at being expected to want to do it. The managers expected the American workers to adopt certain desires, and the Americans did not (second-order) want to have these desires, whereas their Japanese counterparts presumably would have (second-order) wanted to have them. As one might expect of people accustomed to adversarial management and collective bargaining, the Americans did not want their desires managed or their attitudes pre-empted.
- 13.
Contrary to empiricist epistemology, your belief that the cat is on the mat rests not just on seeing the cat on the mat but on a network of concepts and second-order beliefs. The analogy with first- and second-order desires is far from perfect, however. For it to be better, it would have to be possible for you to have a second-order belief that some specifiable first-order belief that you hold is false, and I do not see how that is possible.
- 14.
This is part of what Weick (1979 and elsewhere) means by saying that an organization is enacted.
- 15.
Watson (1982) criticizes Frankfurt on these grounds, and suggests that autonomy has to do with acting on the basis of values rather than any old desires, of any order. The relationships among higher-order desires, values, and one’s interests is beyond my scope; but I must note that if something is in your interests there is at least a presumption that you have a high-order desire for it, particularly if you are rational.
- 16.
Aristotle’s view that the good community is essential to the good life of man suggests that neither one’s identity nor one’s autonomy is entirely separate from one’s community, and that one’s autonomy is supported by the right kind of community and undermined by the wrong kind of community. By that reasoning, insofar as it is the modern person’s lot to live in an organization rather than a city-state, the management of the organization is of comparable moral importance, and business ethics is fairly important.
- 17.
The Greek word eudaimonia performs neither all nor only the functions performed by the English word happiness. All the same, Aristotle is making a point about a good life that involves happiness.
Aristotle’s talk about virtue cannot be readily translated into our talk about ethics. That we have made great progress since Aristotle is an inference that Solomon (1992) declines to draw. A discussion of virtue is beyond our scope, but my emphasis on the right kind of second-order disposition does have some implications that concern virtue.
- 18.
The clearest statement of this view is at Nicomachean Ethics II.3. One of the most influential recent proponents of the Aristotelian approach has been MacIntyre (1981). The form of utilitarianism Brink (1989) espouses as part of his ethical realism owes a great deal to Aristotle, and in particular to the view that there is a natural state of true happiness for humans.
- 19.
Virtuous citizens of the good polis or organization do seek the reward of virtue in this sense: for them, virtue and the reward are identical.
- 20.
Lewis (1989) brilliantly depicts an investment banking culture that encourages just such character.
- 21.
Suppose one is loyal to one’s organization but ruthless, in the sense I have been describing, with respect to others, particularly competitors; can that make one virtuous? To answer the question fully requires more argument than the available space permits, but the short answer is no. Solomon (1992) deals thoroughly with this issue.
- 22.
Robert Frank stated the point that way in correspondence.
- 23.
By this time Solomon and others who warn of game theory’s false presuppositions (see fn. 5, above) may feel they have been vindicated, since the solution I offer to the commons problem involves denying the crucial premise about rationally self-interested choice.
- 24.
Robert Frank (1988), following Thaler and others, has in effect made this point, though he does not explicitly mention the commons.
- 25.
I have claimed that an organization is a commons if and only if cooperation is in everyone’s interests and free riding is possible. Here I claim that the commons can be preserved only if the organization is a community, in the sense that people care about each other’s interests, have emotional ties, etc. But what about a small and simple organization in which management can detect free riding and stop it administratively? Must it be a community if the commons is to be preserved? Possibly not; but it is not the sort of organization to which the metaphor of the commons applies.
- 26.
Sen (1987; 45f.) makes this point, as Michael Rohr pointed out to me.
- 27.
In making this claim I reject the Humean idea, found also in the organizational literature, that reasonableness is only about the relationship between ends and means.
- 28.
Arguably we can reject ruthlessness for utilitarian reasons, since it permits only a few to succeed. But any commons-preserving value will pass muster on utilitarian grounds, and some seem highly unsatisfactory. For example, a highly stratified society in which the serfs are delighted to be serfs seems to us unjust and contrary to rights, but according to the local conception of justice and rights it might score well.
- 29.
Aristotle prefers to speak of virtues and dispositions rather than principles, but that difference is not crucial to our immediate point. It does, however, clearly fit with what I have said about emotion as well as second-order desires.
- 30.
If the sort of approach to business ethics I am suggesting turns out to be the best possible one, then there ought to be no more claims that business ethics is a field parasitic on “real” ethics.
One of the problematical features of the kind of conversation Rawls envisages is the way it imports impartiality into the mythical community. It is not obvious that people in that “original position” can make rational decisions about what they want before they know what values their life in that community will lead them to develop, hence what their best interests will be. Perhaps a way to identify good values would be to ask this question of the Rawlsian founders in the original position: If, not knowing etc., you could choose what your best interests would be, what would you choose?
- 31.
The moral realist Sturgeon (1988, 242) concedes that the correct definitions of moral terms will not be “analytic or conceptual truths [that] provide a privileged basis for the rest of our theory.” He believes the same is true of scientific definitions, and that scientific reasoning is dialectical as moral reasoning is.
- 32.
Harman’s “Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics” (1978) suggests a certain skepticism by its title. But even if morality is just politics, it does not follow that it is not important or that one can believe whatever one likes about it.
- 33.
If Aristotle were familiar with our society, he might consider management, as much as politics, essential to ethics.
- 34.
- 35.
Maitland (1989) is typical of libertarians who believe, as it must be clear I do not, that exit is not only necessary but sufficient protection for the rights of employees. That argument would be stronger if labor markets were what libertarians assume they are and managers cared more about corporate profits and therefore felt genuine pressure to compete rather than just satisfice. Even then, however, it would not take much account of moral considerations other than utilitarian ones.
- 36.
Some feminists say this would include many women. Think of Carol Gilligan’s (1982) title: In a Different Voice. Note that Gilligan is in effect arguing that an Aristotelian way of dealing with moral disputes is as legitimate as a Kantian way. That the former is a characteristically female way of talking about ethics I do not care to claim.
- 37.
This call for pluralism is an expression not of relativism but of confidence that moral progress is possible and that attending to a range of voices is one way to get it. What saves pluralism from degenerating into relativism is a process for negotiating moral claims made on the basis of competing conceptions of the good life. This sort of process is essential to anything that would claim moral or political legitimacy; hence it is a necessary feature of any moral community. Such a process will not end ideological disputes, but it may keep competition among ideas largely at the discursive level. Gauthier’s work is a contribution to the description of this process, which he acknowledges cannot guarantee a fair outcome where the contention is between unequals, for example management and employees. Note I do not claim to give a morally neutral description of the process: on the contrary, I am arguing from the standpoint of a view of human nature as being, among other things, reflective and capable of moral progress. (Mill’s famous phrase is “capable of being improved by rational discussion,” though he does not apply this to all humankind.)
- 38.
Maitland (1989), for example, seems to take this view.
- 39.
Loyalty is not an emotion; but since loyalty is seldom the result of a transaction based on mutual self-interest, we have reason to believe that where there is loyalty there are always emotions. Affection and a feeling of duty or honor, which often but not always overlap, are two of the common emotional supports of loyalty.
- 40.
This is one of those situations, crucial to certain religions, in which one’s good works are rewarded if and only if one does not perform them in order to receive the reward.
- 41.
See for example McCloskey (1994), who argues that in our era it is appropriate to have bourgeois virtues.
- 42.
Political conservatives sometimes talk about character as unitary in suggesting that, for example, a man who would lie to his wife about a sexual liaison would also lie to the country about economic policy. That is not necessarily the case.
- 43.
Supervenience is a law like relation such that one property supervenes on another property, which is usually called the base property, if and only if it is a law of nature that whatever has the base property has the supervenient property. In the case of so-called strong supervenience, which naturalism requires, the base properties necessitate the supervenient properties. (Thus Brink 1989, 160f.)
- 44.
- 45.
It is hardly surprising, then, that virtue ethicist characteristically take a fairly narrow view, relative to that of liberals, of what can count as a good life.
- 46.
See Nichomachean Ethics II 3 1104b5ff. This can be true only if one’s impulses and short-term desires are part of one’s character.
- 47.
See further Frank (1988), for whom the prevalence of reasonableness is an essential tenet. Note that Rawls’s definition presupposes that we know what it is to have reason to adopt some view.
- 48.
- 49.
It does not seem possible to have a value with no associated high-order desire. If I have no desire to be the sort of person who acts charitably, surely I do not value charity. If I wish I could be charitable but cannot always bring myself to act accordingly, I do at least value charity.
- 50.
- 51.
Solomon (1992, 168, 172–74) would agree, for the most part. McFall (1992) claims that moral autonomy is a necessary condition of integrity: there is no integrity in acting virtuously only because one has been told to do so. One must have a reason for doing so, and it must be one’s own reason—hence, I take it, consistent with one’s values.
- 52.
Solomon (1992, 134, 196) discusses this difficulty.
- 53.
Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) provide evidence that the best strategy in games like Prisoner’s Dilemma is tit for tat with a little slack. That is just the strategy that we would expect a reasonable person to adopt.
- 54.
MacIntyre is fond of saying that ethics is a branch of sociology. I suppose he would also say that business ethics is a branch of organization theory or economics. That far I do not care to go.
- 55.
Here I am indebted to Keeley (1995), even where we disagree.
- 56.
Keeley’s writings (1995, 1988) suggest considerable sympathy for libertarianism. He clearly does not want to use the notion of second-order desires to give an account of autonomy. Some libertarians will find the whole notion of higher-order desires questionable.
- 57.
But libertarians usually worry much more about the paternalism of the government than about that of managers, on the theory that if you don’t like your manager you can just get another job. It does not follow, surely, that managerial paternalism is morally excusable.
- 58.
If, as neoclassical economics characteristically assumes, people’s desires do not change, then transactional leadership is the only possible kind.
- 59.
One might question whether we are really talking about second-order desires here, but I don’t think it makes much difference if we talk about second-order principles.
- 60.
McMahon does not believe, as I do not, that any old commons-preserving consensus will be morally optimal. He believes that only a democratic organization will reliably create a good consensus.
- 61.
But McMahon suggests in passing (273f.) that leadership might be useful at this point. Klein (1995) offers a similar conception of leadership, which he finds in Aristotle, particularly in the Politics. Klein argues that leadership has the problem of finding the appropriate criteria for the sort of excellence that deserves to rule. The aristocrat, the plutocrat, and the democrat have their own criteria; which shall we choose? According to Klein, Aristotle argues that each faction considered collectively does well according to the other two factions’ criteria. So each faction can be told that on the basis of its criterion, the other two factions have a legitimate claim. All three factions will therefore have reason to try to balance—or perhaps to negotiate—their competing claims. In the terms that we have adopted from Rawls and McMahon, each faction reasonably allows some compromise set of criteria to preempt its own.
- 62.
See in particular this journal’s “Special Issue: Trust and Business: Barriers and Bridges” (vol. 16, nos. 1–3), with Koehn’s essay as its introduction.
- 63.
- 64.
I think Donaldson (2005) agrees with me on this point.
- 65.
On this issue I am indebted to Ciulla (2000, pp. 192f.) and Miller (1995, 226–8).
- 66.
The suggestion that work can be fulfilling or servile depending in part on the purpose seems lost on MacIntyre.
- 67.
See Ciulla (2000, pp. 88f., 92–96). In Marxian terminology there is a problem about alienation. It should not surprise us that MacIntyre has been influenced by Marx.
- 68.
Heugens et al. (2006) argue that it simply is not.
- 69.
See Jackson (2012, chapter 3), who argues that one will take that view only on the assumption that profit is the single purpose of the firm – a view that MacIntyre does seem to take. Profit may be a result of virtuosity, Jackson claims.
Bibliography
Anderson, E. 2017. Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives and Why We Don’t Talk About it. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Appiah, K.A. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W. W. Norton.
Aristotle. 1894. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Beadle, R., and K. Knight. 2012. Virtue and Meaningful Work. Business Ethics Quarterly 22: 433–450.
Bertland, A. 2009. Virtue Ethics in Business and the Capabilities Approach. Journal of Business Ethics 84: 25–32.
Burns, J. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper and Row.
Ciulla, J. 2000. Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work. New York: Three Rivers Press.
Ciulla, J. 2003. The Ethics of Leadership. Belmont: Wadsworth CENCAGE Learning.
Crossan, M., G. Seijts, and J. Gandz. 2015. Developing Leadership Character. New York: Routledge.
Donaldson, L. 2005. For Positive Management Theories While Retaining Science: Reply to Ghoshal. Academy of Management Learning and Education 4: 109–113.
Drake, M., and J. Schlachter. 2008. A Virtue-Ethics Analysis of Supply Chain Collaboration. Journal of Business Ethics 82: 851–864.
Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frank, R. 1988. Passion within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Greenleaf, R. 1970. The Servant as Leader. Westfield: Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership.
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
Hartman, E. 2013. Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hirschman, A. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Heugens, P., M. Kapstein, and J. Van Oosterhout. 2006. The Ethics of the Node versus the Ethics of the Dyad? Reconciling Virtue Ethics and Contractualism. Organization Studies 27: 391–411.
Jackson, K. 2012. Virtuosity in Business: Invisible Law Guiding the Invisible Hand. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Koehn, D. 1998. Virtue Ethics, the Firm, and Moral Psychology. Business Ethics Quarterly 8: 497–513.
MacIntyre, A. 1985. After Virtue. 2nd ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Miller, F. 1995. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moore, G. 2002. On the Implications of the Practice-Institution Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of Modern Virtue Ethics to Business. Business Ethics Quarterly 12: 19–32.
———. 2005a. Humanizing Business: A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach. Business Ethics Quarterly 15: 237–255.
———. 2005b. Corporate Character: Modern Virtue Ethics and the Virtuous Corporation. Business Ethics Quarterly 15: 659–685.
———. 2008. Re-imagining the Morality of Management. Business Ethics Quarterly 18: 483–511.
———. 2009. Virtue Ethics and Business Organizations. In Normative Theory and Business Ethics, ed. J. Smith, 35–59. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Northouse, P. 2019. Leadership: Theory and Practice. Los Angeles: Sage Publishing.
Ostrom, E., and T.K. Ahn. 2009. The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective Action. In Handbook of Social Capital: The Troika of Sociology, Political Science, and Economics, ed. G. Svendsen and G.L. Svendsen, 17–35. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Phillips, R., and J. Margolis. 1999. Toward an Ethics of Organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly 9: 619–638.
Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sommers, M.C. 1997. Useful Friendships: A Foundation for Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 16: 1453–1458.
Sundman, P. 2000. The Good Manager - A Moral Manager? Journal of Business Ethics 27: 247–254.
Bibliography for Section “The Commons and the Moral Organization”
Allaire, Yvan, and Mihaela E. Firsirotu. 1984. Theories of Organizational Culture. Organization Studies 5: 193–226.
Aristotle. 1894. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1957. Politica. Edited by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bowie, Norman E. 1991. Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm. Business Ethics Quarterly 1: 1–21.
Brink, David O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, John M. 1986. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Cox, Susan Jane Buck. 1985. No Tragedy on the Commons. Environmental Ethics 7: 49–61.
Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton. 1992. Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends. The Philosophical Review 101: 115–189.
Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Dworkin, Gerald. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Rev. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1985. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1989a. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1989b. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. New York: The Free Press.
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1982. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. In Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, 81–95. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fucini, Joseph J., and Suzy Fucini. 1990. Working for the Japanese: Inside Mazda’s American Auto Plant. New York: The Free Press.
Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Geertz, Clifford. 1983. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gordon, George G. 1991. Industry Determinants of Organizational Culture. The Academy of Management Review 16: 396–415.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
———. 1977. Exploring New Ethics for Survival. New York: Penguin Books.
Harman, Gilbert. 1978. Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics. Midwest Studies 3: 109–121.
Heller, Joseph. 1974. Something Happened. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Huxley, Aldous. 1932. Brave New World. New York: Harper and Row. (Perennial Library Edition, first published in 1969).
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. 1986. Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics. Journal of Business 59: S285–S300.
Kuhn, Thomas H. 1971. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewis, Michael. 1989. Liar’s Poker: Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Maitland, Ian. 1989. Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument. Journal of Business Ethics 8: 951–954.
Marcus, George E., and Michael M.J. Fischer. 1986. Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. Motivation and Personality. 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row.
Pastin, Mark. 1986. The Hard Problems of Management: Gaining the Ethics Edge. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Rapoport, Anatol, and Albert M. Chammah. 1965. Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ray, Carol Axtell. 1986. Corporate Culture: The Last Frontier of Control? Journal of Management Studies 23: 287–197.
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sathe, Vijay. 1985. Culture and Related Corporate Realities. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, ed. 1988. Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schein, Edgar H. 1985. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Schmidtz, David. 1991. The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument. Boulder: Westview Press.
Sen, Amartya K. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Solomon, Robert C. 1992. Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sturgeon, Nicholas L. 1988. Moral Explanations. In Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 229–255. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1977. What is Human Agency? In The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, ed. Theodore Mischel, 103–135. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.
Watson, Gary. 1982. Free Agency. In Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, 96–110. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weick, Karl E. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing. 2nd ed. New York: Random House.
Werhane, Patricia. 1992. Justice, Impartiality, and Reciprocity: A Response to Edwin Hartman. Unpublished.
Williams, Bernard. 1973. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wolfe, Alan. 1989. Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bibliography for Section “Character and Leadership”
Aristotle. 1894. Ethica Nicomachea. Edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1985. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Asch, Solomon E. 1955. Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One against a Unanimous Majority. Psychological Monographs 70 (9), Whole no. 416.
Brink, David O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Browne, M. Neil, and Laurie Blank. 1997. The Contrast Between Friendship and Business-Consumer Relationships: Trust is an Earned Attribute.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 16, 1, 2, 3, 155–170.
Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: Harper and Row.
Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Donaldson, Thomas J. 1994. When Integration Fails: The Logic of Prescription and Description in Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 157–169.
Dworkin, Gerald. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Rev. ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1985. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1981. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. In Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, 81–95. New York: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert. 1998. Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/~ghh/VirtueEthics.html
Keeley, Michael. 1995. The Trouble with Transformational Leadership: Toward a Federalist Ethic for Organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly 5: 67–96.
Klein, Sherwin. 1995. An Aristotelian Approach to Ethical Corporate Leadership. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 14 (3): 3–23.
Koehn, Daryl. 1997. Trust and Business: Barriers and Bridges. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 16, 1, 2, 3, 7–28.
Kupperman, Joel. 1991. Character. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewicki, Roy J., and Maura A. Stevenson. 1997. Trust Development in Negotiation: Proposed Actions and a Research Agenda. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 16, 1, 2, 3, 99–132.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After Virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Maitland, Ian. 1997. Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the Virtues. Business Ethics Quarterly 7: 17–31.
McCloskey, Donald. 1994. Bourgeois Virtue. The American Scholar 63: 177–191.
McFall, Lynn. 1992. Integrity. In Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. John Deigh, 79–94. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
McMahon, Christopher. 1994. Authority and democracy: A general theory of government and management. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Moberg, Dennis J. 1997. Trustworthiness and Conscientiousness as Managerial Virtues. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 16, 1, 2, 3, 171–194.
Phillips, R.A. 1997. Stakeholder Theory: A Principle of Fairness. Business Ethics Quarterly 7: 51–66.
Rawls, John. 1964. Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play. In Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York University Press.
———. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1985. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 223–251.
———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
———. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1991. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 1982. Contractualism and Utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya K. Sen and Bernard Williams, 103–128. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Solomon, Robert C. 1992. Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1994. The Corporation as Community: A Reply to Ed Hartman. Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 271–285.
Trevino, Linda Klebe, and Gary R. Weaver. 1994. Business ETHICS/BUSINESS Ethics: One Field or Two? Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 113–128.
Watson, Gary. 1982. Free Agency. In Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, 96–110. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weaver, Gary R., and Linda Klebe Trevino. 1994. Normative and Empirical Business Ethics: Separation, Marriage of Convenience, or Marriage of Necessity? Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 129–143.
Williams, Bernard. 1973. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1981. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hartman, E.M. (2020). Community and Commons. In: Arriving Where We Started. Issues in Business Ethics(), vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44089-3_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44089-3_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44088-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44089-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)