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Aid Allocation and Outcomes: What Role Do Political Motives Play?

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Lessons on Foreign Aid and Economic Development

Abstract

Foreign aid effectiveness has been a hugely explored topic in the economic development and political economy literature. In spite of disagreements in the literature with regard to aid effectiveness, it can be undisputedly argued that aid is an important source of capital for many recipient nations. Yet, this source of capital can be extremely volatile. Studies stress that donors value recipients’ historical, strategic, and geographical interests. An extensive strand of studies have explored donor motives for aid allocation and have found factors like political and economic motivations, political favoritism, and donors’ ideology to be playing crucial roles in such allocations. This chapter summarizes the growing literature on donor motives for aid allocation to recipient nations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, La Crosse, WI, USA

    Nabamita Dutta

  2. Mississippi State University, Mississippi, MS, USA

    Claudia R. Williamson

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  1. Nabamita Dutta
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Correspondence to Nabamita Dutta .

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  1. University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, La Crosse, WI, USA

    Nabamita Dutta

  2. Mississippi State University, Mississippi, MS, USA

    Claudia R. Williamson

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Dutta, N., Williamson, C.R. (2019). Aid Allocation and Outcomes: What Role Do Political Motives Play?. In: Dutta, N., Williamson, C.R. (eds) Lessons on Foreign Aid and Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22121-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22121-8_7

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