Abstract
This paper argues against a version of panpsychism that provides an interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appealing to phenomenal consciousness in order to address difficulties concerning measurements and observations. The challenge presented here is that phenomenal consciousness is neither necessary nor explanatory regarding issues in quantum mechanics. Rather, it is attention and access to information through epistemic constraints, such as rationality, that is necessary and explanatory. This suggests that if one takes mentality to be an essential ingredient in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, then mentality must be defined in terms of access, rather than phenomenal, consciousness.
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Notes
- 1.
For several important solutions to problems confronting panpsychism as an explanation of consciousness, including mapping and combination problems, a very useful volume is Brüntrup and Jaskolla (2017).
- 2.
See de Barros et al. (2017) for problems concerning the axioms of IIT with respect to contextuality.
- 3.
The closest analog of this formulation in interpretations of quantum mechanics is perhaps Stapp (2007).
- 4.
- 5.
Moreover, there are normative reasons for this dissociation. Attention, as mentioned, is best explained in terms of epistemic normativity and rationality, of the kind we expect in scientific measurements, but phenomenal consciousness is related to moral status and moral value (Montemayor and Haladjian 2015). Even in terms of brain anatomy, rational choices are linguistically framed and may require the frontal cortex and the attention areas, but it is quite controversial that phenomenal consciousness necessitates these areas.
- 6.
See Seager (2017) and Mørch (2014) for solutions to emergentist problems concerning this type of view. See Papineau (2001) for criticisms of any type of emergentism. See also Montemayor (2017) for reasons in favor of a purely physicalist interpretation of monism, based on considerations about information.
- 7.
This problem also affects panprotopsychism as well, which is a view that weakens the metaphysical commitments of traditional panpsychism, because it doesn’t take consciousness per se to be fundamental, but some other precursor to consciousness instead.
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Montemayor, C. (2019). Panpsychism and Quantum Mechanics: Explanatory Challenges. In: de Barros, J.A., Montemayor, C. (eds) Quanta and Mind. Synthese Library, vol 414. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21908-6_13
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