Abstract
Philosophers and theologians commonly define a lie as any intentionally deceptive, “stated” message, so in order to answer the delusively simple question posed in our title, the notion of intentionality in animals must be considered, as well as what is meant, in this context, by a statement. The best way to tackle problems such as these is not in the abstract, but by considering actual examples of animal behavior.
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© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Sebeok, T.A. (1986). Can Animals Lie?. In: I Think I Am a Verb. Topics in Contemporary Semiotics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3490-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3490-1_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4899-3492-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4899-3490-1
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