Skip to main content

What Is Remarkable in Psychology?

  • Chapter
Annals of Theoretical Psychology

Abstract

In psychology—as well as in any other scientific or nonscientific context—the remarkability of a sentence, S, is a direct function of the degree to which members of the language community in question, L, would be inclined to interpret S in the direction of a proposition, P, with which a maximal amount of L-members would most assuredly disagree; whereas the P-proponents, to everyone else’s stupefaction, were actually able to demonstrate convincingly that P (as formulated by S) should indeed be considered tenable in view of (now) available but hitherto astoundingly unexpected evidence, or through some scintillating piece of profound, ingenious ratiocination. The prototypal example of a remarkable proposition is Einstein’s conjecture that a ray of light coming from a star and passing near the sun would be deflected through an angle of about 1.75 seconds of arc, which would in fact render such stars visible as are actually (seen from the Earth) located “behind” the sun. The conjecture was tested during the solar eclipse of May, 1919, and the results appeared in good accord with Einstein’s prediction.

When an exploded philosophy dies it goes to psychology where it is resurrected and presented as the latest of insights.1

With apologies to C. D. Broad

The universe is not in accord with common sense ideas.2

Carl Sagan

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Dubinsky, D. The impossibility of formal knowledge. Methodology and Science, 1980, 23(1), 28–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferris, T. The red shift. New York: Bantam, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gullvåg, I. Reféranse, mening og eksistens. Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1967.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sagan, C. Cosmos. New York: Random House, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandage, A. R. The red shift, Cosmology + 1 (Readings from Scientific American.) San Francisco: Freeman, 1977, pp. 4–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. Note on the confusion of evidence and illustration. The Journal of Philosophy, 1959, 56(18), 733–736.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. Ordinary language in memoriam. Inquiry, 1965, 8, 225–249.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. On knowing what one knows not. In J. R. Royce & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.), The psychology of knowing. New York, Paris, London: Gordon & Breach, 1972, pp. 111–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. Scientists in vain wants of world views. Methodology of Science, 1976, 9, 120–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. Quandaries of quotidianism. Methodology and Science, 1978, 11 (2), 114–123.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennessen, H. Problems of knowledge. Assen, Holland: van Gorcum, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1984 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tennessen, H. (1984). What Is Remarkable in Psychology?. In: Royce, J.R., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_22

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9191-4_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4757-9193-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-9191-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics