Abstract
The contemporary morass of facts and theories has resulted in a state of intellectual paralysis in the discipline of psychology. In short, we need a pragmatic basis for dealing with theoretical pluralism. Because extant theories are refuted by better theories rather than by direct refutation I end up with the paradoxical conclusion that the best way to deal with theoretical pluralism is to produce more theory—but with the qualification that the new theory be more theoretically powerful than its predecessors and/or its competitors. The paper concludes with an elaboration of the role of dialectic analysis in the evaluation of complementary and competitive theories.
The primary purpose of this paper is the modest one of bringing the problem of theoretical pluralism to the attention of fellow psychologists in the hope that this will lead to further metatheoretic anaylsis. The issues this problem entails are complex, and their eventual resolution will require extended and penetrating critical analysis.
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Royce, J.R. (1985). The Problem of Theoretical Pluralism in Psychology. In: Madsen, K.B., Mos, L.P. (eds) Annals of Theoretical Psychology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2487-4_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2487-4_20
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