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On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge

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Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 20))

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Abstract

An event is said to be common belief (CB) if every individual in the group believes it, believes that every individual in the group believes it, and so on ad infinitum. Following an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of common knowledge (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. G.R.E.Q.E., Ecoles des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Marseille, France

    Luc Lismont

  2. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France

    Philippe Mongin

  3. C.O.R.E., Université Catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Philippe Mongin

Authors
  1. Luc Lismont
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  2. Philippe Mongin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oxford, USA

    Michael Bacharach (Professor of Economics and Director of the Bounded Rationality in Economic Behaviour) (Professor of Economics and Director of the Bounded Rationality in Economic Behaviour)

  2. Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales, Marseille, France

    Louis-André Gérard-Varet (Directeur d’Etudes) (Directeur d’Etudes)

  3. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, THEMA, France

    Philippe Mongin (Research Professor) (Research Professor)

  4. Oxford University and Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, USA

    Hyun Song Shin (University Lecturer in Economics, Professor of Economics) (University Lecturer in Economics, Professor of Economics)

  5. University of Southampton and Fellow of University College, Oxford, USA

    Hyun Song Shin (University Lecturer in Economics, Professor of Economics) (University Lecturer in Economics, Professor of Economics)

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© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Lismont, L., Mongin, P. (1997). On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge. In: Bacharach, M., Gérard-Varet, LA., Mongin, P., Shin, H.S. (eds) Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Theory and Decision Library, vol 20. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-4804-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-1139-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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