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Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

    D. Samet

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  1. D. Samet
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Samet, D. Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures. Int J Game Theory 21, 213–218 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245462

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245462

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