Abstract
This paper provides a brief historical perspective on the use of cooperative solution concepts in the theory of differential and dynamic games. The paper surveys the publications that appeared in control journals, likeAutomaticatheJournal of Optimization and Applications (JOTA), theSIAM Journal on Control and OptimizationtheIEEE Transactions on Automatic Controland the proceedings of the successive Differential Games Symposia, during a period that spans from the origin of differential game theory, in the early 1960s, until 1990. The survey concentrates on solution concepts that imply Pareto optimality with respect to the reward criteria of the different players. The survey does not include the topic of team theory.
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Haurie, A. (2001). A Historical Perspective on Cooperative Differential Games. In: Altman, E., Pourtallier, O. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 6. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0155-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0155-7_2
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