Abstract
There are many interesting situations which can be described by anN-person general-sum differential game. Such games are characterized by the fact that the strategy of each player depends upon reasonable assumptions about the strategies of the remaining players; and, thus, these games cannot be considered asN uncoupled optimal control problems. In such cases, we say that the game is not strictly competitive, but involves a mutual interest which makes it possible for all of the players to reduce their costs by cooperating with one another, provided the resulting agreement can be enforced. When cooperation is allowed and there are more than two players, there is always the question of whether all possible subcoalitions will be formed with equal ease. This work considers the situation in which a particular subcoalition is preferred. A theory of general-sum games with preferred coalitions is presented, together with constructive examples of alternative approaches which are unsatisfactory.
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References
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Communicated by C. T. Leondes
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Logan, H.L. Preferred coalitions in cooperative differential games. J Optim Theory Appl 13, 186–202 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935539
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935539