Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

  • Mark Hallerberg
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 16)


Many studies consider the veto players in government and move directly to discussions of policy choice and policy change. Institutions in such studies are relevant only to the extent that they determine whether a given player is truly a veto player, and they are exogenously determined. In this chapter, I begin with a review of this research and of the veto player agenda more generally. The review indicates that veto player analysis is a powerful tool in a variety of institutional settings. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that veto players affect the institutions that are chosen to structure decision making. Moreover, the effectiveness of those institutions depends on the ideological distance among veto players. Institutions put in place under a government with low ideological distance may not function well if the ideological distance increases under the next government. This chapter gives examples from the making of fiscal policy, but the concepts are applicable to other policy areas as well.


Central Bank Veto Player Central Bank Independence Parliamentary System Parliamentary Democracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hertie School of GovernanceBerlinGermany

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