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Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction

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Reform Processes and Policy Change

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 16))

Abstract

Some months ago I had the honor to be invited to Mannheim for a conference organized by Thomas Koenig and Marc Debus. The subject matter was “Reform Processes and Policy Change,” and the organizers thought that my book Veto Players would be a good starting point for their study. I thought that the conference was an excellent idea, particularly since the reputation of Mannheim on policy studies is outstanding. Little did I know that this would be only a first step, because they now have received an interdisciplinary multimillion grant from the German Government (SFB 884) to “Political Economy of Reforms”

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I will omit here a discussion of constitutional courts as vps (see Tsebelis 2002).

  2. 2.

    Actually the situation is slightly more complicated because for some laws the Bundesrat does not have veto power, which will mean that for these laws, the only veto players are the Social Democrats and the Greens, while in the most significant legislation, the agreement of the Bundesrat is required.

  3. 3.

    For the details of analyzing institutions that decide by qualified majority, see Tsebelis (2002).

References

  1. Döring H (1995) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. St. Martin’s Press, New York

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  2. Krehbiel K, Rivers D (1990) Sophisticated voting in congress: a reconsideration. J Polit 52:548–78

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  3. Tsebelis G (2002) Veto players: how politcal institutions work. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

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Correspondence to George Tsebelis .

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Tsebelis, G. (2011). Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction. In: König, T., Debus, M., Tsebelis, G. (eds) Reform Processes and Policy Change. Studies in Public Choice, vol 16. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_1

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