Abstract
Three values for non-transferable utility games — the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler—Owen consistent NTU-value — are compared in a simple example.
Dedicated to Guillermo Owen on his sixty-fifth birthday. Research partially supported by a grant of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. The author thanks Robert J. Aumann and Andreu Mas-Colell for their comments.
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Hart, S. (2004). A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_4
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