Abstract
A value forn-person games without side payments is given which coincides with theShapley value for games with side payments, and with theNash value for two-person games.
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Owen, G. Values of games without side payments. Int J Game Theory 1, 95–109 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753436
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753436